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A Study of the Austro- Prussian Conflict in the Light. 
of the American Civil War. 



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ARTHUR \J. OJAQNBR. 



First Lieut. 6th U. S Infantry, 



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Assistant Instructor in the Art of War, at the U. S. Infantry and 
- '■> Cavalry School, Fort Leavenioorth, Kansas. 



FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 
1889. 




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PREFACE 



The greater part of the subject-matter of this volume 
was originally given as a lecture to the officers at the U. 
S. Infantry and Cavalry School. The kindly reception 
accorded to the lecture has encouraged me to revise and 
amplify it, and to publish it in its present form. 

As to the narrative portion of the book, no other 
claim is made than that it is based upon the story of the 
campaign as given in the Prussian Official History of the 
Campaign of 1866, Hozier's "Seven Weeks' War," Derre- 
cagaix's ''La Guerre Moderne," and Adams' "Great Cam- 
paigns in Europe." I have not deemed it necessary to 
cumber the pages with notes of reference, but will here 
express my indebtedness to the works mentioned, giving 
precedence to them in the order named. Other works 
have been consulted, which are enumerated in the biblio- 
graphical note at the end of the volume. I have also 
personally visited the scene of the operations described, 
and, especially in regard to the topography of the battle 
field of Koniggratz, I am able to speak from my own ob- 
servation. 

My object has been: i. To give a brief, but accurate, 
historical sketch of a great campaign, to which but little 
attention has been given in this country. 2. To make a 
comparison of some of the military features of the War of 
Secession with corresponding features of the European 
war which occurred one year later. 

European critics have generally been loth to acknowl- 
edge the military excellence displayed during the War of 
Secession; and, even when giving full credit for the valor 
exhibited by our soldiers, have too often regarded our 
veteran armies as mere "armed mobs." Chesney, Adams, 
Trench and Maude have recognized the value of the les- 



4 
sons taught by the American armies, and Lord Wolseley 
has recently developed an appreciation of such American 
generalship and soldierly worth as he can see through 
Confederate spectacles. But European military writers 
generally, and those of the Continent especially, still 
fail to recognize in the developments of our war the 
germ, if not the prototype, of military features which 
are regarded as new in Europe. The remarks of Colonel 
Chesney still hold true: "There is a disposition to regard 
the American generals, and the troops they led, as alto- 
gether inferior to regular soldiers. This prejudice was 
born out of the blunders and want of coherence exhibited 
by undisciplined volunteers at the outset — faults amply 
atoned for by the stubborn courage displayed by both 
sides throughout the rest of the struggle; while, if a man's 
claims to be regarded as a veteran are to be measured by 
the amount of actual fighting he has gone through, the 
most seasoned soldiers of Europe are but as conscripts 
compared with the survivors of that conflict. The condi- 
tions of war on a grand scale were illustrated to the full 
as much in the contest in America, as in those more re- 
cently waged on the Continent." 

But it is not only among European critics that the 
military excellence displayed by our armies has been de- 
preciated. There is a small class among the professional 
soldiers in our own country, who are wont to bestow all 
possible admiration upon the military operations in recent 
European wars, not because they were excellent, but be- 
cause they were European; and to belittle the operations 
in our own war, not because they were not excellent, but 
because they were American. To this small class, whose 
humility in regard to our national achievements is rarely 
combined with individual modesty, this book is not ad- 
dressed. It is to the true American soldier that this little 
volume is offered, with the hope that the views expressed 
may meet with his approval and be sanctioned by his 
judgment. 

A. L. W. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF KONIGGRATZ. 



THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING NATIONS. 

The German war of 1866, generally known as "the 
Seven Weeks' War," presents many features of interest to 
the student, the statesman and the soldier. It closed a 
strife of centuries between opposing nations and antago- 
nistic political ideas. It resulted in the formation of the 
North German Confederation, and thus planted the seeds 
of a nation, which germinated four years later, during the 
bloody war with France. It banished Austria from all 
participation in the affairs of Germany, expelled her from 
Italy, and deflected her policy thenceforth towards the 
east and south. It demonstrated that preparation for war 
is a more potent factor than mere numbers in computing 
the strength of a nation; and it gave an illustration on a 
grand scale of the new conditions of war resulting from 
the use of the telegraph, the railroad and breech-loading 
firearms. 

It is not the intention here to consider any but the 
military features of the great Germanic contest. Begin- 
ning the subject at the period when the quarrel between 
Austria and Prussia over the provinces that they had 
wrested from Denmark, passed from the tortuous paths 
of diplomacy to the direct road of war, we will consider 
the relative strength of the combatant nations. 

As the advocate of the admission of Schleswig-Hol- 
stein as a sovereign state in the Germanic Confederation, 
Austria gained first the sympathy, and then the active 
alliance, of Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, 
Wiirtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau. Prus- 
sia aimed at the incorporation of the duchies within her 



own territory; and, though loudly championing the cause 
of German unity, her course was so manifestly inspired by 
designs for her own aggrandizement, that she could count 
on the support of only a few petty duchies, whose aggre- 
gate military strength did not exceed 28,000 men. As an 
offset to Austria's formidable German allies, Prussia had 
concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Italy, 
whose army, though new and inferior in organization, 
armament and equipment, to that of her antagonist, might 
be relied upon to "contain" at least three Austrian army 
corps in Venetia. The main struggle was certain to be 
between the two great Germanic nations. 

At a first glance Prussia would seem to be almost 
hopelessly overmatched in her contest with Austria. The 
latter nation possessed an area more than twice as great 
as the former, and in contrast with the Prussian popula- 
tion of less than 20,000,000, it could show an aggregate of 
35,000,000 people. But a more careful examination dis- 
closes the great superiority of the Prussian kingdom. The 
population of Prussia was almost exclusively German; 
that of Austria was a heterogeneous aggregation of Ger- 
mans, Czechs, Magyars, Poles, Croats and Italians, bound 
together in a purely artificial nationality. The Austrian 
national debt amounted to nearly ^1,550,000,000; the an- 
nual expenditures so far exceeded the revenue as to cause 
a yearly deficit of more than ^16,000,000, and the nation 
was threatened with bankruptcy. On the other hand, the 
Prussian national debt was only $210,000,000, the revenue 
exceeded the expenditures, and the finances were in a 
healthy condition. But the great superiority of the north- 
ern kingdom over its opponent lay in the organization, 
armament, equipment diwd personnel of its army. 

The old adage, "Experience is a severe, but good, 
schoolmaster," is true of nations as well as individuals. 
A crushing disaster, bringing with it humiliation, sorrow 
and disgrace, is often the birth of a stronger, better, life in 



the apparent victim of misfortune. The greatness of 
Prussia was not born in the brilliant victories of Rossbach, 
Leuthen and Zorndorf. It was in the bitter travail of 
Jena and the treaty of Tilsit that birth was given to the 
power of the kingdom. Forbidden by Napoleon to main- 
tain an army of more than 42,000 men, the great Prussian 
war minister, Scharnhorst, determined to create an army 
while obeying the commands of the conqueror. There 
was no stipulation in the treaty as to the length of service 
of the soldiers; and after a few months of careful instruc- 
tion and almost incessant drill, they were quietly dis- 
charged, and their places were taken by recruits, who 
were soon replaced in the same manner. Thus the little 
army became, as it were, a lake of military training, into 
which flowed a continuous stream of recruits, and from 
which there came a steady current of efficient soldiers. 
When the army of Napoleon returned from its disastrous 
campaign in Russia, there arose, as by magic, a formida- 
ble Prussian army, of which nearly 100,000 men were 
trained warriors. 

The success of the Prussian arms in the final struggle 
with Napoleon was so manifestly due to the measures 
adopted by Scharnhorst, that his system was made the 
permanent basis of the national military policy. The "Re- 
organization of 1859" nearly doubled the standing army, 
and made some important changes in the length of ser- 
vice required with the colors and in the Landwehr; but 
the essential features of the Prussian system are the same 
now as in the days of Leipsic and Waterloo. 

Every Prussian twenty years of age is subject to mil- 
itar\' duty. The term of service is twelve years, of which 
three are with the colors, four with the reserve and five in 
the Landwehr. The number of soldiers in the active 
army is definitely fixed at a little more than one per cent 
of the population, and the number of recruits annually re- 
quired is regulated by the number of men necessary to 



keep the regular force on its authorized peace footing. A 
list of the young men available for military service is an- 
nually made out, and the selection of recruits is made by 
lot. There are but few exceptions; such, for instance, as 
young men who are the sole support of indigent parents. 
Students who are preparing for the learned professions 
are permitted to serve as "one-year volunteers," on con- 
dition of passing certain examinations satisfactorily, and 
furnishing their own clothing and equipments. The name 
of a man convicted of crime is never placed on the list of 
available recruits; and however humble the position of a 
private soldier may be, his uniform is the honorable badge 
of an honest man. Every young man may be called up 
for draft three years in succession. Those who are not 
drawn for service at the end of the third year are passed 
into the Ersatz reserve, in which are also men whose 
physical imperfections are not sufficient to exempt them 
entirely, where they are free from service in time of peace, 
but from which they may be called in time of war to re- 
place drafts from the reserve. In time of peace the mili- 
tary demands upon the soldiers of the reserve or Landwehr 
are very light. A soldier participates in at least two field 
maneuvers, aggregating about sixteen weeks, during his 
four years of service in the reserve. He is also required 
to attend muster once every spring and autumn. During 
his five years in the Landwehr he is generally called out 
twice for drill, the drill period not exceeding fourteen 
days. 

The active army is the regular army, or permanent 
establishment. When the decree for the mobilization of 
the army is promulgated, this force is at once put upon 
its war footing by drafts from the reserve. The depots 
are immediately formed, and one-half of the troops sta- 
tioned therein are drawn from the reserve; the other half 
being recruits from the Ersatz reserve. As these two 
classes become exhausted, the depot battalions are filled 



from the Landwehr, the youngest classes being taken first; 
or, if needs be, the entire Landwehr is called out in battal- 
ions, regiments, brigades, divisions, or even army corps, 
and sent into the field. After exhausting the Landwehr, 
there still remains the Landsturm, which embraces all 
able-bodied men between the ages of seventeen and forty- 
nine years who do not belong to the active army, the re- 
serve, or the Landwehr. Though the calling out of the 
Landsturm would imply the exhaustion of the organized 
forces of the nation, it would be more than a mere levy 
en masse, as it would bring back into the army many sol- 
diers whose twelve years of service would not have been 
completely forgotten in the midst of civil vocations. 

The machinery for the rapid mobilization of the army 
is kept in perfect order. Each army corps, except the 
Guards, is assigned to a particular province. The prov- 
ince is divided into divisional districts, which are again 
subdivided so that each brigade, regiment and battalion 
has its own district, from which it draws its recruits both 
in peace and war. A register is kept of every man avail- 
able for military duty, and in time of peace every officer 
knows just what part he is to perform the minute mobili- 
zation is decreed, and each soldier knows where he is to 
report for duty. The secret of the efficiency of the Ger- 
man military system lies in the division of responsibility, 
and the thorough decentralization, by which every man, 
from the monarch to the private soldier, has his own es- 
pecial part to perform. 

In 1866 the active army, on a war footing, comprised 
nine army corps, and aggregated 335,000 men. Each 
corps consisted of twenty-four battalions of infantry, six- 
teen batteries of artillery, twenty-four squadrons of cav- 
alry, one battalion of rifles, one battalion of engineers, an 
engineer train, and a military train conveying ammunition 
and subsistence, quartermaster's and hospital supplies. 
Each infantry battalion numbered 1,000 men. Three bat- 



10 

talions formed a regiment, two regiments a brigade, and 
two brigades a division. Each battery contained six guns. 
Four batteries were assigned to each infantry division, two 
batteries of horse artillery were attached to the cavalry 
division, and four batteries of field and two of horse artil- 
lery constituted the reserve artillery of each corps. Each 
squadron of cavalry numbered about 140 sabres. Four 
squadrons composed a regiment, two regiments a brigade, 
two brigades a division. A regiment of cavalry was at- 
tached to each infantry division. Each corps numbered 
about 31,000 combatants, except the Guards, which num- 
bered 36,000 — having four additional battalions and eight 
additional squadrons. During the campaign under con- 
sideration, the cavalry of an army corps consisted of only 
one regiment to each division of infantry; the cavalry di- 
vision being taken from each corps, and merged into the 
corps of reserve cavalry. 

The depot troops consisted of a battalion for each 
regiment of infantry, a squadron for each regiment of 
cavalry, an abtheihmg [^■^ or 4 batteries] for the artillery of 
each corps, and a company for each rifle battalion, engi- 
neer battalion and train battalion. The army in the field 
was constantly kept up to a full war strength by men 
drawn from the depots. The fortresses were garrisoned 
by Landwehr; and on troops of the same class devolved 
the duty of pushing forward to occupy invaded territory, 
and to relieve the active army from the necessity of leav- 
ing detachments to guard its communications. 

This is a brief outline of the organization that enabled 
a nation of less than 20,000,000 people eventually to bring 
600,000 soldiers upon the theatre of war, and to place a 
quarter of a million of them upon the decisive field of 
Koniggratz. 

The Austrian regular army, when placed upon its war 
footing, numbered about 384,000 men; and by calling out 



II 

all of the reserve, this force could be raised to a formida- 
ble total of 700,000. But in organization and system of 
recruitment the Austrian army was inferior to its antago- 
nist, notwithstanding its war experience in 1849 ^^^ ^^ 
the struggle with France and Italy ten years later. The 
superb system by which Prussia was enabled to send forth 
a steady stream of trained soldiers to replace the losses of 
battle was wanting in Austria; and the machinery of mili- 
tary administration seemed deranged by the effort required 
to place the first gigantic armies in the field. The differ- 
ence between the two military systems is shown in a strik- 
ing manner by the fact that the mobilization of the Prus- 
sian army of 490,000 men, decreed early in May, was 
completed in fourteen days, and by the 5th of June 325,000 
were massed on the hostile frontiers; while the mobiliza- 
tion of the Austrian army, begun ten weeks earlier than 
that of Prussia, was far from complete on that date. 

Nor was the superiority of the Prussian to the Aus- 
trian army, as a collective body, greater than the individ- 
ual superiority of the Prussian soldier to his antagonist. 
As a result of the admirable Prussian school system, every 
Prussian soldier was an educated, man. Baron Stoffel, the 
French military attache -aS. Berlin from 1866 to 1870, says: 
" 'When,' said the Prussian officers, 'our men came in con- 
tact with the Austrian prisoners, and on speaking to them 
found that they hardly knew their right hand from their 
left, there was not one who did not look upon himself as 
a god in comparison with such ignorant beings, and this 
conviction increased our strength tenfold.' " 

The Prussian army was the first that ever took the 
field armed entirely with breech-loading firearms. In the 
War of Secession a portion of the Federal troops were, 
towards the end of the struggle, armed with breech-loading 
rifles; but now the entire Prussian army marched forth 
with breech-loaders, to battle against an army which still 
retained the muzzle-loading rifle. Great as was the supe- 



12 

riority of the needle gun over the Austrian musket, it 
would seem but a sorry weapon at the present day. The 
breech mechanism was clumsy, the cartridge case was 
made of paper, the accuracy of the rifle did not extend 
beyond 300 yards, and its extreme range was scarcely 
more than twice that distance. Yet this rifle was the best 
infantry weapon of the time, and it contributed greatly to 
the success of the Prussians. The Prussian artillery was 
armed mainly with steel breech-loading rifled guns. These 
guns were classed as 6-pounders and 4-pounders, though 
the larger piece fired a shell weighing 15 lbs., and the 
smaller one used a similar projectile weighing 9 lbs.* Shell 
fire seems to have been exclusively used, and the shells to 
have been uniformly provided with percussion fuses. 

In the Austrian army the artillery was provided with 
bronze muzzle-loading rifled guns, classified as 8-pdrs. and 
4-pdrs. The infantry was armed with the muzzle-loading 
Lorenz rifle. 

The German allies of Austria could place about 
150,000 men in the field; Italy, about 200,000. 

THE GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION. 

The geographical situation was unfavorable to Prus- 
sia. The map of Germany, as it existed before the Austro- 
Prussian war, shows Rhineland and Westphalia completely 
separated from the other provinces of Prussia by the hos- 
tile territory of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, which, extend- 
ing from the north, joined the South German Stateswhich 
were in arms against the northern kingdom. The Austrian 
province of Bohemia, with the adjacent kingdom of Sax- 
ony, formed a salient, pushing forward, as it were, into the 
Prussian dominions, and furnishing a base from which 
either Silesia or Lusatia might be invaded. In the lan- 



*These guns were classed, not according to the weight of the projectile, but 
according to the diameter of the bore. Thus the gun firing a 15-lb. shell was rated 
as a 6 pdr., because the diameter of its bore was the same as that of a 6-pdr. 
smooth-bore gun. 



13 

guage of the Prussian Staff History of the Campaign of 
1866: "In one direction stood the Saxon army as a pow- 
erful advanced guard only six or seven marches distant 
from the Prussian capital, which is protected from the 
south by no considerable vantage ground; in the other 
Breslau could the more easily be reached in five marches, 
because, trusting to a former federal compact with Austria, 
Schweidnitz had been given up as a fortress." The forces 
of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, numbering 25,000 men, could 
operate against the communications of the Prussian armies, 
or withdraw to the south and unite with the Austrians or 
^Bavarians. The South German armies might form a junc- 
tion in Saxony or Bohemia with the Austro-Saxon army. 

THE PLANS OF VON MOLTKE AND VON BENEDEK, AND THE 
DISPOSITIONS OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES. 

The Prussian army was commanded by the King. 
His chief-of-sta£f was Baron Hellmuth Von Moltke, a sol- 
dier of reputation in Prussia, but as yet almost unknown 
beyond the boundaries of his own country. 

The object of Von Moltke was to protect the Prussian 
rear by defeating the Hanoverian and Hessian troops; to 
prevent a junction of these troops with their South Ger- 
man allies; to "contain" the latter with as small a force as 
possible, and to hurl the crushing weight of the Prussian 
forces upon the Austro-Saxon army. 

On the 14th of June the Prussian armies were sta- 
tioned as follows: 

The "Army of the Elbe," consisting of three divisions, 
two cavalry brigades and 144 guns, in cantonments round 
Torgau, under command of General Herwarth Von Bitten- 
feld; 

The "First Army," consisting of three army corps, a 
cavalry corps of six brigades, and 300 guns, near Gorlitz, 
under command of Prince Frederick Charles; 



14 

The "Second Army," consisting of four army corps, a 
cavalry division of three brigades, and 336 guns, in the 
vicinity of Neisse, under command of the Crown Prince. 

Besides the three main armies, there were other forces 
stationed as follows: 

One division at Altona, in Holstein, under Von Man- 
teuffel; 

One division at Minden, under Vogel Von Falcken- 
stein; 

One division (made up principally of the Prussian 
garrisons withdrawn- from the Federal fortresses of May- 
ence, Rastadt and Frankfort) at Wetzlar, under Von 
Beyer. 

The Austrian "Army of the North" was posted as fol- 
lows: 

1st Corps, at Prague, Teplitz, Theresienstadt and Jo- 
sephstadt; 

Ilnd Corps, near Bomisch Triibau; 

IVth Corps, near Teschen; 

Vlth Corps, at Olmiitz; 

Illd Corps, at Briinn; 

Xth Corps at Briinn-; 

Vlllth Corps, in the neighborhood of Austerlitz. 

To these corps were attached five divisions of cavalry 
and more than 750 guns. 

This army was under command of Field Marshal Von 
Benedek, an officer of great experience and high reputa- 
tion. 

The Saxon army, 25,000 strong, with fifty-eight guns, 
was at Dresden, under command of the Crown Prince of 
Saxony. 

The Bavarian army was concentrating on the line of 
the Main between Amberg and Wiirzburg. It numbered 



15 

52,000 men, and was under command of Prince Charles of 
Bavaria. 

The Vlllth Federal Corps was forming at Frankfort. 
It consisted of the contingents of Wiirtemberg, Baden, 
Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau, and an Austrian division 
drawn from the Federal fortresses. It numbered about 
42,000 men, and was under the command of Prince Alex- 
ander of Hesse. 

The Vth, Vllth and IXth Austrian corps, under the 
Archduke Albrecht, were in Venetia, opposed to an Ital- 
ian army of four corps. 

Von Benedek expected to assume the offensive and 
invade Prussia. He had announced this intention before 
the beginning of hostilities, even going so far as to pre- 
scribe rules for the behavior of his soldiers while in the 
enemy's country. It is hard to understand (in the light 
of subsequent events) the slight esteem in which the Aus- 
trians held their opponents before the commencement of 
hostilities. In a general order issued to his army on June 
17, 1866, the Austrian commander says: "We are now 
faced by inimical forces, composed partly of troops of the 
line and partly of Landwehr. The first comprises young 
men not accustomed to privations and fatigue, and who 
have never yet made an important campaign; the latter is 
composed of doubtful and dissatisfied elements, which, 
rather than fight against us, would prefer the downfall of 
their government. In consequence of a long course of 
years of peace, the enemy does not possess a single gen- 
eral who has had an opportunity of learning his duties on 
the field of battle." 

Von Benedek's unfavorable opinion of his adversaries 
was probably shared by many other prominent European 
soldiers; for the excellence of the military system of Prus- 
sia was, as yet, not appreciated by other nations. Absurd 
as Von Benedek's order now appears, it seems to have 
excited no unfavorable comment at the time of its appear- 



ance; and, in fact, the expectation of Austrian success was 
quite general in Europe. 

On the 15th of June the Austrian outposts were noti- 
fied of the intention of the Prussians to begin hostilities, 
and war was formally declared against Hanover, Hesse- 
Cassel and Saxony. Within twenty-four hours after the 
declaration of war, the invasion of each of these minor 
states was begun. 

OPERATIONS AGAINST THE HESSIANS AND HANOVERIANS.* 

Von Falckenstein from Minden, and Von Manteuffel 
from Altona, moved upon Hanover, and Von Beyer in- 
vaded Hesse-Cassel from Wetzlar. On the night of the 
1 5th the Hanoverian army, accompanied by the blind mon- 
arch. King George, retreated, chiefly by rail, to Gottingen; 
the retreat being conducted in such haste that even the re- 
serve ammunition and hospital supplies were left behind. 
On the 17th Von Falckenstein entered the Hanoverian 
capital; on the 19th Von Manteuffel marched into the city; 
and by the 22d all Hanover, except Gottingen, was in the 
possession of the Prussians. 

Von Beyer pushed into Hesse-Cassel, the Hessian 
army retiring before him, by way of Fulda, upon Hanau, 
where it formed a junction with the Federal forces. On 
the 19th the Prussians entered Cassel, and an army was 
thus placed across the path of the retreating Hanoverians. 

The Hanoverian army, which had been compelled to 
wait several days at Gottingen to complete its organiza- 
tion, resumed its march on the 21st, intending to cross a 
portion of the Prussian territory via Heiligenstadt and 
Langensalza, and thence through Eisenach or Gotha, to 
form a junction with the Bavarians in the neighborhood 
of Fulda. Von Falckenstein pursued from Hanover, de- 
tachments were sent from Magdeburg and Erfurt to Blei- 
cherode and Eisenach, and Von Beyer occupied the line 



*See frontispiece map. 



I? 

of the Werra between AUendorf and Eisenach. Though 
the route through Eisenach was thus blocked, energetic 
measures on the part of the allies might easily have extri- 
cated the Hanoverian army from the constricting grasp 
of the Prussians. Gotha was occupied by a weak force 
of six battalions, two squadrons and three batteries, while 
the retreating army numbered 20,500 men. Had the Ba- 
varian army been well prepared and ably led, a junction 
might have been formed with the Hanoverians, and the 
Prussian force at Gotha captured. But the Bavarian com- 
mander was inefficient, and the over-estimate placed by 
King George upon the number of his enemies at Gotha 
was strengthened by the receipt, from the commander of 
the petty force, of an audacious summons to surrender. 
Negotiations were entered upon by the Prussian and Han- 
overian representatives; but the armistice (begun on the 
24th and continued until the 26th) produced no other re- 
sult than the reinforcement of the force at Gotha; General 
Von Flies, with five battalions, being detached from Von 
Falckenstein's army, and sent by rail, via Magdeburg and 
Halle, to Gotha. 

At Treffurt, Kreutzberg, Eisenach and Gotha, points 
on a semi-circle in front of the Hanoverians, and within a 
day's march of them, were nearly 30,000 Prussians. 

On the 27th General Von Flies, advancing through 
Warza upon Langensalza, with about 9,000 men, struck the 
army of King George, which was well posted on the left 
bank of the Unstrut river. A battle followed, in which 
the Hanoverians defeated Von Flies, and drove his army 
several miles towards Warza. 

But the Hanoverian victory was a barren one. Von 
Flies was reinforced at Warza by a strong detachment 
from Von Goeben's division at Eisenach. Von Goeben 
and Von Beyer advanced from Eisenach upon Langensalza, 
and Von Manteuffel, moving via Heiligenstadt, Worbis, 
Dingelstadt, Miihlhausen and Gross Gottern, closed upon 



the Hanoverians from the north. The army of King 
George was now surrounded by 40,000 Prussians, united 
under the command of Von Falckenstein. Further resist- 
ance was hopeless, and on the 29th of June the Hanoveri- 
ans surrendered. The men were dismissed to their homes, 
the officers were paroled, and King George was banished 
from his kingdom. 

THE INVASION OF SAXONY, AND ITS RESULTS. 

In the meantime the main armies had not been idle. 
The invasion of Saxony was begun on the i6th of June by 
the Army of the Elbe and the First Army. On the night 
of the 15th of June the Saxon army began its retreat to 
Bohemia, detachments of pioneers tearing up the railroad 
track between Rieza and Dresden, and between the latter 
city and Bautzen. The work of destruction, except the 
burning of the bridge at Rieza, was hurriedly and imper- 
fectly done, and did not appreciably delay the Prussian 
advance. The Army of the Elbe advanced from Torgau, 
via Wurzen, Dahlen and Strehla; a division to each road, 
and a detachment from the right division moving via 
Ostrau and Dobeln to cover the right flank. The First 
Army advanced from the neighborhood of Gorlitz, through 
Lobau and Bautzen, a strong detachment being sent out 
on the Zittau road, beyond Ostritz, to observe the passes 
of Reichenberg and Gabel, for the army was making a 
flank march, and the Austrians might attack through these 
passes. A cavalry detachment was pushed out through 
Bischofswerda to feel the left of the Army of the Elbe. 

On the i8th of June the Army of the Elbe occupied 
Dresden, and pushed its outposts beyond the city as far 
as Lockwitz and Pillnitz. On the following day the junc- 
tion of the two armies was perfected. The ist Reserve 
Division was sent from Berlin to reinforce Herwarth Von 
Bittenfeld, and the combined forces of the Army of the 
Elbe and the First Army were placed under the command 
of Prince Frederick Charles. To guard against a possible 



19 

invasion of Saxony by the Bavarians, measures were at 
once taken to fortify Dresden, which was occupied by the 
2nd Reserve Division from Berh'n; Leipsic and Chemnitz 
were occupied by Landwehr; and the Leipsic-Plauen rail- 
way beyond Werdau was destroyed. 

On the 17th of June the Emperor of Austria issued a 
manifesto, in which he formally announced to his subjects 
the state of war existing between Austria and Prussia. 
Italy declared war against Austria three days later. 

We can now see the immense results following from 
the thorough military preparation of Prussia. Launching, 
as it were, a thunderbolt of military force upon her ene- 
mies at the first moment of war, less than two weeks suf- 
ficed for the complete conquest of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel 
and Saxony. Indeed, four days had sufficed for the 
seizure of the last two. The King of Hanover had been 
dethroned; the Elector of Hesse-Cassel was a prisoner, 
and the King of Saxony was a fugitive with his army in 
Bohemia. The military results were even greater than 
the political consequences. The severed portions of the 
Prussian kingdom were united. The Hanoverian army 
had been eliminated from the military problem, and there 
was no longer any menace to Prussia from the rear. Von 
Falckenstein was now free to turn his undivided attention 
to the Bavarians and the Federal Corps, and the occupa- 
tion of Saxony prevented all possibility of a junction of 
the Bavarian and Saxon armies. But the strategical ad- 
vantages gained in regard to operations in Bohemia were 
the grandest result of the occupation of Saxony. 

We have seen that on the 14th of June the Army of 
the Elbe was around Torgau, the First Army near Gorlitz; 
and the Second Army in the vicinity of Neisse; being thus 
separated from each other by from 100 to 125 miles. The 
Second Army covered Breslau, the Army of the Elbe 
covered Berlin, and the First Army was in a position to 
support either of the others. Geographical circumstances 



20 

thus compelled the separation of the Prussian armies, and 
only two of them were available for the invasion of Bo- 
hemia. The occupation of Saxony changed matters for 
the better. The distance between the Army of the Elbe 
and the First Army was reduced to the extent of actual 
junction, and these combined armies were only about 120 
miles from Landshut, where the right of the Second Army 
now rested, and with which there was communication by 
means of the hill road of Schreiberschau. The entire 
force was now available for the invasion of Bohemia; the 
northern passes of the Bohemian frontier were secured; 
and if compelled to act upon the defensive, Frederick 
Charles could find in the mountains of Southern Saxony 
many advantageous positions for defensive battle. 

The Prussian plan of operations required an advance 
of Frederick Charles' armies from Saxony into Bohemia, 
and an invasion of that province by the Second Army, 
advancing from Silesia; both armies to unite at Gitschin, 
or in its vicinity. It is clear that in thus advancing from 
divergent bases, the Prussians gave to their adversary the 
advantage of operating by interior lines; generally a seri- 
ous military error, as the general operating by interior 
lines, holding one of the opponent's armies by a contain- 
ing force, and falling with superior numbers upon the 
other, may defeat both in succession. Von Moltke's plan 
was, however, sound and proper, for the following reasons: 

1. The geographical configuration of the Prussian 
frontier compelled the separation of the Prussian armies, 
in order that Lusatia and Silesia might both be protected 
from Austrian invasion; and the only possible concentra- 
tion that would not yield to the enemy the advantage of 
the initiative, and permit him to invade Prussia, was a 
concentration to the front, in the hostile territory. 

2. The entire army "could not have advanced in ef- 
fective order by one set of mountain roads, but would 
have extended in columns so leng-thened that it would 



21 

have been impossible to form to a front commensurate 
with its numbers." 

3. The re-entering base of the Prussians would en- 
able each of their armies to cover its communications 
with its base, while one of these armies would surely 
menace the communications of the Austriaus, if Von Ben- 
edek should advance against either. 

4. The certainty that the Prussian armies could act 
with celerity, and the probability that the Austrian army 
was not yet fully prepared for prompt offensive maneu- 
vers, justified the hope that the concentration might be 
effected at a point some distance in front of the enemy's 
line. The distance from Gorlitz and Neisse to Gitschin 
was less than the distance from Olmiitz, Briinn and Bom- 
isch Triibau to the same point, and there was an excellent 
prospect of being able to concentrate before Von Benedek 
could get his army well in hand to strike the Prussian 
armies separately. 

5. By keeping up telegraphic communication be- 
tween the two separated armies, their co-operation and 
simultaneous action could be assured. 

6. If the Prussians could reach the Iser and the Elbe 
without serious check, the contracted theatre of operations 
would render Von Benedek's interior position one of dan- 
ger, rather than one of advantage. Von Moltke himself, 
in commenting upon his strategical combination, says: 
"If it is advantageous for a general to place his army on 
an interior line of operation, it is necessary, in order that 
he may profit by it, to have sufficient space to enable him 
to move against one of his adversaries at a distance of 
several days' march, and to have time enough then to re- 
turn against the other. If this space is very contracted, 
he will run the risk of having both adversaries on his 
hands at once. When an army, on the field of battle, is 
attacked in front and on the flank, it avails nothing that 
it is on an interior line of operations. That which was a 



22 

strategical advantage becomes a tactical disadvantage. 
If the Prussians were allowed to advance to the Iser and 
to the Elbe, if the several defiles which it was necessary 
to pass fell into their power, it is evident that it would be 
extremely perilous to advance between their two armies. 
In attacking one, the risk would be incurred of being at- 
tacked in rear by the other." The combination, on the 
field of battle, of the two armies operating from divergent 
bases, would admit of just such a front and flank attack 
as would convert Von Benedek's strategical advantage 
into a serious tactical disadvantage. It would be a repe- 
tition of Waterloo. 

7. A failure to unite before encountering the main 
force of the enemy, though unfortunate, would not neces- 
sarily have been disastrous. According to Jomini, the 
advantages of an interior position diminish as the armies 
operating increase in size; for the following reasons: 

(a). "Considering the difficulty of finding ground 
and time necessary to bring a very large force into action 
on the day of the battle, an army of 130,000 or 140,000 
men may easily resist a much larger force. 

(b). "If driven from the field, there will be at least 
100,000 men to protect. and insure an orderly retreat and 
effect a junction with one of the other armies. 

(c). "The central army * * * requires 
such a quantity of provisions, munitions, horses and ma- 
teriel of every kind, that it will possess less mobility and 
facility in shifting its efforts from one part of the zone to 
another; to say nothing of the impossibility of obtaining 
provisions from a region too restricted to support such 
numbers. 

(d). "The bodies of observation detached from the 
central mass to hold in check two armies of 135,000 men 
each must be very strong (from 80,000 to 90,000 each); 
and, being of such magnitude, if they are drawn into a 



23 

serious engagement, they will probably suffer reverses, 
the effect of which might outweigh the advantages gained 
by the principal army." 

Finally, the increased defensive power given to in- 
fantry by the introduction of breech-loading rifles might 
be counted upon to increase greatly the probability of 
either of the Prussian armies being able to fight success- 
fully a /z/r^/j/ (^^y^;w?W battle against the entire army of 
Von Benedek, armed, as it was, with muzzle-loaders. 

In view of these reasons. Von Moltke's strategy was 
not only justifiable, but perfect. The Prussian objective 
was the Austrian army, wherever it might be. 

Before the commencement of hostilities Von Benedek 
had, as we have seen, announced his intention of invading 
Prussia. Two routes offered themselves to his choice: one 
by way of Gorlitz and Bautzen to Berlin; the other by way 
of the valley of the Oder into Silesia. The latter route 
was obstructed by the fortresses of Glatz, Neisse and Kosel; 
the former would have led to the unobstructed occupation 
of Saxony, and would have enabled the Bavarian army to 
concentrate, via the passes of the Saale and Wittenberg, 
with the Austrians and Saxons. But, at a time when min- 
utes were worth millions, Von Benedek was slow; and the 
preparation and energy of the Prussians enabled them to 
take the initiative and throw the Austrians upon the de- 
fensive in Bohemia. Von Benedek then decided to con- 
centrate his army in the vicinity of Josephstadt and 
Koniginhof ; to hold the strong defiles of the Iser or the 
Elbe with comparatively weak detachments, and throw 
his main army upon the Crown Prince or Frederick 
Charles, as circumstances might decide. 

Von Benedek's concentration began on the i8th of 
June; and on the 25th his army stood as follows: 

The 1st Corps, with one brigade of the Ilird Corps 
and a cavalry division, on the left bank of the Iser, from 



24 

Turnau, through Miichengratz to Jung Buntzlau, where 
the retreating Saxons formed on the left. 

The Xth Corps, with one cavalry division, at Jaromir. 

The IVth Corps at Opocno.. 

The Vlth Corps at Solnitz. 

The Ilird Corps on the left of the Vlth, at Tynist. 

The Vlllth Corps at Wamberg. 

The lid Corps at Geyersberg. 

Four cavalry divisions were at Gabel, Leitomischel, 
Abtsdorf and Policzka, respectively. 

The force on the Iser, under Count Clam-Gallas, was 
thus opposed to the entire army of Frederick Charles; 
while Von Benedek confronted the Crown Prince with six 
corps. The Austrian line extended beyond Gitschin, the 
point at which the Prussian armies were to concentrate. 

THE INVASION OF BOHEMIA. 

It was now certain that Bohemia was to be the thea- 
ter of war. This province of the Austrian Empire may 
be described as a huge basin, whose rim is composed of 
mountains. It is separated from Silesia by the Riesenge- 
birge (Giant Mountains), from Saxony by the Erzgebirge 
(Iron Mountains), from Moravia by the Moravian Hills, 
and from Bavaria by the Fichtelgebirge and the Bohmer- 
wald; the Moravian Hills and the Bohmerwald separating 
it from the valley of the Danube. This great basin is 
drained by the Elbe river, which, rising in the Riesenge- 
birge, makes a huge loop, flowing first south, then west, 
and finally north, and receives the waters of the Iser, 
Adler, Moldau and Eger rivers before it issues forth from 
the Bohemian frontier into Saxony. This theater is well 
suited to defensive operations, as the mountain frontiers 
are penetrated by few passes, and the forests and rivers 
constitute additional obstacles. On the Silesian frontier 
the only issues by which an invader can enter Bohemia 



N"2. 

I'.'ARMr ON 22?, 23'°i24V J'UNE. 



Hermthul 



/ I ! ! » / ; / I 



^6aiel. 







IJ am 22 

a .. 23 

■ 24 



Gal^(<mx 



Jinp'lidt Mtlen 



25 

are the passes of Trautenau, Eypel, Kosteletz, Nachodand 
Neustadt. These passes could all be easily defended, 
while on the Saxon frontier the passes of Reichenberg, 
Gabel and Konigstein-Tetschen could be used by retard- 
ing forces, which could afterwards find a strong defensive 
line on the Iser. 

Two railway lines lay in the theater of war, and were 
of great importance to the contending armies. One line 
ran from Vienna, via Kosel, Breslau and Gorlitz, to Dres- 
den. The other connected the Austrian capital with 
Prague, via Olmiitz (or Briinn) and Bomisch Triibau. 
The two lines were joined by a railway from Dresden to 
Prague, and by one which, running from Lobau to Turnau, 
branched from the latter point to Prague and Pardubitz. 
These railways connected with others leading to all the 
important cities of Prussia. The two Prussian armies 
could cover their railway communications while advancing; 
but the Prague-Olmiitz line, which was of vital importance 
to the Austrian army, ran parallel to, and dangerously 
near, the Silesian frontier, and was not covered by the 
Austrian front during the operations in Bohemia. 

The Prussian advance began on the 20th of June. 
The Army of the Elbe marched from the vicinity of Dres- 
den, via Stolpen, Neustadt, Schluckenau and Rumburg, 
to Gabel. As the greater part of this march had to be 
made by one road, it required six days, though the dis- 
tance was only 65 miles. The First Army had concen- 
trated at Zittau, Herrnhut, Hirschfelde, Seidenberg and 
Marklissa. From these points it began its march on the 
22d of June, each division marching by a separate road; 
and on the 25th it was closely concentrated around Reich- 
enberg. The entire Prussian front was now reduced to 
about 100 miles, and Herwarth Von Bittenfeld was only 
twelve miles from Frederick Charles. 

It would have been dangerous in the extreme for the 
Crown Prince to begin his march while Von Benedek held 



26 

six corps in hand to hurl upon him. The passage of the 
Second Army through the defiles depended on surprise; 
and in the face of a superior and concentrated army, it 
would have been, a desperate undertaking. It was neces- 
sary, therefore, to distract the plans of the enemy by false 
maneuvers, and to wait for Frederick Charles to menace 
the Austrian left, on the Iser, before beginning the for- 
ward movement with the Second Army. With these ob- 
jects in view, the Vlth Corps was ordered to push forward 
towards Olmiitz, and Frederick Charles received the fol- 
lowing instructions from Von Moltke: "Since the difficult 
task of debouching from the mountains falls upon the 
Second, weaker. Army, so, as soon as the junction with 
Herwarth's corps is effected, the First Army must, by its 
rapid advance, shorten the crisis." The Vlth Corps moved 
from Neisse into the Austrian dominions as far as Frei- 
waldau, where its advanced-guard had a successful skirm- 
ish with a party of Austrian cavalry. This corps was 
supposed by the Austrians to be the advanced-guard of 
the Crown Prince's army marching upon Olmiitz; and the 
demonstration had the effect of holding a large force of 
Austrians between Hohenmauth and Bomisch Triibau, 
where it could not be used to oppose the real advance of 
the Second Army. 

The Crown Prince's army was to move as follows: 

The 1st Corps* via Liebau and Trautenau, to Arnau; 

The Guards, via Neurode, Braunau, Eypel, to Konig- 
inhof; 

The Vth Corps, via Glatz, Reinerz, Nachod, to Gradlitz; 

The cavalry, from Waldenburg, via Trautenau, to 
Koniginhof: 

*It may be of assistance to the reader, in the following pages, to note that the 
divisions in the Prussian army are numbered consecutively throughout the several 
army corps. Thus, the 1st Corps consists of the 1st and 2d Divisions; the lid Corps, 
of the 3d and 4th Divisions; the Vlth Corps, of the 11th and 12th Divisions, and 
so on. 



r I. 



PROPOSED ADVANCE OF 2" ARMY FROM 25" TO 28™ JUNE , 



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POSITtON OF 80TH ARMIES OU THE EVENING OF THE ZkVJVUS.. 









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27 

The Vlth Corps, having made the diversion to Frei- 
waldau, was withdrawn to Glatz and Patschkau, from 
which points it was to follow the Vth. A corps of obser- 
vation, consisting of two regiments of infantry, one of 
cavalry, and a light battery, was detached at Ratibor to 
make demonstrations against Austrian Silesia. In case 
this detachment should encounter a large force of the 
enemy, it was to fall back upon the fortress of Kosel. 
During the campaign an unimportant war of detachments 
was carried on in this region, generally to the advantage 

of the Prussians. 

JUNE 26th. 

On the 26th of June the Army of the Elbe marched 
upon Niemes and Oschitz. The advanced-guard encoun- 
tered an Austrian outpost near Hiihnerwasser, and drove 
it back after a sharp skirmish. The main body of the 
Army of the Elbe bivouacked at Hiihnerwasser, with out- 
posts towards Weisswasser, Miinchengratz and Gablonz. 
In the evening there was another brisk outpost fight in 
the direction of Miinchengratz, in which the Austrians 
were again worsted. 

In the First Army the advance on this day was begun 
by General Von Horn, whose division had held the out- 
posts the night before. At Liebenau Von Horn struck 
the Austrians, whose force consisted of a small body of 
infantry, four regiments of cavalry and two ba.tteries of 
horse artillery. Driven out of the village, and from the 
field where they next made a stand, the Austrians retreat- 
ed across the Iser, via Turnau, to Podol. The First Army 
now occupied a position extending through Reichenberg, 
Gablonz, Liebenau and Turnau; Von Horn's division ex- 
tending down the Iser from Turnau, with outposts near 
Podol. Free communication — in fact a junction — was now 
established with the Army of the Elbe, one division of 
which occupied Bomisch Aicha. 

An attempt made by a company of Prussian riflemen 
to seize the bridges at Podol, about dusk in the evening. 



28 

brought on a sharp fight. The forces on each side were 
reinforced until parts of two Prussian and two Austrian 
brigades were engaged. A stubborn infantry battle was 
carried on by moonlight until i o'clock in the morning, 
when the Austrians retreated towards Miinchengratz. By 
this victory the Prussians secured the passage of the Iser 
at Podol; the shortest line to Gitschin was opened to them; 
the communications of Count Clam-Gallas with the main 
army were threatened; and a plan which he had formed 
to riposte upon the Prussians at Turnau was thwarted. 

We will now turn to the Second Army. On this day 
the 1st Corps concentrated at Liebau and Schomberg, 
ready to cross the frontier. The Vth Corps was at Reinerz, 
about twenty miles from the 1st. The Guard Corps, 
which had just crossed the frontier, in front of Neurode, 
midway between the two corps, was in a position to sup- 
port either. The Vlth Corps was at Landeck and Glatz, 
part of its cavalry being sent forward to cover the left of 
the Vth Corps and maintain communication between the 
two. After passing the mountains, the entire army, piv- 
oted on Nachod and Skalitz, was to wheel to the left, seize 
the Josephstadt-Turnau railway, and form a junction along 
that line with the armies of Frederick Charles. On the 
evening of the 26th, the advanced-guard of the Vth Corps 
occupied Nachod. The distance between the Crown 
Prince and Frederick Charles had now been reduced to 
about fifty miles, while the distance between the extreme 
corps of the Austrian army was about the same. Von 
Benedek's strategical advantages were already beginning 
to disappear. The Prussian demonstrations towards Ol- 
miitz had caused the Austrian lid Corps to be retained 
dangerously far to the right; Count Clam-Gallas was 
struggling against superior numbers on the Iser, and Von 
Benedek had only four corps with which he could imme- 
diately oppose the four corps of the Crown Prince. 

The Austrian commander ordered the following move- 
ments for the next day: 



N'+. 



POSITION OF BOTH ARMIES ON THE EVENING OF THE IS'l" JUNE. 



Srabuai 

■Kientts . o LiAmau 

0t BAuJu,. .*8 




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29 

The Xth Corps, from Josephstadt and Schurz, upon 
Trautenau; 

The Vlth Corps, from Opocno to Skalitz; 

The IVth Corps, from Lanzow to Jaromir; 

The Vlllth Corps, from Tynist to beyond Jaromir, to 
support the Vlth; 

The Illd Corps, from Koniggratz to Miletin; 

The lid Corps, from Senftenberg to Solnitz; 

The Reserve Cavalry, from Hohenmauth and Wild- 
enschwerdt to Hohenbriick; 

The Light Cavalry to accompany the lid Corps. 

JUNE 27TH. 

On the 27th of June the Crown Prince pushed forward 
the 1st Corps against Trautenau, and the main body of the 
Vth Corps upon Nachod. One division of the Guard 
supported each corps. 

The 1st Corps, under Von Bonin, marched in two col- 
umns from Liebau and Schomberg, and was to concentrate 
at Parschnitz, about two miles east of Trautenau, where it 
was to rest two hours before moving upon the latter place. 

Contrary to expectation, the left column arrived first 
at Parschnitz, the right (with the advanced-guard) being 
delayed by bad roads. Trautenau was as yet unoccupied 
by the Austrians; but instead of seizing the town and the 
heights which overlooked it, on the farther bank of the 
Aupa river. Von Clausewitz (commanding the left col- 
umn) obeyed the strict letter of his orders, and waited at 
Parschnitz two hours, from 8 to 10 a. m., until the advanced 
guard of the right column arrived. 

While Von Clausewitz was thus idly waiting, Mondl's 
brigade of the Xth Austrian Corps arrived, and took up a 
strong position in the town and on the heights which 
commanded it. A stubborn fight took place before the 



30 

Austrians could be dislodged; and Mondl fell back in 
good order upon the main body of the Xth Corps, which 
was hurrying towards Trautenau. Believing himself in 
complete possession of the field, Von Bonin, at i o'clock, 
declined the assistance of the ist Division of Guards, 
which had hurried up to Parschnitz, and the division, af- 
ter a halt of two hours, marched off to the left, towards 
Eypel. About half past 3 o'clock the entire Xth Corps, 
under Von Gablentz, arrived on the field, and made a vig- 
orous attack upon the Prussians. Von Bonin's left wing 
was turned; and, after fighting six hours, the Prussians 
were driven from the field, and retreated to the positions 
from which they had begun their march in the morning. 

The Prussian defeat was due to two causes: 

I. The delay of Von Clausewitz at Parschnitz, when 
common sense should have prompted him to exceed his 
orders, and seize the unoccupied town and heights of 
Trautenau. For two hours these positions were complete- 
ly undefended by the Austrians, and could have been oc- 
cupied by Von Clausewitz without firing a shot.* 



*Derr6cagaix and the Prussian Offlcial History both condemn Von Clausewitz's 
delay. Adams, however, finds an excuse for it. He says : "The first question tliat 
arises is, should Clausewitz have occupied Trautenau? Mondl was up, in all 
probability, and he would have been deeply engaged before Grossmann [com- 
manding the right column] came up, against orders. He could not have been ac- 
quainted with the situation, for Bonin himself was not, and it is difficult, therefore, 
to attach blame to him. The cause of Grossmann's delay is said to have been the 
hilly character of the road. Mondl, on the other hand, reaching Hohenbriick 
about 7:30, seems to have halted there to form. The Austrian official account 
states that he had occupied the heights since 9:15, and before this he had reached 
Hohenbriick at 7:45. When he had formed — that is to say, waited to mass his bri- 
gade before deploying— the position must have been taken up by him between 8:30 
and 9 : 15. Had Clausewitz advanced, it would have taken three-quarters of an hour 
to debouch in force south of Trautenau, so that he would have had to continue 
his march without halting to cross the Aupa, and push forward from Trautenau, 
contrary to orders, in order to engage Mondl on the very strong ground he by that 
time had fully occupied. 

"Probably the latter was informed * * * (j^at no immediate 

danger was impending, or he would not have waited leisurely to form. The first 
duty of the advance, on coming into collision with the enemy, is to occupy rapidly 
such localities as may prove of use in the impending action." 

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the heights were unoccupied when Von 
Clausewitz arrived at Parschnitz; and it was his duty, as well as that of Mondl, on 



31 

2. The fatuity of Von Bonin in declining the assist- 
ance of the Guards. Von Bonin knew that Mondl had 
not been routed, that he had fallen back "slowly and 
fighting," and he did not know what other force might be 
in his immediate front. He had no reason to expect that 
he would be allowed to pass through the defile without 
the most stubborn opposition. He knew that he had 
been opposed by a single brigade, and the plucky resist- 
ance of that small force should have made him suspicious 
that it had stronger forces at its back. His orders were 
to push on to Arnau, some twelve miles from Trautenau, 
and to carry out these orders it was necessary to sweep 
aside the opposition in his front. His declension of assist- 
ance when the firing had scarcely ceased, and when the 
aid of the Guards would have enabled him to clinch his 
success, was inexcusable. Like Beauregard at Shiloh, 
Von Bonin seems to have labored under the delusion that 
a victory could be sufficiently complete while the enemy's 
army still remained in his front.* 

The Austrians had certainly gained a brilliant victory. 
With a force of 33,600 men, they had defeated 35,000 
Prussians, armed, too, with breech-loaders, while the vic- 

coming into collision with the enemy, to occupy rapidly such localities as might 
have proved of use in the impending action. As to engaging Mondl "on the very 
strong ground he by that time had fully occupied," it is sufficient to state that he 
had only a brigade, while Von Clausewitz had a division. A subordinate com- 
mander assumes a grave responsibility when he violates or exceeds his orders; but 
it is hardly to be expected that an able division commander will fetter himself by 
observing the strict letter of an order, when he knows, and his superior does riot 
Jfnow, that the condition of affairs in his front is such as to offer an opportunity 
for a successful and valuable stroke, even though that stroke be not contemplated 
in the orders of his chief. Von Alvensleben understood matters better when he 
marched without orders to assist Von Fransecky at Koniggratz. If a division 
commander were never expected to act upon his own responsibility when a move- 
ment is urged by his own common sense, it is evident that the position of general 
of division could be filled by a man of very limited abilities 

*"While this was going on a staff-officer * * of General Beauregard's 
headquarters * * * came up to General Bragg and said, 'The General 
directs that the pursuit be stopped; the victory is sufficiently complete; it is need- 
less to expose our men to the fire of the gun-boats.' General Bragg said, 'My God ! 
was a victory ever sufficiently complete?' " — Battles and Lenders; of the Civil War, 
Vol. J., p. 60.5. 



32 

tors had only muzzle-loading rifles. The loss of the Prus- 
sians was 56 ofificers and 1,282 men, while the Austrians 
lost 196 officers and more than 5,000 men. This disparity 
of loss illustrates the difference in the power of the old 
and the new rifles; it also speaks volumes for the pluck of 
the Austrian soldiers. 

But the Austrian victory was doomed to be as fruit- 
less as it was costly; for Prussian skill and valor on other 
fields obliterated all that was gained by Von Gablentz in 
the bloody combat of Trautenau. 

The march of the Vth Corps, under Von Steinmetz, 
lay through the defile of Nachod, five miles in length, in 
which the entire corps was obliged to march in a single 
column. The advanced-guard, which had seized Nachod 
the night before, pushed forward rapidly, beyond the out- 
let of the defile, to the junction of the roads leading to 
Skalitz and Neustadt, where it received orders to halt, 
and thus cover the issue of the main body through the 
defile. While the advanced-guard was making prepara- 
tions for bivouacking, its commander. General Von Loew- 
enfeldt, received news of the approach of the Austrian 
Vlth Corps, which, as we have seen, had been ordered 
upon Nachod. Hastily forming for action, the Prussian 
advanced guard received the attack of a brigade, which 
was reinforced until nearly the whole Austrian corps was 
engaged. It was a desperate struggle of six and one-half 
battalions, five squadrons and twelve guns, against twenty- 
one battalions, eighty guns and a greatly superior force 
of cavalry. For three hours the advanced-guard sustained 
the unequal conflict, with no other reinforcement than 
Wnuck's cavalry brigade. The Prussian force, in one line 
3,000 paces long, without reserves, was sorely pressed, 
until the main body began to issue from the defile and 
deploy upon the field. The entire Austrian corps was 
now engaged. Finally, after a successful charge of 
Wnuck's cavalry brigade upon the Austrian cuirassiers, 
and the repulse of a heavy infantry attack. Von Steinmetz 



-N*5. 



POSlTiON OF BOTH ARMIES Oi*.'TK£FVEN!NG Of TME 27'"' JfciiH f 



TflS. 14^ ^ 

•l« Sichroty . „ 

Podol 




Lieiau- 
S. 6cAor>U'sr-q 



■^ 



J o sepJti stadt 

Bbhenbru.ck Solnitx 



Bolic 

M?hanmau/A 
Chrast A_RA_ 



Sna-lisA, JM.il »i 



20 



30 



40 



J"*. 



^V 



33 

assumed the offensive, and the Austrians, defeated with 
great loss,- retreated to Skalitz. In the latter part of this 
action the Prussians were under the immediate command 
of the Crown Prince. The Prussian loss was 1,122, killed 
and wounded; the Austrians lost 7,510, of which number 
about 2,500 were prisoners. 

The 1st Division of the Guards halted this night at 
Eypel; the 2d Division at Kosteletz. 

This day, which had seen two bloody actions fought 
by the Second Army, was one of inaction on the part of 
the armies of Frederick Charles. The day was consumed 
in constructing bridges across the Iser, at Turnau and 
Podol, and in concentrating the main body of the army 
on the plateau of Sichrow, preparatory to an attack upon 
the Austrian position at Miinchengratz. 

JUNE 28th. 
The First Army and the Army of the Elbe made a 
combined attack upon Count Clam-Gallas at Miinchen- 
gratz, the Austrians being assailed in front and on both 
flanks. The Austrian commander had begun his retreat 
before the Prussian attack commenced; and after a brief 
resistance, he fell back upon Gitschin, with a loss of about 
2,000 men, killed, wounded and prisoners. The Prussian 
loss was only 341. The armies of Frederick Charles were 
now completely united. One division was pushed forward 
to Rowensko, and the. remaining eight, numbering, with 
the cavalry, upwards of 100,000 men, were concentrated 
upon an area of about twenty square miles. Some distress 
began to be felt because of the short supply of food and 
the difficulty of getting water; for only part of the provis- 
ion trains had come up, and the Austrian inhabitants, 
when they abandoned their homes, had filled up the wells. 
Two roads led east from the Prussian position; one via 
Podkost, and the other via Fiirstenbriick, but both united 
at Sobotka. The Austrian rear guard was driven from 
Podkost during the night, and both roads were open for 
the Prussian advance on the following morning. 



34 

Frederick Charles has been severely ( and it would 
seem justly) criticised for his inaction on the 27th of 
June. His explicit instructions from Von Moltke should 
have been enough to cause him to hasten forward, and so 
threaten the Austrian left as to relieve the pressure on 
the Crown Prince. And there was another reason for 
prompt action. As already mentioned, the victory of 
Podol had opened to Frederick Charles the shortest line 
to Gitschin, from which place he was now distant only 
fifteen miles, while Clam-Gallas, at Miinchengratz, was 
twenty miles away from the same point. The town of 
Gitschin, like Ivrea in 1800, or Sombref and Quatre-Bras 
in 181 5, had accidentally become a strategic point of the 
first importance by reason of the relative positions of the 
opposing armies and the direction of the roads necessary 
for the concentration of each. All the roads leading 
from the Iser, from Turnau to Jung Bunzlau, center at 
Gitschin, whence other roads branch out to Neu Bidsow, 
Koniggratz, Josephstadt, Koniginhof, and other important 
points. The possession of Gitschin by either army would 
seriously. delay, and perhaps eventually prevent, the con- 
centration of the other. A prompt movement to Gitschin 
by Frederick Charles would have cut off Clam-Gallas, who 
could then have effected a junction with Von Benedek 
only by a circuitous march of such length as to make it 
probable that his two corps would have been eliminated 
altogether from the problem solved on the field of Konig- 
gratz. As the Austro-Saxons at Miinchengratz, covering 
the roads to Prague, could have protected their commun- 
ications with that city, while menacing the communica- 
tions of the Prussians with their base, it was, doubtless, 
necessary to dislodge them from that position; but Fred- 
erick Charles might have promptly pushed to Gitschin a 
force sufficient to seize and hold the place, and still have 
kept in hand enough troops to defeat Clam-Gallas so 
heavily as to drive him back in complete rout; for Fred- 
erick Charles' force numbered, at this time, nearly 140,000 
men, while Clam-Gallas had not more than 60,000. 



35 

This movement would not have really divided Fred- 
erick Charles' army, for the force at Gitschin and the one 
attacking at Miinchengratz would have been practically 
within supporting distance, and in direct and unimpeded 
communication with each other. Moreover, the nearest 
troops available to oppose such a force thrust forward to 
Gitschin would have been the single Austrian Corps (the 
Illd) which was at Miletin, quite as far from Gitschin as 
the main body of Frederick Charles' army would have 
been. Frederick Charles' entire army could have been 
at Gitschin quite as soon as Von Benedek could have sent 
thither any force large enough to offer respectable oppo- 
sition; and the necessity of hurrying troops to that point 
would have caused the Austrian commander to relax ma- 
terially the pressure upon the Crown Prince; a pressure 
which Frederick Charles had every reason to believe 
greater than it really was. Hozier states that the Prus- 
sian commander had formed a plan to capture the entire 
army of Clam-Gallas; but Adams truly remarks that the 
destruction of the Austro-Saxons at Miinchengratz would 
not have compensated for a severe defeat of the Crown 
Prince. Moreover, as we have seen, Clam-Gallas was not 
captured but fell back upon Gitschin, whence he was able 
to form a junction with the main army. Had Frederick 
Charles pushed a force to Gitschin, and with the rest of 
his army dealt Clam-Gallas such a blow as to send him 
reeling back towards Prague, the Prussian general would 
have reaped the double advantage of interposing between 
the divided forces of the enemy, and facilitating his own 
junction with the Crown Prince. Adams correctly says 
of Frederick Charles: "The fault attributable to the 
Prince is, that with a superiority of force at his command, 
which gave him unbounded advantage over his enemy, 
he refused to incur risks which that fact reduced to a 
minimum, in the general interests of the campaign."* 



*The above criticism on the delay of Frederick Charles is based mainly on the 
comments of Major Adams, in his " Great Campaigns in Europe." Hozier, who, 
in the main, follows the Prussian Staff History of the war, has nothing but praise 



To return to the Second Army: 

The Crown Prince received information, at i o'clock 
in the morning, of the defeat of the 1st Corps at Traute- 
nau. 

The 1st Division of the Guards was at once ordered 
to move against Von Gablentz from Eypel, and the 2d 
Division (which had been intended to support the Vth 
Corps) was ordered from Kosteletz to support the ist 
Division. The movement was begun at 4 a. m. Antici- 
pating the attack, Von Gablentz took up a position facing 
east, with his left in Trautenau and his right at Prausnitz, 
about five miles south of the former village. A brigade 
of the Austrian I Vth Corps, ordered to his assistance from 
Jaromir, mistook the route, and did not arrive in time to 
participate in the action. 

The Prussian attack was begun by the ist Division of 
the Guards at 9:30 a. m. The Austrian center and right 
were forced back upon Soor and Altenbach. The brigade 
on the Austrian left was contained by two Prussian bat- 
talions until the arrival of the 2d Division, at 12:30 p. m., 
when it was driven back upon Trautenau, and the greater 
part of it captured. The main body of the Austrians was 
driven from the field, and retreated upon Neustadt and 



for the Prince. The absence of adverse criticism on the action of Frederick Charles 
in the Prussian Official History is, perhaps, explained by the high military and so- 
cial position of that general. Adams seems to think that a forward movement by 
Frederick Charles would have caused' Clam-Gallas to abandon Miinchengratz at 
once, and does not seem to consider that if the Austro-Saxons had not been dis 
lodged, Clam-Gallas would have had the Prussian communications by the throat, 
while covering his own, and that this advantage might have compensated him for 
his separation from Von Benedek. Itmay be urged in objection to these comments, 
that Frederick Charles did not know the exact condition of affairs in his front at 
the time. To this it may be replied that ability to appreciate a strategical advant- 
age, and power to form a correct estimate of the enemy's dispositions, are a test 
of a general's merits as a stiategist. McClellan is not excused for believing that, 
when Lee was attacking his right at Gaines' Mill, the enemy was in strong force 
between the Federal army and Richmond; and Ilamley is not gentle in his com- 
ments on Napoleon's failure to estimate correctly the force and dispositions of the 
Prussians at Jena; though, being an Englishman, he does not hesitate to adopt 
another standard of criticism when he finds it necessary to defend Wellington for 
his error in leaving at Hal 17,000 men so sorely needed at Waterloo.— [See Hamley'.s 
"Operations of War," p. 94 et seQ., and p. 198]. 



N?6. 



POSITION OF BOTH ARMIES ON THE EVENING OF THE 28? JUNE 



HiiAna-wassa' . „ J^ 
GLD R 










i^da^ OS r^^^ 






Arnau 



I raititnetti. 







Ruckert)! 



^Aerki^frai^- 






Molio 

K%K 



l^nglisK. Mi'les 



J- /o 



•#(3 



37 

Neuschloss. The Prussian loss was 713, killed and wound- 
ed; the Austrian loss 3,674, killed, wounded and prisoners. 

While the Guards were thus engaged in repairing the 
defeat of the 1st Corps, the Vth Corps was battling with 
the Austrians at Skalitz. Baron Ramming, commanding 
the Austrian Vlth Corps, having called for reinforcements, 
Von Benedek ordered the Vlllth Corps to Dolan, about 
four miles west of Skalitz, and gave the command of both 
corps to the Archduke Leopold. Early on the morning 
of the 28th the VII Ith Corps relieved the Vlth in its po- 
sition on the east bank of the Aupa, in front of Skalitz, 
and the latter took up a position as a reserve in rear of 
the right wing. The IVth Corps was stationed at Dolan. 
On the Prussian side, Von Steinmetz had been reinforced 
by a brigade of the Vlth Corps. The Austrians had be- 
gun a retrograde movement before the Prussian attack 
commenced; and the corps of Baron Ramming was already 
too far to the rear to give efficient support to the VI I Ith 
Corps. After a severe action, the Austrians were driven 
from their position, and retreated upon Lanzow and Sal- 
ney; the IVth Corps, as a rear guard, holding Dolan. The 
Prussian loss in the battle of Skalitz was 1,365 killed, 
wounded and missing; the Austrians lost nearly 6,000 
men, of whom 2,500 were prisoners. 

The battles of Soor and Skalitz opened the passes of 
Trautenau and Nachod to the unimpeded advance of the 
1st and Vlth Corps. During these battles the Crown 
Prince was stationed at Kosteletz, from which point he 
might easily reach either battle field, if his presence should 
become necessary. In the night he went to Trautenau. 

The distance between the advanced guard of Freder- 
ick Charles, at Ztowa, and that of the Crown Prince, at 
Burkersdorf (near Soor), was only twenty-seven miles. 

JUNE 29TH. 
Intelligence received at the Prussian headquarters of 
the battles in which the armies had been engaged, ren- 



38 

dered it certain that of the seven Austrian army corps, 
the IVth, Vlth, Vlllth and Xth were opposed to the 
Crown Prince, and that only the 1st Corps and the Saxons 
were arrayed against Frederick Charles. The position of 
the Illd Corps was unknown; but it was clear that it was 
the only one that could come to the assistance of Count 
Clam-Gallas, as the lid Corps was known to be far to the 
rear. The necessity of relieving the Crown Prince from 
the overwhelming numbers of Von Benedek,* and the 
prospect of being able to deliver a crushing blow upon 
the inferior force in his front, alike rendered it of the ut- 
most importance that Frederick Charles should move 
promptly upon Gitschin. Apparently impatient at the 
Prince's delay, Von Moltke reiterated the instructions al- 
ready given him, saying, in a telegram from Berlin on 
June 29th: "His Majesty expects that a speedy advance 
of the First Army will disengage the Second Army, 
which, notwithstanding a series of successful actions, is 
still momentarily in a precarious situation." 

Frederick Charles, who had already decided to ad- 
vance without further delay, at once moved as follows: 

The Left, from Turnau, via Rowensko; 

The Center, from Podol, via Sabotka; 

The Right, from Miinchengratz, via Ober Bautzen 
and Sabotka; 

The Army of the Elbe, from Miinchengratz, ot'(3: Unter 
Bautzen and Libau. 

The advance of the army was rendered difficult by 
the small number of roads available. The leading divis- 
ions were started as early as possible, to make a long 
march, in order that the other divisions might march in 
the evening on the same roads. It was, even then, neces- 
sary for the Army of the Elbe to make a long detour. 



*It should be remembered that, in addition to the four corps immediately op- 
posed to the Crown Prince, the Illd and lid Austrian Corps were at Von Benedek's 
disposal ; the latter being scarcely more than two marches distant from Josephstadt. 



39 

Count Clam-Gallas, having been promised the assist- 
ance of the Illd Corps, resolved to make a stand near 
Gitschin. His position was on a range of hills west and 
north of that village, his right resting upon the village of 
Eisenstadt, his left on the Anna Berg, near Lochow. In 
front of the center were the rocky heights of Prywicin, 
which, being almost impassable for ordinary pedestrians, 
would isolate the attacks of the enemy, while, terminating 
in front of the Austrian position, they could not interfere 
with the free movements of the troops on the defensive. 
In front of the hills were ravines, gullies and broken 
ground. The position was thus very strong for an army 
whose role was a purely defensive one. 

Von Tiimpling's division, (5th) leaving Rowensko at 
1:30 P. M., came in contact with the enemy shortly after 
3 o'clock. Von Werder's division (3d) left Zehrow at 
noon; but, having a greater distance to march, did not 
strike the enemy until 5:30. Von Tiimpling immediately 
attacked the Austrian right, with a view to cutting off 
Count Clam-Gallas from the main army of Von Benedek. 
The action continued, with varying fortune, until 7:30, 
when. Von Tiimpling having carried the village of Dielitz, 
in the center of the Austrian right wing. Von Werder hav- 
ing gained ground on the left, and Von Benedek having 
sent word that the assistance of the Illd Corps could not 
be given, Count Clam-Gallas ordered a retreat. The Aus- 
trians retired in good order upon Gitschin; the retreat of 
the right wing being covered by an attack of a brigade 
upon the Prussians at Dielitz; that of the left by an attack 
of a regiment of infantry and a battalipn of rifles. Both 
attacks were repulsed with heavy loss. Following the 
enemy, the Prussians, after a sharp fight with the Austrian 
rear guard in the streets, occupied Gitschin after midnight. 
The Prussian loss was 2,612 killed, wounded and missing; 
the Austrians lost about 7,000 men, of whom 4,000 were 
prisoners. Count Clam-Gallas reported to Von Benedek 



40 

that he had been defeated, that he was no longer able to 
oppose Frederick Charles, and that he was retreating upon 
Koniggratz. 

Von Benedek now determined to throw his main force 
on Frederick Charles, leaving a containing force to op- 
pose the Crown Prince. But with this object in view, his 
dispositions were faulty. Strangely ignoring the results 
of the battles of Nachod, Soor and Skalitz, he seems to 
have thought that one corps would sufifice to hold the 
Crown Prince in check; and on the morning of the 29th 
he issued orders for the advance of the II Id Corps to 
Gitschin and the Reserve Cavalry to Horzitz. The lid, 
Vlth, Vlllth and Xth were to follow on the next day in 
the direction of Lomnitz and Turnau. But during the 
day events occurred which necessitated a complete change 
of plan. 

In the Second Army the 1st Corps marched via 
Trautenau to Pilnikau, and the cavalry division following 
_ it halted at Kaile, where the Crown Prince established his 
headquarters. 

The Guards advanced upon Koniginhof, from which 
place they drove out a brigade of the Austrian IVth 
Corps, capturing about 400 prisoners. 

The Vth Corps (with one brigade of the Vlth) march- 
ing upon Gradlitz, encountered the other brigades of the 
Austrian IVth Corps at Schweinschadel, and after an ac- 
tion of three hours, drove them from the field with a loss 
of nearly 5,000 men, killed, wounded and prisoners. The 
Austrians retreated to Salney. The Crown Prince had 
now reached the Elbe. 

During the day Von Benedek, becoming alarmed at 
the progress of the Second Army, countermanded the or- 
der for the Hid Corps to move upon Gitschin, and direct- 
ed it to remain at Miletin. The 1st Corps and the Saxons 
were ordered to join the main army via Horzitz and 



POS) 




A.R.A. 



G.i..O. M # AS 

IS. 



|o Jun^^u^laio 



1 w 



Q / J2. 3 -4 r 



Encfini 



POSITION OF BOTH ARMIES ON THE. EVENING OF THE 29" JUNE 




TrauientiUo 



CiO. ^ * *^ A.RA. 



\,JuM/XlUVflfiU, 






jHB SUrn oSAlney 



fafomu- 
^J^*y^Joseph»tadt 



Eno-hsh Mill- 



a I 2 3 4 J- 



41 

Miletin; but the orders, as we have seen, came too late to 
save them from their defeat at Gitschin. The rest of the 
army was concentrated before night upon the plateau of 
Dubenetz, against the army of the Crown Prince, as fol- 
lows: 

The IVth Corps at Salney, with the 1st Reserve Cav- 
alry Division, and the 2d Light Cavalry Division on its 
right and rear; 

The lid Corps at Kukus, on left of IVth; 

The Vlllth Corps near Kasow (one brigade in line 
on left of lid Corps, the other brigades as reserve); 

The Vlth Corps on the left of the Vlllth; 

The 3d Reserve Cavalry Division on the left of the 
Vlth Corps; 

The 2d Reserve Cavalry Division on the extreme left 
wing; 

The Xth Corps, in reserve, between Stern and Lieb- 
thal. 

Five army corps and four cavalry divisions were thus 
concentrated on a line five and one-half miles long. The 
nature of the ground was unfavorable to the interior com- 
munications of the line, but it was, in the main, a strong 
position, with the Elbe on its front, and the fortress of 
Josephstadt protecting its right flank. 

The junction of the Prussian armies now seemed as- 
sured, and the strategical situation was decidedly against 
Von Benedek. His great fault was his failure to decide 
promptly in regard to the army which he should contain 
while throwing his weight upon the other. Placing an 
exaggerated value upon his interior position, he does not 
seem to have considered that every hour of Prussian ad- 
vance diminished his advantages; and he was, apparently, 
unable to make his choice of the two plans of operations 
which presented themselves. His best move, if made in 



42 

time, would have been against Frederick Charles. True, 
his communications could have been quickly cut, in this 
case, by a successful advance of the Second Army across 
the Elbe; while in moving against the Crown Prince, his 
communications could not so readily have been seized by 
Frederick Charles. But, on the other hand, topographical 
features made it an easier matter to contain the Second 
Army than the First Army and the Army of the Elbe. 
If the Austrian field marshal had learned the lesson 
taught at Atlanta, Franklin and Petersburg, he would 
have made use of hasty entrenchments. The Xth Corps 
and Vlth Corps, strongly entrenched, could certainly have 
held the passes against the assaults of the Crown Prince. 
The ground was admirably adapted to defense, and the 
entrenchments would have more than neutralized the su- 
periority of the needle gun over the Lorenz rifle. To 
have invested and reduced the entrenched camps, if pos- 
sible at all, would have required much more time than 
Von Benedek would have needed for disposing of Fred- 
erick Charles. To have advanced by the road leading to 
Olmiitz or Bomisch Triibau, the Crown Prince would have 
been compelled to mask the passes with at least as many 
troops as garrisoned the camps at their outlets, or his own 
communications would have been at the mercy of the 
Austrians. This would have left him only two corps; and 
an invasion of Moravia with this small force, every step 
of the advance carrying him farther away from Frederick 
Charles, would have been an act of suicidal madness, 
which he would not have seriously contemplated for a 
moment. When Osman Pasha, eleven years later, para- 
lyzed the advance of 110,000 Russians, by placing 40,000 
Turks in a hastily entrenched position on their right, at 
Plevna, he showed plainly how Von Benedek might have 
baulked the Second Army with entrenched positions at 
the Silesian passes. 

Leaving, then, two corps to take care of the Crown 
Prince, the Austrian commander would have had (includ- 



43 

ing the Saxons) six corps, and nearly all of the reserve 
cavalry and artillery, to use against Frederick Charles. 
Count Clam-Gallas, instead of undertaking the task of 
holding the line of the Iser, should have destroyed the 
bridges; and opposing the Prussians with a strong rear- 
guard at the different crossings, obstructing the roads, 
offering just enough resistance to compel his adversary 
to deploy and thus lose time, but avoiding anything like 
a serious action, he should have fallen back via Gitschin 
to form a junction with Von Benedek. He could thus 
have gained sufficient time for his chief to arrive at Git- 
schin as soon as Frederick Charle's; and the army of the 
latter, numbering not more than 130,000 men,* would 
have been opposed by an army of fully 200,000 Austrians. 
What the result would have been we can best judge from 
the course of the battle of Koniggratz before the Crown 
Prince arrived upon the field. 

Hozier, Adams, Derrecagaix and (above all) the 
Prussian Official History of the Campaign of 1866, claim 
that the best move of Von Benedek would have been 
against the Crown Prince. If we consider the successful 
passage of the defiles by the Second Army as a thing to 
be taken for granted in Von Benedek's plan of campaign, 
there can be no doubt that the Austrian commander 
should have turned his attention to the Crown Prince, and 
that he should have attacked him with six corps, as soon 
as the Prussians debouched from the defiles of Trautenau 
and Nachod. The line of action here suggested as one 
that would probably have resulted in Austrian success, is 
based entirely on the condition that the Second Army 
should be contained at the defiles, by a force strongly en- 
trenched after the American manner of 1864-5; ^ condi- 
tion not considered by the eminent authorities mentioned 



*At the battle of Koniggratz, Frederick Charles had 123,918 men. His losses at 
Gitschin aggregated 2,612 men. It seems, therefore, that 130,000 men is a high esti- 
mate of the maximum force which he would have been able to oppose to Von 
Benedek at Gitschin, had the latter made a junction with Clam Gallas at that point. 



44 

above. After the Crown Prince had safely passed the 
defiles, Von Benedek had either to attack him or fall back. 
The time for a successful move against Frederick Charles 
had passed. 

Von Benedek had carefully planned an invasion of 
Prussia. Had he been able to carry the war into that 
country, his operations might, perhaps, have been admira- 
ble; but when the superior preparation of the Prussians 
enabled them to take the initiative, he seems to have been 
incapable of throwing aside his old plans and promptly 
adopting new ones suited to the altered condition of af- 
fairs. Von Benedek was a good tactician and a stubborn 
fighter; but when he told the Emperor "Your Majesty, I 
am no strategist," and wished to decline the command of 
the army, he showed a power of correct self-analysis equal 
to that displayed by Burnside when he expressed an opin- 
ion of his own unfitness for the command of the Army of 
the Potomac. The brave old soldier did not seem to ap- 
preciate the strategical situation, and was apparently los- 
ing his head.* With all the advantages of interior lines, 
he had everywhere opposed the Prussians with inferior 
numbers; he had allowed the Crown Prince to pass through 
the defiles of the mountains before he opposed him at all; 



*Col. C. B. Brackenbury, R. A., who accompanied the Austrian headquarters 
during the camp.aign, says that on one occasion he heard Von Benedek say, hotly, 
to his disputing staff, "For God's sake do something I" and mentions the follow- 
ing incident: "After the battles of Nachod and Trautenau the second officer of 
the Intelligence Department examined all the prisoners, and obtained clear infor- 
mation of the whereabouts of all the columns of the Crown Prince, jthen struggling 
through the mountain passes. He wrote his report and took it to the officer who 
had been sent to Benedek to decide the strategy of the campaign. At that time 
several Austrian corps were close by. The General looked at the paper and had 
all the facts explained to him. He then dismissed the Captain, who, however, re- 
mained and said, probably in that tone of distrust which prevailed, ' Now, Herr 
General, I have shown you chat the Crown Prince can be beaten in detail if attacked 
by our great force within half a day's march ; may I ask what you propose to do 
with the Austrian army?' The General replied, 'I shall send it against Prince 
Frederick Charles.' The Captain put his hands together in an attitude of suppli- 
cation and said, 'For God's sake, sir, do not,' but was ordered out of the room. I 
did not know this fact when Benedek said, the day after the defeat of Koniggratz, 
' Did you ever see such a fine army so thrown away?' "— " Field Works,'" by Col. 
C. B. Brackenbury, K. A., p. 20,5 and note. 



45 

six of his eight corps had suffered defeat; he had lost 
more than 30,000 men; and now he was in a purely defen- 
sive position, and one which left open the road from Arnau 
to Gitschin for the junction of the Prussian armies. 

It would have been better than this had the Austri- 
ans everywhere fallen back without firing a shot, even at 
the expense of opposing no obstacles to the Prussian con- 
centration; for they could then, at least, have concentrat- 
ed their own army for a decisive battle without the 
demoralization attendant upon repeated defeats. 

JUNE 30TH. 

A detachment of cavalry, sent by Frederick Charles 
towards Arnau, met the advanced-guard of the 1st Corps 
at that place. Communication was thus opened between 
the two armies. 

It was evident that the advance of Frederick Charles 
would, by threatening the left and rear of the Austrians, 
cause them to abandon their position on the Elbe, and 
thus loosening Von Benedek's hold on the passages of the 
river, permit the Crown Prince to cross without opposi- 
tion. 

The following orders were therefore sent by Von 
Moltke: 

"The Second Army will hold its ground on the Upper 
Elbe; its right wing will be prepared to effect a junction 
with the left wing of the First Army, by way of Konigin- 
hof, as the latter advances. The First Army will press 
on towards Koniggratz without delay. 

"Any forces of the enemy that may be on the right 
flank of this advance will be attacked by General Von 
Herwarth, and separated from the enemy's main force." 

On this day the armies of Frederick Charles marched 
as follows: 

The Illd Corps, to Aulubitz and Chotec; 



46 

The IVth Corps, to Konetzchlum and Milicowes; 

The lid Corps, to Gitschin and Podhrad; 

The Cavalry Corps, to Dworetz and Robaus; 

The Army of the Elbe, to the vicinity of Libau; 

The Landwehr Guard Division, which had been 
pushed forward from Saxony, arrived at Jung Buntzlau.* 

The Second Army remained in the position of the 
preceding day. 

Von Benedek's army remained in its position on the 
plateau of Dubenetz. 

JULY 1ST. 

At I o'clock in the morning Von Benedek began his 
retreat towards Koniggratz. 

The Illd Corps moved to Sadowa; 

The Xth Corps, to Lipa; 

The 3d Reserve Cavalry Division, to Dohalica; 

The Vlth Corps, to Wsestar; 

The 2d Reserve Cavalry Division, to a position be- 
tween Wsestar and Koniggratz; 

The Vlllth Corps, to Nedelist, on left of the village; 

The IVth Corps, to Nedelist, on right of the village; 

The lid Corps, to Trotina; 

The 2d Light Cavalry Division, to the right of the 
lid Corps; 

The 1st Reserve Cavalry Division, behind Trotina; 

The 1st Corps took up a position in front of Konig- 
gratz; 



*Gitschin, Jung Buntzlau, and Libau are shown on Map No. 6. The positions 
of the other places here mentioned are, in reference to Gitschin, as follows: Auli- 
bitz, nearly 4 miles east; Chotec, about 7i4 miles east; Konetzchlum, about 6^4 miles 
east-south-east; Milicowes, about 4>^ miles south-south-east; Podhrad, about 3 
miles soutli-west: Robaus. abontSmiles east: Dworetz, near, and north of, Robaus. 



POSITION or BOTH. ARMIES 
pTithe evening of the 2".''JTtly, 1866. 



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47 

The 1st Light Cavalry Division, on the left of the 
1st Corps; 

The Saxons were stationed at Neu Prim. 

The Prussian armies, though at liberty to concentrate, 
remained separated for tactical considerations. The ar- 
mies were to make their junction, if possible, upon the 
field of battle, in a combined front and flank attack upon 
the enemy. In the meantime, as they were only a short 
day's march from each other, the danger to be appre- 
hended from separation was reduced to a minimum. 

Frederick Charles' armies moved as follows: 

The Illd Corps, to Miletin and Dobes; 

The IVth Corps, to Horzitz and Gutwasser; 

The lid Corps, to Aujezd and Wostromer; 

The 1st Cavalry Division, to Baschnitz; 

The 2d Cavalry Division, to Liskowitz; 

The Army of the Elbe, to a position between Libau 
and Hochwesely. 

In the Second Army, the 1st Corps was thrown across 
the Elbe to Prausnitz, and the Vlth Corps arrived at 
Gradlitz. 

JULY 2D. 

The Army of the Elbe moved forward to Chotetitz, 
Lhota and Hochweseley, with an advanced-guard at 
Smidar. 

The Guard Landwehr Division advanced to Kopidlno, 
a few miles west of Hochweseley. 

The Austrians remained in the positions of the pre- 
ceding day, but sent their train to the left bank of the 
Elbe. 

Incredible as it seems, the Prussians were ignorant of 
the withdrawal of the Austrians from the plateau of Dub- 



enetz, and did not, in fact, even know that Von Benedek 
had occupied that position. TheAustrians were supposed 
to be behind the Elbe, between Josephstadt and Konig- 
gratz. On the other hand. Von Benedek seems to have 
been completely in the dark in regard to the movements 
of the Prussians. The Prussian Staff History acknowl- 
edges that "the outposts of both armies faced each other 
on this day within a distance of four and one-half miles, 
without either army suspecting the near and concentrated 
presence of the other one." Each commander ignorant 
of the presence, almost within cannon shot, of an enormous 
hostile army! Such a blunder during our Civil War would, 
probably, have furnished European military critics with a 
text for a sermon on the mob-like character of American 
armies. 

Supposing the Austrians to be between Josephstadt 
and Koniggratz, two plans were open to Von Moltke's 
choice. First: To attack the Austrian position in front 
with the First Army and the Army of the Elbe, and on 
its right with the Second Army. This would have neces- 
sitated forcing the passage of a river in the face of a 
formidable enemy; but this passage would have been facil- 
itated by the flank attack of the Crown Prince, whose en- 
tire army (except the Is't Corps) was across the river. It 
would have been a repetition of Magenta on a gigantic 
scale, with the Crown Prince playing the part of McMahon, 
and Frederick Charles enacting the role of the French 
Emperor. Second: To maneuver the enemy out of his 
position by moving upon Pardubitz; the occupation of 
which place would be a serious menace to his communi- 
cations. The latter movement would necessitate the 
transfer of the Second Army to the right bank of the 
Elbe, and then the execution of a flank march in danger- 
ous proximity to the enemy; but its successful execution 
might have produced decisive results. This movement 
by the right would have been strikingly similar to Von 



49 

Moltke's movement by the left, across the Moselle, four 
years later. The resulting battle might have been an an- 
tedated Gravelotte, and Von Benedek might have found 
a Metz in Koniggratz or Josephstadt. At the very least, 
the Austrians would, probably, have been maneuvered out 
of their position behind the Elbe. 

Before determining upon a plan of operations, it was 
decided to reconnoiter the Elbe and the Aupa. The Army 
of the Elbe was directed to watch the country towards 
Prague, and to seize the passages of the river at Pardubitz. 
The First Army was ordered to take up the line Neu 
Bidsow-Horzitz and to send a detachment from its left 
wing to Sadowa, to reconnoiter the line of the Elbe be- 
tween Koniggratz and Josephstadt. The 1st Corps was 
to observe the latter fortress, and to cover the flank march 
of the Second Army, if the movement in question should 
be decided upon. The remaining corps of the Second 
Army were, for the present, to remain in their positions, 
merely reconnoitering towards the Aupa and the Metau. 

These orders were destined to be speedily counter- 
manded. 

Colonel Von Zychlinsky, who commanded an outpost 
at the castle of Cerakwitz, reported an Austrian encamp- 
ment near Lipa, and scouting parties, which were then 
sent out, returned, after a vigorous pursuit by the Austri- 
an cavalry, and reported the presence of the Austrian 
army in force, behind the Bistritz, extending from Problus 
to the village of Benatek. These reports, received after 6 
o'clock p. M., entirely changed the aspect of matters. 

Under the influence of his war experience, Frederick 
Charles was rapidly developing the qualities of a great 
commander; his self-confidence was increasing; and his 
actions now displayed the vigor and military perspicacity 
of Mars-la-Tour, rather than the hesitation of Miinchen- 
gratz.* He believed that Von Benedek, with at least four 

*It is interesting to note the growth of great generals under the influence of 
their actual experience in war. The Frederick of Rossbach and Leuthen was very 



50 

corps, was about to attack him; but he unhesitatingly de- 
cided to preserve the advantages of the initiative, by him- 
self attacking the Austrians in front, in the early morning, 
while the Army of the Elbe should attack their left. The 
co-operation of the Crown Prince was counted upon to 
turn the Austrian right, and thus secure victory. 

With these objects in view, the following movements 
were promptly ordered: 

The 8th Division to be in position at Milowitz at 2 a.m.; 

The 7th Division to take post at Cerakwitz by 2 a. m.; 

The 5th and 6th Divisions to start at 1:30 a. m., and 
take post as reserves south of Horzitz, the 5th west, and 
the 6th east, of the Koniggratz road; 

The 3d Division to Psanek, and the 4th to Bristan; 
both to be in position by 2 a. m.; 

The Cavalry Corps to be saddled by daybreak, and 
await orders; 

The reserve Artillery to Horzitz; 

General Herwarth Von Bittenfeld, with all available 
troops of the Army of the Elbe, to Nechanitz, as soon as 
possible. 

Lieutenant Von Normand was sent to the Crown 
Prince with a request that he take post with one or two 
•corps in front of Josephstadt, and march with another to 
Gross Burglitz. 

The chief-of-staff of the First Army, General Von 
Voigts-Rhetz, hastened to report the situation of matters 



■different from the Frederick of Mollwitz. lu 1796 we find Napoleon calling a coun- 
cil of war before hazarding a second attempt upon Colli's position at St. Michel, 
and showing, even in that vigorous and brilliant campaign, a hesitation never 
shown by the Napoleon of Ulm and Austerlitz. The Grant of Vieksburg was not 
the Grant of Shiloh ; and Lee at Chancellorsville and Petersburg does not seem 
like the same commander who conducted the impotent campaign of 1861 in West 
Virginia. The old saying, " Great generals are born, not made," is not altogether 
true. It would be more correct to say, " Great generals are born, and then made." 



51 

to the King, who had assumed command of the armies on 
June 30th, and now had his headquarters at Gitschin. The 
measures taken by Frederick Charles were approved, and 
Von Moltke at once issued orders for the advance of the 
entire Second Army, as requested by that commander. 
These orders were sent at midnight, one copy being sent 
through Frederick Charles at Kamenitz; the other being 
carried by Count Finkenstein direct to the Crown Prince 
at Koniginhof. The officer who had been sent by Fred- 
erick Charles to the Crown Prince was returning, with an 
answer that the orders from army headquarters made it 
impossible to support the First Army with more than the 
1st Corps and the Reserve Cavalry. Fortunately, he met 
Finkenstein a short distance from Koniginhof. Compar- 
ing notes, the two officers returned together to the Crown 
Prince, who at once issued orders for the movement of 
his entire army to the assistance of Frederick Charles. 

In order to deliver his dispatches to the Crown Prince, 
Finkenstein had ridden twenty-two and one-half miles, 
over a strange road, on a dark, rainy night. Had he lost 
his way; had his horse suffered injury; had he encountered 
an Austrian patrol, the history of Germany might have 
been different. It is almost incredible that the Prussian 
general should have diverged so widely from the charac- 
teristic German prudence as to make success contingent 
upon the life of an aide-de-camp, or possibly the life of a 
horse. Even had the other courier, riding via Kamenitz, 
reached his destination safely, the time that must have 
elapsed between the Crown Prince's declension of co-op- 
eration and his later promise to co-operate, would have 
been sufficient to derange, and perhaps destro)^, the com- 
binations of Von Moltke, 

Let us now examine the Austrian position. Derreca- 
gaix describes it as follows: 

"In front of the position, on the west, ran the Bistritz, 
a little river difficult to cross in ordinary weather, and 
then very much swollen by the recent rains. 



52 

"On the north, between the Bistritz and the Trotina, 
was a space of about five kilometers, by which the columns 
of the assailant might advance. Between these two rivers 
and the Elbe the ground is broken with low hills, covered 
with villages and woods, which gave the defense advan- 
tageous points of support. In the center the hill of Chlum 
formed the key of the position, and commanded the road 
from Sadowa to Koniggratz. The heights of Horenowes 
covered the right on the north. The heights of Problus 
and Hradek constituted a solid support for the left. At 
the south the position of Liebau afforded protection on 
this side to the communications of the army.* 

"The position selected had, then, considerable defen- 
sive value; but it had the defect of having at its back the 
Elbe and the defiles formed by the bridges." 

On this subject, however, Hozier says: "The Aus- 
trian commander took the precaution to throw bridges 
over the river. With plenty of bridges, a river in rear of 
a position became an advantage. After the retreating 
army had withdrawn across the stream, the bridges were 
broken, and the river became an obstacle to the pursuit. 
Special, as well as general, conditions also came into play. 
* * * * The heavy guns of the fortress scoured the 
banks of the river, both up and down stream, and, with 
superior weight of metal and length of range, were able 
to cover the passage of the Austrians." 



*The author's own observations of the topography of the field correspond, in 
the main, with the description given above. The Bistritz, however, is not such a 
formidable obstacle as one might infer from the description quoted. At the vil- 
lage of Sadowa it is a mere ditch, not much larger than some of the acequias in 
Colorado or Utah. It is perhaps eight feet wide and three feet in depth. It could 
hardly have been an obstacle to infantry. Its muddy bottom and marshy banks 
doubtless rendered it a considerable obstacle for artillery, but the eight villages 
through which it flows, within the limits of the battle field, certainly could have 
furnished abundant material for any number of small bridges required for cross- 
ing it. In the vicinity of Nechanitz, the Bistritz, having received the waters of a 
tributary creek, becomes a true obstacle, as it spreads out to a width of about 
thirty yards, and the banks are swampy. It should be remarked that at the time 
of the author's visit to Koniggratz, there had been very heavy rains, and the con- 
dition of the stream was probably the same as on the day of the battle. 



53 

In considering the Austrian retreat, we shall find that 
neither of these distinguished authorities is entirely right, 
or wholly wrong, in regard to the defects and advantages 
of the position described. 

The following dispositions were ordered by Von Ben- 
edek: 

The Saxons to occupy the heights of Popowitz, the 
left wing slightly refused, and covered by the Saxon Cav- 
alry; 

The 1st Light Cavalry Division, to the rear and left, 
at Problus and Prim; 

The Xth Corps on the right of the Saxons; 

The Illd Corps to occupy the heights of Lipa and 
Chlum, on the right of the Xth Corps; 

The Vlllth Corps in reserve, in rear of the Saxons. 

In case the attack should be confined to the left wing, 
the other corps were merely to hold themselves in readi- 
ness. If, however, the attack should extend to the center 
and right, the following dispositions were to be made: 

The IVth Corps to move up on the right of the Illd 
to the heights of Chlum and Nedelist; 

The Ild Corps, on the right of the IVth, constituting 
the extreme right flank; 

The 2d Light Cavalry Division, to the rear of Nedelist; 

The Vlth Corps to be massed on the heights of 
Wsestar; 

The 1st Corps to be massed at Rosnitz; 

The 1st and 3d Cavalry Divisions to take position at 
Sweti; 

The 2d Reserve Cavalry Division, at Briza; 

The Reserve Artillery behind the 1st and Vlth Corps. 

The 1st and Vlth Corps, the five cavalry divisions 
and the Reserve Artillery were to constitute the general 
reserve. 



54 

A slight attempt was made to strengthen the position 
by throwing up entrenchments. Six batteries were con- 
structed on the right, as well as breastworks for about 
eight companies of supporting infantry. The infantry 
breastworks, as well as the batteries, were constructed by 
engineer soldiers, and were of strong profile, with trav- 
erses, and had a command of eight feet. There was not 
the slightest attempt to have the infantry shelter them- 
selves with hasty entrenchments. Even the earthworks 
that were constructed were of no use; for a misunder- 
standing of orders caused the line of battle to be estab- 
lished far in advance of them. On the left but little was 
done to strengthen the position before the Prussian attack 
began. 

THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ, JULY 3D. 

Notwithstanding the heavy rain, the muddy roads, 
and the late hour at which the orders had been received, 
the divisions of the First Army were all at their appointed 
places soon after dawn. The Army of the Elbe pushed 
forward energetically, and at 5:45 o'clock its commander 
notified Frederick Charles that he would be at Nechanitz 
between 7 and 9 o'clock, with thirty-six battalions. The 
First Army was at once ordered forward. 

The 8th Division marched on the left of the high 
road, as the advanced-guard of the troops moving upon 
Sadowa. 

The 4th and 3d Divisions marched on the right of the 
road, abreast of the 8th. 

The 5th and 6th Divisions followed the 8th on the 
right and left of the road respectively, while the Reserve 
Artillery followed on the road itself. 

The Cavalry Corps had started from Gutwasser at 5 
o'clock, and it now marched behind the right wing to 
maintain communication with the Army of the Elbe. 

The 7th Division was to leave Cerekwitz as soon as 
the noise of the opening battle was heard, and was to join 
in the action according to circumstances. 



55 

The divisional cavalry of the 5th and 6th Divisions 
was formed into a brigade, and a brigade of the Cavalry 
Division was attached to the lid Corps. 

About 7:30 the advanced-guard of the Army of the 
Elbe reached Nechanitz, where it encountered a Saxon 
outpost, which retired after destroying the bridges. 

About the same time the 8th Division advanced in 
line of battle upon Sadowa. The Austrian artillery opened 
fire as soon as the Prussians came in sight. The latter 
took up a position near the Sadowa brickfield, and skirm- 
ishing began. 

The 4th Division took up a position at Mzan, on the 
right of the 8th, and its batteries engaged in combat with 
the Austrian artillery. 

The 3d Division formed on the right of the 4th, near 
Zawadilka. 

The 5th and 6th Divisions formed line at Klenitz; one 
on each side of the road. 

The Reserve Cavalry was stationed at Sucha. 

At the first sound of the cannon Von Fransecky 
opened fire upon the village of Benatek, which was soon 
set on fire by the Prussian shells. The village was then 
carried by assault by the advanced-guard of the 7th Di- 
vision. 

There was now a heavy cannonade all along the line. 
The heavy downpour of the last night had given place to 
a dense fog and a drizzling rain; and the obscurity was 
heightened by the clouds of smoke which rose from the 
guns. Frederick Charles rode along the right wing, giving 
orders to respond to the Austrian batteries by firing slow- 
ly, and forbidding the crossing of the Bistritz. His object 
was merely to contain Von Benedek, while waiting for 
the weather to clear up, and for the turning armies to 
gain time. 



56 

At 8 o'clock loud cheering announced the arrival of 
the King of Prussia upon the battle field. As soon as 
Frederick Charles reported to him the condition of affairs, 
the King ordered an advance upon the line of the Bistritz. 
The object of this movement was to gain good points of 
support for the divisions upon the left bank of the Bistritz^ 
from which they might launch forth, at the proper time, 
upon the main position of the enemy. The divisions were 
cautioned not to advance too far beyond the stream, nor 
up to the opposite heights. 

The Austrian position differed slightly from the one 
ordered on the eve of the battle. The Saxons, instead of 
holding the heights eastward of Popowitz and Tresowitz, 
found a more advantageous position on the heights be- 
tween Problus and Prim, with a brigade holding the hills 
behind Lubno, Popowitz and Tresowitz. Nechanitz was 
held merely as an outpost. The remaining dispositions 
of the center and left were, on the whole, as ordered the 
night before; on the right they differed materially from 
the positions designated. 

Instead of the line Chlum-Nedelist, the IVth Corps 
took up its position on the line Cistowes-Maslowed-Hore- 
nowes, 2,000 paces in advance of the batteries that had 
been thrown up. 

The lid Corps formed on the right of the IVth, on 
the heights of Maslowed-Horenowes. 

The 1st and Vlth Corps and the Cavalry took their 
appointed positions, and the Reserve Artillery was sta- 
tioned on the heights of Wsestar and Sweti. 

In the language of the Prussian Staff History: "In- 
stead of the semi-circle originally intended, the Austrian 
line of battle now formed only a very gentle curve, the 
length of which, from Ober-Prim to Horenowes, was about 
six and three-fourths miles, on which four and three- 
fourths corps d'armee were drawn up. The left wing had 



57 

a reserve of three weak brigades behind it, and on the 
right wing only one brigade covered the ground between 
the right flank and the Elbe. On the other hand, a main 
reserve of two corps of infantry and five cavalry divisions 
stood ready for action fully two miles behind the center 
of the whole line of battle." 

The strength of the Austrian army was 206,100 men 
and 770 guns. At this period of the battle it was opposed 
by a Prussian army of 123,918 men, with 444 guns. The 
arrival of the Second Army would, however, increase this 
force to 220,984 men and 792 guns. 

The 7th Division, which had already occupied the 
village of Benatek, was the first to come into serious con- 
flict with the Austrians. The attack, beginning thus on 
the left, was successively taken up by the 8th, 4th and 3d 
Divisions; and the advanced-guard of the Army of the 
Elbe being engaged at the same time, the roar of battle 
extended along the entire line. 

In front of the 7th Division were the wooded heights 
of Maslowed, known also as the Swiep Wald. This for- 
est, extending about 2,000 paces from east to west, and 
about 1,200 from north to south, covered a steep ridge in- 
tersected on its northern slope by ravines, but falling off 
more gradually towards the Bistritz. Against this formi- 
dable position Von Fransecky sent four battalions, which 
encountered two Austrian battalions, and, after a severe 
struggle, drove them from the wood. Now was the time 
to break the Austrian line between Maslowed andCistowes, 
and, turning upon either point, or both, roll up the flanks 
of the broken line. The advanced battalions were quickly 
reinforced by the rest of the division; but all attempts to 
debouche from the wood were baffled. Heavy reinforce- 
ments were drawn from the Austrian IVth and lid Corps, 
and a furious counter-attack was made upon the Prussians. 
Calling for assistance. Von Fransecky was reinforced by 
two battalions of the 8th Division; but he was still strug- 



58 

gling against appalling odds. With fourteen battalions 
and twenty-four guns, he was contending against an Aus- 
trian force of forty battalions and 128 guns. Falling back 
slowly, contesting the ground inch by inch, the Prussian 
division, after a fierce struggle of three hours, still clung 
stubbornly to the northern portion of the wood. Still the 
Austrians had here a reserve of eleven battalions and 
twenty-four guns, which might have been hurled with de- 
cisive effect upon the exhausted Prussians, had not other 
events interfered. 

As soon as the 7th Division had advanced beyond 
Benatek, the 8th Division advanced against the woods of 
Skalka and Sadowa. Two bridges were thrown across the 
Bistritz, west of the Skalka wood, by the side of two per- 
manent bridges, which the Austrians had neglected to 
destroy. The reserve divisions (5th and 6th) advanced, 
at the same time, to Sowetitz, and the Reserve Artillery 
to the Roskosberg. As soon as the 8th Division crossed 
the Bistritz, it was to establish communication with the 
7th Division, and turn towards the Koniggratz highroad. 
The woods of Skalka and Sadowa were occupied without 
much difficulty; the Austrian brigade which occupied them 
falling back in good order to the heights of Lipa, where 
the other brigades of the Illd Austrian Corps were sta- 
tioned. On these heights, between Lipa and Langenhof, 
160 guns were concentrated in a great battery, which sent 
such a "hailstorm of shells" upon the advancing Prussians 
as to check effectually all attempts to debouche from the 
forests. 

The 4th Division advanced from Mzan, and the 3d 
from Zawadilka, soon after the 8th Division moved for- 
ward. The retreat of the Austrian brigade from Sadowa 
had uncovered the flank of the outposts, and compelled 
the withdrawal of the troops successively from Dohalitz, 
Dohalica and Mokrowous to the main position westward 
of Langenhof and Stresetitz, and these outposts were con- 
sequently gained by the Prussians with slight loss. Fur- 



59 

ther advance of the 4th and 3d Divisions was, however, 
prevented by the rapid and accurate fire of the Austrian 
batteries. 

The advanced-guard of the Army of the Elbe had 
gained the left bank of the Bistritz, part of the left wing 
crossing by the bridge of Nechanitz (which had been re- 
paired with gates and barn doors) and part by wading 
breast-deep across the stream. The right wing of the ad- 
vanced-guard was obliged to march down stream to Kun- 
citz, where it crossed, after dislodging a small force of 
Saxons and repairing the bridge. The Saxon outposts 
were all driven back to the main position, and the Prus- 
sian advanced-guard occupied the line Hradek-Lubno, 
thus covering the crossing of the main body. The Prus- 
sians succeeded in throwing only one bridge at this part 
of the field; and as the entire Army of the Elbe was 
obliged to cross upon it and defile through Nechanitz, the 
deployment was necessarily slow. 

At 1 1 o'clock the Prussian advance had been checked. 
The Army of the Elbe was slowly forming in rear of the 
line Hradek-Lubno. The First Army, advancing, as we 
have seen, by echelon of divisions from the left, had 
gained the position Maslowed-Sadowa Wood-Mokrowous, 
thus executing a wheel of about an eighth of a circle to 
the right. The immediate object of the advance had been 
practically gained, it is true, by the occupation of the line 
of the Bistritz, and the conversion of the strong advanced 
posts of the Austrians into good points of support for the 
Prussians. Yet Fransecky was sorely pushed on the left, 
and the 8th Division was suffering so severely from the 
fire of the Austrian guns, that Frederick Charles deemed 
it necessary to order the 5th and 6th Divisions to move 
up to the Sadowa wood. All attempts of these fresh 
troops to gain ground towards the heights of Lipa were 
repulsed, and the Prussian advance again came to a stand- 
still. A counter-attack by a single Austrian brigade 



6o 

against the Sadowa wood ( made without Von Benedek's 
permission) was repulsed. 

The position of the First Army was now critical. The 
last battalion of the infantry reserves had been brought 
into action. Von Fransecky was on a desperate defensive. 
The other divisions were all subjected to a furious, crush- 
ing fire from nearly 250 pieces of artillery, which the Aus- 
trians had brought into action on the heights from Lipa 
to Problus; while, owing partly to the wooded ground, 
partly to the difficulty of crossing the stream, and partly 
to the inefficiency of the Prussian artillery officers, only 
42 guns were on the left bank of the Bistritz to reply to 
this formidable cannonade. Only a portion of Frederick 
Charles' guns were brought into action at all; and their 
long range fire from the positions west of the Bistritz was 
ignored by the Austrian batteries, whose entire energy 
was devoted to a merciless pelting of the Prussian in- 
fantry. 

The statement of the Prussian Staff History that the 
center was in no danger, seems, therefore, to savor more 
of patriotism than of candor. To advance was impossi- 
ble. The infantry was suffering terribly from the Austrian 
fire; the artillery was feebly handled; and the cavalry 
could render no assistance. There was danger that the 
army would be shaken to pieces by Von Benedek's artil- 
lery, and that the demoralized troops would then be swept 
from the field by the comparatively fresh infantry and 
cavalry of the Austrians. The King and his generals 
eagerly scanned the northern horizon with their glasses; 
and, with the intense anxiety of Wellington at Waterloo, 
waited for tidings from, the army on the left, and strained 
their vision for a sight of the advancing columns. The 
question of retreat was discussed. The Reserve Cavalry 
was ordered up to Sadowa, apparently with a view to cov- 
ering the withdrawal of the army to the right bank of the 
stream. It was now past i o'clock. It was resolved to hold 
the line of the Bistritz at all hazards, and a heavy artillery 



6i 

fire was kept up. In the meantime, events on other parts 
of the field were already beginning to extricate the First 
Army from its perilous situation. 

At 11:30, the 14th and 15th Divisions of the Army of 
the Elbe having come upon the field, an attack was ordered 
upon both flanks of the Saxons. The 15th Divison, fol- 
lowed by a brigade of cavalry, moved, through Hradek, 
against Ober-Prim. The 14th Division moved on the 
heights east of Popowitz, through the forest, against Prob- 
lus. The advanced-guard, between the two divisions, 
moved to the attack, pushing its flanks forward, for the 
double purpose of avoiding the heavy fire from the ene- 
my's front and masking the movements of the turning 
divisions. The Prince of Saxony, believing it a favorable 
opportunity to assume the offensive, attacked the Prus- 
sian advanced-guard with a Saxon brigade. The attack, 
though made with great spirit, was repulsed. Again the 
Prince attacked, this time with two brigades; but the ad- 
vancing Saxons being struck on the left flank by the 15th 
Division, were driven back with heavy loss, and Ober-Prim 
was carried by the Prussians. General Herwarth Von 
Bittenfeld had succeeded in bringing 66 guns to the left 
bank of the Bistritz, and he now pushed them forward to 
within 2,000 paces of Nieder Prim, upon which they con- 
centrated a heavy fire, under cover of which the place was 
carried by a regiment of the 15th Division. The 14th Di- 
vision, having gained possession of Popowitz and the 
wood east of that village, now joined the 15th Division in 
a concentric attack upon Problus. The Prince of Saxony 
had not only observed the preparations for this attack, 
but he had also observed the arrival of the Prussian Sec- 
ond Army at Chlum; and he now, at 3 o'clock, ordered a 
retreat to the heights southwest of Rosnitz. The troops 
at Problus, acting as a rear-guard, offered a stubborn re- 
sistance to the advancing Prussians; but they were driven 
from the village, and the advance of the 14th and 15th 
Divisions was checked only by the artillery fire of the 



62 

Saxons and theVIIIth Corps, stationed on the hills north- 
east of Problus. 

During this time the Second Army had been working 
great results. At 8 o'clock Von Alvensleben, command- 
ing the advanced-guard of the Guard Corps, at Daubrow- 
itz, heard the cannonade in the direction of Benatek. 
Without waiting for orders, he at once put his command 
in march for the scene of conflict, notifying his corps 
commander of his departure, and sending word to Von 
Fransecky that he would beat Jericek by 11:30. The 
rest of the corps quickly followed, marching straight 
across country, up hill and down hill, pushing through the 
heavy mud with such restless energy that several of the 
artillery horses dropped dead from fatigue. The ad- 
vanced-guard arrived at Jericek at 11 o'clock, and at the 
same hour the heads of the columns of the main body ar- 
rived at Choteborek, to which point the Crown Prince had 
hurried in advance of the troops. 

The Vlth Corps advanced from its position, near 
Gradlitz, in two columns. The 12th Division marched, 
via Kukus and Ertina, to the heights east of Rosnow, de- 
taching a battalion and a squadron to mask the fortress 
of Josephstadt. The nth Division marched, via Schurz, 
to Welchow. As soon as it neared the latter place Von 
Mutius, commanding the corps, ordered both divisions to 
keep connection and march to the sound of the cannonade. 
The troops pushed on "over hills, meadows and ditches, 
through copses and hedgerows," across the swampy val- 
ley of the Trotina, part of the troops crossing the stream 
by the single bridge, and part wading breast-deep through 
the water. At 11 o'clock the nth Division arrived at the 
heights north of Racitz, and came under the fire of the 
enemy's batteries. 

At 8 o'clock the Vth Corps began its march, via 
Schurz and Dubenitz, to Choteborek; and at n o'clock its 
advanced-guard was approaching that village. 



63 ■ 

The 1st Corps did not start until 9:30. It marched 
via Zabres, Gross-Trotin and Weiss Polikau; and at 11 
o'clock it had not yet reached Gross-Burglitz. 

Thus, at 1 1 o'clock, the only troops that had reached 
the Trotina were the Guards and the Vlth Corps; and 
they were still two and one-half miles from the left wing 
of the First Army. In three hours the Second Army had 
been so concentrated as to reduce its front from twenty- 
two and one-half miles to nine miles; and it now occupied 
the line Burglitz-Jericek-Choteborek-Welchow. 

The Crown Prince, from his station on the heights of 
Choteborek, about four and one-half miles from Maslowed, 
had an extended view towards the valley of the Bistritz; 
and notwithstanding the rain and fog, he could trace the 
direction of the contending lines by the smoke of the 
burning villages and flashes of the guns. It was evident 
that his columns were marching in such a direction as to 
bring them directly upon the flank and rear of the Aus- 
trian troops already engaged; but, though the formidable 
heights of Horenowes appeared to be occupied by only 
one battery, it seemed probable that the passage of the 
Elbe by the Crown Prince was known by Von Benedek, 
and that the troops on the Austrian right were waiting 
behind the crest of the hills, to spring forward into action 
when the Prussians should undertake to cross the swampy 
valley between the Trotina and the heights of Horenowes. 
The different divisions were ordered to direct their march 
upon a prominent group of trees on the Horenowes hill. 

The Austrians were now in a position of extreme 
danger. The heights of Horenowes, which seemed to 
offer such a formidable obstacle to the advance of the 
Crown Prince, had been left almost defenseless. As we 
have seen, the Austrian IVth and Ild Corps had taken 
up the line Cistowes-Maslowed-Horenowes, and the space 
between the right flank and the Elbe was guarded by only 
one brigade and two battalions. To make matters worse, 



64 

the IVth and lid Corps had been drawn into the fight 
with Von Fransecky in the Swiep Wald, and, facing west, 
they now presented a flank to the advancing columns of 
the Crown Prince. The advance of these two corps be- 
yond the line Chlum-Nedelist had carried them far beyond 
support; and now, with the Prussian Second Army within 
two and one-half miles of them, their reserves were fully 
three miles away. 

Von Benedek discovering that these two corps had 
not taken up their designated positions, sent orders, be- 
fore II o'clock, to their commanders, to fall back to the 
positions originally assigned to them. Unfortunately, the 
commander of the IVth Corps, ignorant of the approach 
of the Crown Prince, and flushed with his success against 
Von Fransecky, thought it an opportune moment to as- 
sume a vigorous offensive against the Prussian left, and 
would not make the movement ordered until he had sent 
a report to that effect to his chief. The projected offen- 
sive was disapproved, and the former order was repeated. 
The two corps now retired to the positions originally des- 
ignated, the movement being covered by the fire of 64 
pieces of artillery posted on the plateau of Nedelist. The 
withdrawal had been delayed too long; for the Crown 
Prince already had 48 guns in position between Racitz 
and Horenowes, the Prussian infantry was advancing, and 
the Austrian movement partook, consequently, of the na- 
ture of a retreat. Yet it is greatly to the credit of the 
Austrian troops that they were able to execute a flank 
movement — and a retrograde movement, too — under the 
fire of the enemy; though they had been in action fully 
three hours. 

At noon Von Benedek received a telegram from Sal- 
ney, via Josephstadt, announcing the approach of the 
Second Army. At this very moment the guns of the 
Crown Prince were playing upon the Austrian right flank. 



65 

The advanced-guard of the ist Division of Guards 
had debouched from Zizilowes at 11:15A.M.; its right 
flank being covered by the cavalry brigade which had cov- 
ered the left of the 7th Division. The advanced-guard of 
the 2d Guard Division, (which had been separated from 
the main body by the Reserve Artillery of the 1st Divis- 
ion cutting into the column on the road) without waiting 
for the arrival of its comrades, joined the ist ^Division in 
its attack upon Horenowes. At noon the 12th Division 
had captured the Horicka Berg, the nth Division had 
driven the Austrians from Racitz, and the Guards were 
advancing upon Horenowes. The withdrawal of the Aus- 
trian lid Corps had been covered by 40 guns posted east 
of Horenowes, which kept up a heavy fire upon the Prus- 
sians. But the Guards easily carried Horenowes, the po- 
sition of the great battery was turned, the hostile infantry 
was advancing upon its flank, and the artillery was forced 
to retire. The 12th Division, in the meantime, had cap- 
tured Sendrasitz, cutting off the Austrian brigade which 
had been covering the right flank. The nth Division 
then moved up to a posicion north of Sendrasitz, on the 
left of the Guards, and the latter advanced to Maslowed. 
The Prussians now had 90 guns on the heights of Hore- 
nowes; and most of these pieces were hurried forward 
beyond Maslowed, within 1,300 paces of the Austrian po- 
sition, where they prepared the way for the infantry assault 
by a vigorous cannonade. 

When the Guards advanced, the Austrian IVth Corps 
was still engaged in taking up its new position. Unchecked 
by the fire of more than 100 guns in position west of Ned- 
elist, the Guards crushed the two battalions on the left of 
the IVth Corps, and penetrated into the gap; the left wing 
rolling up the flank of an Austrian brigade, and pushing 
on in the direction of Sweti; while the right wing, chang- 
ing front to the right, stormed the village of Chlum, 
which, though the key of the Austrian position, was occu- 



66 

pied by only a single battalion. As the Guards advanced, 
the force under Von Alvensleben, which had constituted 
the advanced-guard in the morning, moved forward in 
echelon on their right. A brigade of the Austrian IVth 
Corps, which, by some mistake, had been left at Cistowes, 
and was now marching to the new position of its corps, 
was struck by Von Alvensleben, and driven to the west- 
ward of Chlum with heavy loss. Simultaneously with the 
Guards, the Vlth Corps advanced upon the enemy, the 
nth Division capturing Nedelist, and the I2th driving the 
cut-off Austrian brigade into Lochenitz. The Austrians 
made several determined attacks from Langenhof and the 
Lipa wood upon the Prussians in Chlum; but though they 
fought with great bravery and penetrated into the village, 
they were repulsed by the Guards, who then seized Ros- 
beritz and the forest of Lipa. The 1st Austrian Reserve 
Cavalry Division, consisting of five regiments, charged the 
Prussians south of Chlum. The brigade on the left con- 
sisted of two regiments of cuirassiers, and was formed in 
double column: the one on the right was composed of two 
regiments (one of cuirassiers and one of lancers), formed 
in double column, with a regiment of cuirassiers following 
as a second line. The charge was repulsed by four com- 
panies of the infantry of the Guard. It is remarkable that 
in this case, the cavalry came within 200 yards of the in- 
fantry before the latter opened fire. 

At 3 o'clock matters had, consequently, changed very 
much for the worse with the Austrians. On the left, the 
Saxons had been driven from their position; on the right, 
the Prussian Guards and Vlth Corps occupied the line 
Rosberitz-Nedelist-Lochenitz. The Austrian IVth and 
lid Corps had been defeated, and were retreating upon 
Wsestar, Sweti, Predmeritz and Lochenitz. The ist Di- 
vision of the Guards had captured 55 guns, and had seized 
the key of the Austrian position. The Austrian Illd 
Corps was sandwiched between the Guards and the First 
Army. Yet the position of the Guards was full of danger. 






6; 

In the valley of Sweti-Wsestar-Rosnitz were the two in- 
tact corps of Austrian reserves, with more than 70 squad- 
rons of cavalry; and between Wsestar and Langenhof were 
massed the powerful batteries of the reserve artillery, 
which kept Rosberitz and Chlum under a heavy fire. The 
main body of the 2d Division of the Guards was just as- 
cending the heights of Maslowed. There were no other 
troops within a mile and a quarter upon whom they could 
depend for assistance. 

Von Benedek, who had taken his position between 
Lipa and Chlum, hearing of the occupation of the latter 
village by the Prussians, could scarcely believe the sur- 
prising news. As he rode hurriedly toward Chlum, the 
information was rudely corroborated by a volley from the 
Prussians, which mortally wounded an aide-de-camp, and 
seriously injured several other members of his escort. 
There was no longer any doubt. Victory was now out of 
the question, and it was necessary to take prompt meas- 
ures to save the right wing from annihilation, and to pre- 
vent the retreat of the rest of the army from being cut off. 

A brigade of the Austrian 1st Corps was sent to rein- 
force the Saxons near Problus, and another brigade of the 
same corps was sent against the Lipa wood and the heights 
west of Chlum. The latter brigade, reinforced by a bri- 
gade of the Illd Corps and fragments of the IVth Corps, 
made three desperate attacks upon the advanced-guard 
of the 2d Division and part of the ist Division of the 
Prussian Guards at these points, only to recoil, completely 
baffled, before the deadly fire of the needle gun. The 
Illd Corps no longer had any intact troops; it was be- 
tween two fires; it began its retreat, and abandoned the 
village of Lipa to the Prussians. On the left, the main 
body of the ist Division of the Guards was engaged at 
Rosberitz with the Austrian Vlth Corps. Advancing res- 
olutely to the attack, the Austrians dislodged the Guards 
from the village after a bloody struggle; but as they halt- 



ed at the outskirts of the town to re-form for another as- 
sault, the Guards were reinforced by the advanced-guard 
of the 1st Corps. At the same time, the commander of 
the Prussian Vlth Corps, leaving the I2th Division en- 
gaged with the Austrians at Lochenitz, half-wheeled the 
nth Division to the right, and advanced from Nedelist 
upon Rosberitz. The Austrian lid Corps was already in 
retreat. A counter-attack of the Guards and the 1st Corps 
drove the Austrians out of Rosberitz; and the nth Divis- 
ion striking them on the flank routed them with heavy 
loss. The nth Division then attacked a brigade of the 
Austrian IVth Corps, which had taken up a position near 
Sweti to protect the reserve artillery. The brigade and 
the artillery were driven back to the village, which was 
carried by assault, many cannon being captured. TheVth 
Corps reached Horenowes at 4 o'clock, and was designat- 
ed as the general reserve of the army. 

The full tide of Prussian success had now set in. The 
i6th Division had not yet crossed at Nechanitz, but the 
14th and 15th Divisions had defeated the Saxons and the 
Austrian Vlllth Corps, and the allies were in retreat. 
Both of the Austrian flanks had been crushed, and the 
First Army was now actively engaged in an attack upon 
Von Benedek's front. 

The aide-de-camp sent by the Crown Prince to an- 
nounce his approach had been delayed by the condition 
of the roads and the necessity of making a long detour, 
and did not arrive at the royal headquarters until late in 
the afternoon. The Crown Prince's advance was first 
made known to the commander of the First Army by the 
flashes of the Prussian guns on the heights of Horenowes. 
Soon after, the Prussian columns were seen ascending the 
heights of Maslowed. The fire of the Austrian guns in 
front perceptibly diminished, and it was evident that some 
of the batteries had changed front to the right. It was 
clear that the Second Army had struck the Austrian flank; 



69 

and at 3:30 o'clock the King ordered "an advance all along 
the line" of the First Army. The retreat of the Austrian 
Xth Corps had begun, but it was concealed by the nature 
of the ground, and covered by the line of artillery, which 
devotedly maintained its position, and kept up a heavy 
fire, until its own existence was imperiled by the advance 
of the foe. The Xth Corps had passed well beyond the 
danger of infantry pursuit when the advance of the First 
Army was ordered. The Austrian artillerists held to their 
position until the enemy was almost at the muzzle of the 
cannon, and then withdrawing to Rosnitz and Briza, with 
all the guns that their stubborn defense had not compelled 
them to sacrifice, again opened fire upon the Prussians. 
The cavalry, too, devoted itself to the task of covering 
the retreat. The Prussian cavalry, which had been delayed 
by the blocking of the bridges by the artillery, and the 
crowding of the roads by the infantry, now appeared in 
the front of the pursuers, and fierce cavalry combats took 
place near Langenhof, Stresetitz and Problus. Though 
eventually overmatched, the Austrian cavalry made a no- 
ble fight, and, at the sacrifice of its best blood, materially 
assisted in covering the retreat of the army. 

Frederick Charles, bringing up 54 guns to the heights 
of Wsestar and Sweti, opened fire upon the new line of 
Austrian artillery. The Austrian batteries replied with 
spirit, until the advance of the nth Division upon Rosnitz 
and Briza compelled them to withdraw, with the loss of 
36 guns. Still undaunted, the artillery took up a new po- 
sition on the line Stosser-Freihofen-Zeigelshag. Here all 
available guns were brought into action, and under their 
fire the Prussian pursuit virtually ended. Withdrawing in 
excellent order to the line Placitz-Kuklena, the Austrian 
artillery kept up a duel with the Prussian guns on the line 
Klacow-Stezerek until long after darkness had set in. 

The Prussian Staff History says: "The behavior of 
the cavalry and the well-sustained fire of the powerful line 



70 

of artillery at Placitz and Kuklena, proved that part, at 
least of the hostile army still retained its full power of 
resistance. 

"It is true that affairs behind this line of artillery 
bore a very different aspect. At first the corps had, for 
the most part, taken the direction of the bridges north- 
ward of Koniggratz, but were prevented from using them 
by the advance of the Prussian extreme left wing. This 
caused the different bodies of troops to become promis- 
cuously and confusedly mingled together. The flying 
cavalry, shells bursting on all sides, still further increased 
the confusion, which reached its climax when the com- 
mandant of Koniggratz closed the gates of the fortress. 

"Hundreds of wagons, either overturned or thrust off 
from the highroad, riderless horses and confused crowds 
of men trying to escape across the inundated environs of 
the fortress and the river, many of them up to their necks 
in water — this spectacle of wildest flight and utter rout, 
immediately before the gates of Koniggratz, was naturally 
hidden from the view of the pursuing enemy." 

A prompt pursuit would, however, have been imprac- 
ticable, even if the Prussians had fully appreciated the 
extent of the Austrian demoralization. The concentric 
attacks, so magnificently decisive on the field, had pro- 
duced an almost chaotic confusion on the part of the vic- 
tors themselves. Owing to the direction of their attacks, 
the Second Army and the Army of the Elbe were "tele- 
scoped" together; and the advance of the First Army had 
jammed it into the right flank of the former and the left 
flank of the latter. At noon the front of the combined 
Prussian armies had been more than sixteen miles long. 
The front of this great host was now but little more than 
two miles; and men of different regiments, brigades, di- 
visions, corps, and even armies, were now indiscriminately 
mingled together. Aside from this confusion, the exhaus- 
tion of the Prussian soldiers precluded pursuit. Most of 



71 

them had left their bivouacs long before dawn, and it had 
been a day of hard marching and hard fighting for all. 
Many had been entirely without food, all were suffering 
from extreme fatigue, and several officers had fallen dead 
on the field from sheer exhaustion. 

As a result of the exhaustion of the Prussians and the 
excellent conduct of the Austrian cavalry and artillery, 
Von Benedek slipped across the Elbe, and gained such a 
start on his adversaries that for three days the Prussians 
lost all touch with him, and were in complete ignorance 
of the direction of his retreat. 

Thus ended the great battle of Koniggratz. The 
Prussian losses were 9,153, killed, wounded and missing. 
The Austrians lost 44,200, killed, wounded and missing, 
including in the last classification 19,800 prisoners. They 
also lost 161 guns, five stands of colors, several thousand 
muskets, several hundred wagons and a ponton train. 
The sum total of the killed, wounded and missing (exclu- 
sive of prisoners) in this battle was 27,656. 

It is not necessary, for the present, even to sketch the 
retreat of the Austrian army upon Olmiitz and Vienna; 
the masterly march of Von Moltke to the Danube; the 
Italian disasters of Custozza and Lissa; and the campaign 
in which the Army of the Maine defeated the Bavarians 
and the Vlllth Federal Corps.* Koniggratz was the de- 
cisive battle of the war. Austria could not rally from her 
disaster, and twenty-three days after the battle the truce 
of Nikolsburg virtually ended the contest. 

COMMENTS. 

It is not only on account of its great and far-reaching 
results that Koniggratz must be rated as one of the great- 
est battles of the world. In point of numbers engaged, it 
was the greatest battle of modern times; for the two con- 
tending armies aggregated nearly half a million men. In 



*A sketch of these operations is given in the appendices. 



72 

this respect it exceeded Gravelotte, dwarfed Solferino and 
even surpassed the "Battle of Nations" fought on the 
plains of Leipsic, fifty-two years before. 

Yet, considering the numbers engaged, the loss of 
life was not great. The sum total of the killed and 
wounded was nearly 6,000 less than at Gettysburg, though 
in that sanguinary struggle the combined strength of the 
Union and Confederate armies was less than that of the 
Austrian army alone at Koniggratz.* In fact, of all the 
battles of the War of Secession, Fredericksburg, Chatta- 
nooga and Cold Harbor were the only ones in which the 
losses of the victors, in killed and wounded, did not ex- 
ceed, in proportion to the numbers engaged, the losses of 
the defeated army at Koniggratz. A bit of reflection upon 
these facts might convince certain European critics that 
the failure of victorious American armies to pursue their 
opponents vigorously was due to other causes than ineffi- 
cient organization or a lack of military skill. In the 
words of Colonel Chesney: "In order to pursue, there 
must be some one to run away; and, to the credit of the 
Americans, the ordinary conditions of European war- 
fare in this respect were usually absent from the great 
battles fought across the Atlantic. Hence, partly, the 
frequent repetition of the struggle, almost on the same 
ground, of which the last campaign of Grant and Lee is 
the crowning example." It is, perhaps, not too much to 
say, that had Von Benedek been a Lee, and had his army 
been of the nature of Lee's army, even if defeated at 
Koniggratz, the next day would have found him on the 
left bank of the Elbe, under the shelter of hasty entrench- 



*The strength of the Union army at Gettysburg was 78,043. The Confederate 
army numbered about 70,000. The Union army lost 3,073 killed, and 14,497 wound- 
ed. The Confederates lost 2,592 killed, and 12,709 wounded. In comparing the 
losses of Gettysburg with those of Koniggratz, no account is here taken of the 
"missing" in either the Union or the Confederate losses; though the missing (ex- 
elusive of prisoners) are figured in with the killed and wounded of the Prussian 
and Austrian armies. The figures in regard to Gettysburg are taken from the ta- 
bles (compiled from official records) in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War." 
The figures in regard to Koniggratz are taken from the Prussian Official History. 



73 

ments, presenting a bold front to the Prussians; for there 
was no reason, aside from demoralization, for the retreat 
of the Austrians far from the scene of their defeat. Their 
communications were neither intercepted nor seriously 
endangered; their losses had not been excessive; and, but 
for their discouragement and loss of morale, there is no 
reason why their defeat at Koniggratz should have been 
decisive. 

Not the least of the causes of the Austrian defeat 
was the autocratic policy of Von Benedek, which caused 
the entire management of the army to be centralized in 
his own person, and the plan of battle to be locked up in 
his own mind. However brave, willing and obedient a 
subordinate officer may be, there can be no doubt that his 
duties will be better done, because more intelligently done, 
if he has a clear knowledge of the part that he is called 
upon to perform. The higher the rank, and the more im- 
portant the command, of the subordinate officer, the more 
certainly is this the case. Yet Von Benedek seems to 
have desired from his corps commanders nothing more 
than the blind obedience of the private soldier. On the 
day before the battle of Koniggratz all the corps com- 
manders were summoned to headquarters; but Von Bene- 
dek, after alluding merely to unimportant matters of 
routine, dismissed them without a word of instruction as 
to the part to be performed by them in the battle which 
he must have known to be imminent. On the day of the 
battle the commanders of the corps and divisions on the 
right were not informed of the construction of the batter- 
ies, and were not notified that these entrenchments were 
intended to mark their line. Instead of being thrown up 
by the divisions themselves, these works were constructed 
by the chief engineer, without one word of consultation 
or explanation with the corps commanders. Had the 
commanders of the Hid, IVth and lid Corps been informed 
that their principal duty would be to guard against a pos- 



74 

sible, if not probable, advance of the Crown Prince, it is 
not likely that the line Cistowes-Maslowedr-Horenowes 
would have been occupied by the. right wing; but these 
generals seem to have taken up their positions with no 
more idea of their object or of their influence upon the 
result of the battle than had the men in the ranks.- 

* * 
The selection made by Von Benedek of a field for the 
coming battle cannot be condemned. On the whole, the 
position was a strong one, and the fault lay in the dispo- 
sitions purposely made, or accidentally assumed, rather 
than in any inherent weakness in the position. 

According to some writers. Von Benedek committed 
an error in holding his advanced posts in the villages on 
the Bistritz with small forces (which in some cases did 
not exceed a battalion), while the Prussian advanced- 
guards generally consisted of a brigade at least. Derre- 
cagaix says: "It was of importance to the Imperial Army 
to compel the Prussian forces to deploy at the earliest 
moment; to tire them before their arrival at the Bistritz; 
to dispute the passage of that river, which constituted an 
obstacle, in order that they might approach the main po- 
sition only after having exhausted their efforts and lost 
their e/an through heavy casualties." To this end, he sug- 
gests that the Austrians should have established west of 
the Bistritz, on the two roads by which the Prussians must 
necessarily have advanced, two strong advanced posts, 
composed of troops of all three arms, and sufficiently 
strong to resist the enemy's advanced-guards. He con- 
tinues: "The Bistritz formed a first line of defense, on 
which it would have been possible to check the assailant's 
efforts. It possessed the peculiarity of having all along 
its course villages distant from i,000 to 1,500 meters, and 
separated by marshy meadows with difficult approaches. 
With some batteries in rear of the intervals which sepa- 
rated the villages, it would have been possible to hold 



75 

them a certain time, and compel the enemy to execute a 
complete deployment. The Imperial Army had, it is true, 
on the Bistritz and beyond, detachments of considerable 
strength. But they played an insignificant part, by reason 
of the orders given, or modified their positions in the 
morning. As a result, the line of the Bistritz, its banks, 
the villages and the woods beyond, were occupied by the 
Prussians without great efforts, and they had from that 
moment defensive /^?';?/^ d' appid on which it was possible 
to await events and sustain the fight." 

It is impossible to agree fully with Derrecagaix on 
this point. Speaking of defensible points in front of a 
position, Hamley says: "A feature of this kind will be 
especially valuable in front of what would otherwise be a 
weak part of the position. Strong in itself, and its garri- 
son constantly reinforced from the line; while the ground 
in front is swept by batteries, such a point is difficult to 
attack directly; the enemy cannot attempt to surround it 
without exposing the flank and rear of the attacking 
troops; and to pass by it in order to reach the position, 
the assailants must expose their flank to its fire. If sev- 
eral such points exist, they support each other, isolate 
the parts of the enemy's attack, and force him to expend 
his strength in costly attacks on them: in fact, they play 
the part of bastions in a line of fortification. But it is 
important that they should be within supporting distance 
and easy of covered access from the rear; failing these 
conditions, they had better be destroyed, if possible, as 
defenses, and abandoned to the enemy." 

Now, none of the advanced posts in question were in 
front of a weak part of the position (for the line adopted 
by Von Benedek was incomparably stronger than anything 
on the line of the Bistritz), and it would have been impos- 
sible to use artillery in them with anything like the mur- 
derous effect produced by the batteries on the line Lipa- 
Problus. They were more than a mile and a quarter in 



76 

front of the position, and were not "easy of covered ac- 
cess from the rear." They were, it is true, within sup- 
porting distance of each other; but, while attacking them, 
the Prussians would have been beyond the best effect of 
the powerful artillery in the main Austrian line. The 
preliminary combats would have largely fallen on the in- 
fantry; and, owing to the inferior arms and impaired 
morale of his infantry, it was, doubtless, the first aim of 
the Austrian commander to use his artillery to the fullest 
extent; for in that arm he knew that he was superior to 
the Prussians. Von Benedek's plan was, apparently, to 
lure Frederick Charles into a position where he should 
have the Bistritz at his back; where he should be at the 
mercy of the Austrian artillery; and where he could be 
overwhelmed by the attack of superior numbers of in- 
fantry and cavalry, after he had been demoralized and 
shattered by a crushing cannonade. The Bistritz (above 
Lubno) is an insignificant obstacle; but it might have 
been a troublesome obstruction in the rear of a defeated 
army. Had the Crown Prmce been delayed five or six 
hours, it is probable that Von Benedek's plan would have 
succeeded. The terrible battering which Frederick Charles 
received, as it actually was, is shown by the fact that his 
losses exceeded those of the Second Army and the Army 
of the Elbe combined. Tn fact, the event proved that, so 
far as the repulse of a front attack was concerned, Von 
Benedek's position fulfilled every condition that could be 
desired; and it does not seem that anything could have 
been gained by the occupation in force of the villages on 
the Bistritz above Lubno. They should rather have been 
abandoned and destroyed, and everything left to depend 
on the magnificent position in rear — a position scarcely 
inferior in strength to Marye's Heights or St. Privat. 

The only village on the Bistritz that had any real 
value was Nechanitz. Von Benedek's weak points were 
his flanks. Had Nechanitz been occupied in strong force. 



11 

the turning of the Austrian left by the Army of the Elbe 
would have been a matter of extreme difficulty, if not a 
downright impossibility. We have seen that the retreat 
of the Austrian brigade from Sadowa uncovered the flanks 
of the advanced posts, and compelled the withdrawal of 
the troops successively frorn Dohalitz, Dohalica and Mok- 
rowous; and it might seem, at first, that the abandonment 
of Nechanitz might have been caused in a similar manner: 
but such is not the case. The heights in rear of that vil- 
lage, and between it and Hradek, should have been hel'd 
by two corps, from which a strong detachment should 
have been placed in Nechanitz. This detachment could 
easily have been reinforced as occasion demanded. Any 
attempt to make a flank attack upon the village, from the 
direction of Popowitz, would have been made over unfa- 
vorable ground, and the attacking force could have been 
assailed in flank by Austrian troops from the heights. 
Attempts to cross at Kuncitz or Eoharna could have been 
promptly met and repulsed; and attempts to cross further 
down would have extended the Prussian front to such a 
degree as to expose it to a dangerous counter-attack 
through Nechanitz. This occupation of Nechanitz would, 
it is true, have thrust Von Benedek's left flank forward, 
towards the enemy; but that flank would have been strong 
in numbers and position; it would have been covered by 
the Bistritz (where that stream is swollen into a true ob- 
stacle); and it would have occupied a position command- 
ing Nechanitz and Kuncitz, and within easy reinforcing 
distance of each. Nechanitz would have been to Von 
Benedek's left what Hougomont was to Wellington's 
right; and in the event of Austrian success, it would have 
given the same enveloping front that the British had at 
Waterloo. The neglect of Von Benedek to hold Nechanitz 
in force is surprising; for the position of his reserves indi- 
cates that he expected an attack upon his left — a not un- 
sound calculation, as his main line of retreat lay in rear 
of his left wing. 



78 

On the right there were three positions, any one of 
which might have been so occupied as to check the attack 
of the Crown Prince; namely: i. The Hne Tro'ina-Hore- 
nowes; 2. The line Trotina-Sendrasitz-Maslowed; 3. The 
line Lochenitz-Nedelist-Chlum. The first is regarded as 
the best by the Austrian Staff. The third is the one ac- 
•tually chosen by Von Benedek, but not taken up, owing 
to a misunderstanding of orders. Without undertaking 
to discuss in detail the dispositions that should have been 
made by the Austrian commander, or the relative merits 
of the three defensive positions available on the right, the 
assertion may be ventured that, in order to make them 
well suited to the ground and the circumstances of the 
battle, the Austrian dispositions actually made needed 
only to be modified so as to make the left strong in the 
vicinity of Nechanitz and the heights of Hradek, and to 
occupy any one of the three defensive positions on the 
right with two corps, with another corps in reserve within 
easy supporting distance. If then, profiting by American 
experience. Von Benedek had covered his position with 
hasty entrenchments (for the construction of which the 
battle field afforded every facility), he should have been 
able to repulse the combined Prussian armies; for the 
numerical odds against him were not great at any time; 
his reserves would have- been in a position to push for- 
ward promptly to any point seriously endangered; and 
his entrenchments would have fully counterbalanced the 
superior firearms of the Prussian infantry. Though he 
could not, in all probability, have gained a decisive vic- 
tory, he could have inflicted greater losses than he re- 
ceived, he could have given his adversaries a bloody 
check, and the mere possession of a hard-fought field 
would have raised the morale of his depressed army. 

For a defensive battle, the formation on a salient an- 
gle would, in this case, have been deprived of its usual 
objections. Considering the nature of the country, and 



79 

the enormous armies engaged, it is plain that the whole 
force of the assailant could not be brought to bear on one 
face of the angle; and the heights of Chlum would have 
served as a huge traverse to protect the lines from enfilade 
fire by the enemy's artillery. 

A serious defect of the Austrian position was its want 
of proper extent. As we have seen, the entire army oc- 
cupied a position only six and three-quarters miles long. 
Including the reserves, there were, then, more than 30,000 
men to a mile. The entire army was crowded, and the 
cavalry had no room for action. The latter should have 
operated across the Bistritz against the Prussian right; or 
(sacrificing itself if necessary) it should have operated 
against the Prussian left, opposing the advance of the 
Crown Prince, and gaining time for the infantry to take 

up the new position. 

* 
* * 

The "spectacle of wildest flight and utter rout" in the 
passage of the defeated army over the Elbe* would surely 
seem to support the views of Derrecagaix, rather than 
those of Hozier, in regard to a position with a river at its 
back, even though the river be spanned by many bridges. 
Yet Von Benedek undoubtedly derived considerable ad- 
vantage from having the Elbe at his back; for the Prus- 
sian Staff History says: "The Elbe formed a considerable 
barrier to any further immediate pursuit. As soon as the 
bridges over the river were once reached by the enemy — 
to whom moreover the fortress of Koniggratz, which com- 
mands so large a tract of the surrounding country, afford- 
ed a perfectly secure place of crossing — the pursuers were 
obliged to make the detour by way of Pardubitz." If Von 
Benedek had encountered only a front attack, and had 
been defeated, it is probable that the Elbe at his back 
would have been advantageous to him in the highest de- 
gree; for the superb behavior of his artillery and cavalry 

*See page 70. 



8o 

wo.uld have effectually covered the retreat of his infantry 
over the numerous bridges, and the Elbe would have 
played the same part in favor of the Austrians that the 
Mincio did after Solferino. But the direction of the 
Crown Prince's attack destroyed the value of the bridges 
north of Koniggratz; and, but for the protection afforded 
by the fortress, the Elbe, instead of being of the slightest 
advantage, would have completely barred the retreat of a 

great part of the Austrian army. 

* 
* * 

Von Benedek's selection of his individual station for 
watching the progress of the battle was unfortunate. 
From his station on the slope between Lipa and Chlum, 
his view of the field was limited by the Swiep Wald on the 
north, and Problus on the south; and his view of the entire 
northeastern portion of the field was cut off by the hill 
and village of Chlum. The hill of Chlum was his proper 
station, and the church tower in that hamlet should have 
been used as a lookout by some officer of his staff. From 
that point the Horica Berg, the heights of Horenowes, 
the Swiep Wald, the village and wood of Sadowa, the vil- 
lages on the Bistritz (almost as far as Nechanitz), the vil- 
lages of Langenhof and Problus — in brief, every important 
part of the field — can be plainly seen. Had this important 
lookout been utilized, Von Benedek could not have been 
taken by surprise by the advance of the Crown Prince. 
Even the rain, mist and low-hanging smoke could not 
have wholly obscured the advance of the Second Army 
from view; for the Crown Prince was able to trace the di- 
rection of the contending lines from the heights of Chote- 
borek, a point much farther from the scene of action than 
Maslowed and Horenowes are from Chlum. Von Bene- 
dek's neglect to make use of the church tower of Chlum 
probably had not a little to do with the extent of his de- 
feat.* 



♦Although the above comment coincides in its main features with the criticism 
of Hozier on the same subject, it is based upon the author's own observation of 
the views of the field afforded from the church tower of Chlum, and from Von 
Benedek's position near Lipa. 



* 
* * 

Among the causes of Prussian success in this cam- 
paign, the needle gun has been given a high place by all 
writers; and Colonel Home, in his admirable ''Precis of 
Modern Tactics," says: "It is not a little remarkable that 
rapidity of fire has twice placed Prussia at the head of the 
military nations of Europe — in 1749 and 1866." Never- 
theless, the importance of the breech-loader in this cam- 
paign has probably been over-estimated. The moral and 
physical effects of the needle gun upon the Austrian sol- 
diers were tremendous, and were felt from the very begin- 
ning of the campaign. All other things equal, the needle 
gun would have given the victory to the Prussians; but all 
other things were not equal. The strategy and tactics of 
the Prussians were as much superior to those of their op- 
ponents as the needle gun was to the Austrian muzzle- 
loader. In every case, the Prussian victory was due to 
greater numbers or better tactics, rather than to superior 
rapidity of fire; and when we consider the tactical features 
of each engagement, it is hard to see how the result could 
have been different, even if the Prussians had been no 
better armed than their adversaries. The needle gun, un- 
doubtedly, enabled the Prussian Guards to repulse the 
attacks of the Austrian reserves at Chlum; but the battle 
had already gone irretrievably against the Austrians, and 
if they had driven back the Guards, the 1st and Vth Corps 
would have quickly recovered the lost ground, and the 
result would have been the same. Derrecagaix, too, over- 
estimates the influence of the needle gun when he points, 
for proof of its value, to the great disparity of loss between 
the Prussians and Austrians at Koniggratz. The same 
enormous disproportion of loss existed in favor of the 
Germans at Sedan, though the needle gun was notoriously 
inferior to the Chassepot. This inequality of loss is to be 
attributed mainly to the superior strategical and tactical 
movements of the Prussians, by which, in both these bat- 



82 

ties, they crowded their opponents into a limited space, 
and crushed them with a concentric fire. 

It is a remarkable fact, moreover, that the superiority 
of the needle gun over the muzzle-loader did not arise so 
much from the greater rapidity of fire, as from the greater 
rapidity and security of loading. Baron Stoffel says: 
"On the 29th of June, 1866, at Koniginhof, the Prussians 
had a sharp action with the enemy. After the action, 
which took place in fields covered with high corn, Colonel 
Kessel went over the ground, and to his astonishment, 
found five or six Austrian bodies for every dead Prussian. 
The Austrians killed had been mostly hit in the head. His 
[Kessel's] men, far from firing fast, had hardly fired as 
many rounds as the enemy. The Austrian officers who 
were made prisoners said to the Prussians: 'Our men are 
demoralized, not by the rapidity of your fire, for we could 
find some means, perhaps, to counterbalance that, but be- 
cause you are always ready to fire. This morning your 
men, like ours, were concealed in the corn; but, in this 
position, yours could, without being seen, load their rifles 
easily and rapidly: ours, on the other hand, were compelled 
to stand up and show themselves when they loaded, and 
you then took the opportunity of firing at them. Thus 
we had the greatest difficulty in getting our men to stand 
up at all; and such was t'heir terror when they did stand 
up to load that their hands trembled, and they could 
hardly put the cartridge into the barrel. Our men fear 
the advantage the quick and easy loading of the needle 
gun gives you; it is this that demoralizes them. In action 
they feel themselves disarmed the greater part of the 
time, whereas you are always ready to fire.' " 

As to rapidity of fire, it only remains to add that in 
the battle of Koniggratz the number of cartridges fired 
by the infantry averaged scarcely more than one round per 
man. This, however, is largely accounted for by the fact 
that during a great part of the battle the Austrian artillery 



83 

kept most of Frederick Charles' army beyond effective 
infantry fire, as well as by the circumstance that a large 
part of the Crown Prince's army did not fire a shot — the 
Vth Corps not coming into action at all. 

The needle gun was of inestimable value to the Prus- 
sians, but it was by no means the principal cause of their 
triumph. The great cause of the success of Prussia was, 
without doubt, the thorough military preparation which 
enabled her to take the field while her adversaries were 
yet unprepared, and to begin operations the minute war 
was declared. This, combined with the able strategy of 
Von Moltke, enabled the Prussians to seize the initiative; 
to throw the Austrians everywhere upon the defensive; 
and to strike them with superior numbers at every move, 
so that Von Benedek's troops were demoralized before 
the decisive battle was fought. 

* 
* * 

The tactics of the Prussians can be best described in 
the words of Derrecagaix: 

"In advancing to the attack, the Prussian divisions 
generally adopted, in this battle, a formation in three 
groups; the advanced-guard, the center and the reserve. 
In the 7th Division, for instance, the advanced-guard con- 
sisted of four battalions, four squadrons, one battery and 
one-half company of pioneers. The center, or main body, 
was composed of six battalions and one battery. In the 
reserve there were one and three-fourths battalions, two 
batteries and one and one-half companies of pioneers. 

"These dispositions enabled them to launch against 
the first points assailed a succession of attacks, which 
soon gave a great numerical superiority to the assailants. 
This accounts for the rapidity with which the points of 
support fell into the hands of the Prussians. Their groups 
gained the first shelter by defiling behind the rising 
ground, and when a point was stubbornly defended, the 



artillery opened fire upon it, while the infantry sought to 
turn it by pushing forward on the flanks." 

On this point Hamley says: "When it is said that 
the Prussians are specially alive to the necessity of flank 
attacks, it is not to be supposed that the turning of the 
enemy's line alone is meant; for that is a matter for the 
direction of the commanding general, and concerns only 
a fraction of the troops engaged. The common applica- 
tion lies in the attack of all occupied ground which is 
wholly or in part disconnected from the general line, such 
as advanced posts, hamlets, farm buildings, woods, or 
parts of a position which project bastion-like, and are 
weakly defended in flank." 

The Prussians seem, in almost every case, to have 
advanced to the attack in company columns, supported 
by half-battalion columns, or even by battalions formed 
in double column on the center. Though the columns 
were preceded by skirmishers, the latter seem to have 
played only the comparatively unimportant part of feel- 
ing and developing the enemy; and the present system 
by which a battle is begun, continued and ended, by a 
constantly reinforced skirmish line, was not yet dreamed 
of. It is remarkable that, after witnessing the destructive 
effects of the needle gun upon their adversaries, the Prus- 
sians should have retained their old attack formation, 
until, four years later, the thickly strewn corpses of the 
Prussian Guards at St. Privat gave a ghastly warning that 
the time had come for a change. 

It is interesting to compare the tactical features of 
the campaign of 1866 with those of our own war. The 
necessity of launching upon the points assailed a succes- 
sion of attacks was recognized in the tactical disposition 
frequently made, during the War of Secession, in which 
the assaulting divisions were drawn up in three lines of 
brigades, at distances of about 150 yards, the leading bri- 
gade being preceded by one, or sometimes two, lines of 



85 

skirmishers.* The skirmishers being reinforced by, and 
absorbed in, the first line, the latter, if checked, being 
reinforced and pushed forward by the second, and the 
third line being similarly absorbed, the assaulting force, 
at the moment of collision, generally consisted of all the 
successive lines merged into one dense line. This forma- 
tion was the outgrowth of bitter experience in attacking 
in column, though the attack with battalions ployed in 
close column had not altogether disappeared in i864.t 
In comparison with the beautiful tactics by which the 
Germans now attack, with a firing line constantly rein- 
forced from supports and reserves kept in small columns 
for the double purpose of obtaining the greatest possible 
combination of mobility and shelter, the attack formation 
used in the Civil War seems far from perfect; but it was 
certainly superior to the Prussian attack formation of 
1866, for it recognized the hopelessness of attacks in col- 
umn, and provided for the successive reinforcement of an 
attacking line. General Sherman, in describing the tac- 
tics in use in his campaigns, says: "The men generally 
fought in strong skirmish lines, taking advantage of the 
shape of the ground, and of every cover." Dispositions 
being, of course, made for the constant reinforcement of 
these lines, we find Sherman's army habitually using tac- 
tics embracing the essential features of the German tactics 
of the present day. J 



*For example, the formation of Sedgwick's division at Antietam, Meade's at 
Fredericksburg, Pickett's ai Gettysburg, and Sheridan's at Chattanooga. 



tSee the interesting comments of General J. D. Cox on the assaults in column 
at Kenesaw Mountain, p. 129, Vol. IX., ("Atlanta"), Scribner's "Army and Navy 
in the Civil War." 



iThe following remarks of Captain F. N. Maude, R. E., on "The Tactics of the 
Americnn War" sustain the views expressed above, and are interesting as showing 
an able English military critic's appreciation of the advanced tactical develop- 
ment of ^he American armies: 

"It is curious to note how little attention has been devoted to the study of the 
fighting of this most bloody of modern wars; and yet it would seem that the rec- 
ords of these campaigns fought out to tlie bitter end by men of our own Anglo- 
Saxon races, would be a far more likely source of information, from which to 



86 

The Austrian infantry tactics possessed the double 
attribute of antiquity and imbecility. Major Adams, of' 
the Royal Military and Staff Colleges, says: "Since the 
Italian war, when Napoleon III. declared that 'arms of 
precision were dangerous only at a distance,' it had been 
the endeavor of Austria to imitate the tactics to which 
she attributed her own defeat. If the uniform success of 
the French in 1859 had established the trustworthiness of 
the Emperor's theory, how much more necessary must it 
now be to arrive at close quarters, where precision was 
accompanied by unusual rapidity of fire? The more re- 
cent experiences of the American war would seem indeed 
to have excited but little interest in Austria. Could it 



deduce the theory of an attack formation specially designed to meet our needs, 
than the histories of struggles between French and Germans, or Russians and 
Turks. Von Moltke is reported to have said that 'nothing was to be learnt from 
the struggle of two armed mobs.' If that is really the case, which we venture to 
doubt exceedingly, the great strategist mustere this have been sorry he ever spoke, 
for, armed mobs or not, both Southern and Northern troops bore, and bore victo- 
riously, a per centage of loss before which even the best disciplined troops in Ger- 
many, the Prussian Guard Corps, failed to make headway. It is of no relevance 
to the argument to say that the breech-loader was not then in use. When a man is 
hard hit himself, or sees his comrade rolled over, it never enters his head to con- 
sider wliether the hit was scored by muzzle-loader or breech-loader; the fact itself, 
that he or the other man is down, is the only one he concerns himself with, and 
wlien the percentage of hits in a given time rises high enough, the attack collapses 
equally, no matter against what weapon it may be delivered. 

"Actually, though the armament was inferior, the per centage of hits was fre- 
quently far higher than in breech-loading campaigns. There is no action on rec- 
ord during recent years in which the losses rose so high, and in so short a time, as 
in the American fights." 

After a brief description of Meagher's attack at Fredericksburg, and Pickett's 
charge at Gettysburg, Captain Maude continues: 

"Surely, Moltke never spoke of such gallant soldiers as an armed mob, seeing 
that they succeeded in driving an attack home against four times the per centage 
of loss that stopped the Prussian guard at St. Privat. * * # 

And assuming, for the moment, that the saying attributed to him is really 
true, we cannot help fancying that he must have often bitterly regretted it when 
watching his own men in the manceuvers of late years, attacking in what is really, 
practically the same formation which the armed mobs worked out for ihemselves. 

"The points of contrast between ourselves and the Americans are far too num- 
erous to be dismissed without comment. They began the war with a drill book 
and system modeled on our own, and they carried it out to its conclusion, with 
only a few modifications of detail, but none of principle. The normal prescribed 
idea of an attack appears to have been as follows: A line of scouts, thickened to 
skirmishers according to the requirements of the ground; from 2 to 300 paces in 



87 

really be reasonably expected that Austrian soldiers 
should effect vs'hat American generals had long discarded 
as no longer to be attained? The advocacy of the bayo- 
net, so loudly proclaimed in Austrian circles, would surely 
have elicited a contemptuous smile from the veterans of 
the Army of the Potomac. During three years of war, 
but 143 cases of bayonet wounds were treated in the 
northern hospitals; of these, but two-thirds were received 
in action, and six only proved eventually fatal. How, 
then, could it be imagined that tactics, which had already 
failed against the common rifle, -* * * should now 
prevail against the Prussian breech-loaders? The manner 
in which these naked Austrian battalions were ignorantly 
flung against the murderous fire of the enemy soon pro- 
duced results which every novice in the art of war will 
readily appreciate. Even under cover the dread of the 
Prussian weapon became such that, as the enemy ap- 



rear, the 1st line, two deep, precisely like our own, then in rear a 2d line and re- 
serve. Of course, their lines did not advance with the steady precision of our old 
peninsula battalions. Their level ot instruction was altogether too low, and be- 
sides, the extent of fire-swept ground had greatly increased. Eye witnesses say 
that after the first few yards, the line practically dissolved itself into a dense line 
of skirmishers, who threw themselves forwsird generally at a run as far as their mo- 
mentum would carry them ; sometimes, if the distance was short, carrying the po- 
sition at the first rush, but more generally the heavy losses brought them to a halt 
and a standing fire fight ensued. 'I'hey knew nothing of Scherff's great principle, 
on which the "Treflfen Abstande" or distances between the lines are based, but 
they generally worked it out in practice pretty successfully. 'J'he second line came 
up in the best order they could and carried che wreck of the first on with them ; if 
they were stopped, the reserve did the same for them, and either broke too, or suc- 
ceeded. 



"It will be seen that except in its being more scientifically put together, this 
German attack is, practically, precisely similar to that employed by the Americans, 
with the sole difference that the breech-loader has conferred on the assailants the 
advantage of being able to make a more extended use of their weapons, and has 
reduced to a certain extent the disadvantage of having to halt. 



"Had we, in ISVl, been thoroughly well informed as to the methods employed 
across the Atlantic, we should have seen at once that the new weapons did not 
necessarily entail any alteration in principle in our drill book, and with a little 
alteration in detail, have attained at one bound to a point of efficiency not reached 
even in Germany till several years after the war."— "Ttoc^ics and Organization,'''' 
by Capt. F. N. Maude, R. E., p. 299, et seq. 



preached, the Austrian infantry either broke or surren- 
dered." 

* 

* * 

The important aid that the Austrians might have de- 
rived from hasty entrenchments has already been pointed 
out.* In not one single instance did they make use of 
such shelter-trenches or breastworks as were habitually 
used by the American armies, though the theater of war 
offered the best of opportunities for the quick construc- 
tion and valuable use of such works. Such attempts at 
the construction of entrenchments as were made, savor 
more of the days of Napoleon than of the era of arms of 
precision. But the Austrians were not alone in their neg- 
lect to profit by American experience in this respect. It 
was not until Osman Pasha showed on European soil the 
value of hasty entrenchments, that European military 
men generally took note of a lesson of war that they 
might have learned thirteen years earlier.t 

* 

* * 

The great value of hasty entrenchments, and the im- 
measurable superiority of fire action over "cold steel," 
were not the only lessons taught by our war which were 
unheeded by Austrian soldiers steeped in conservatism 
and basking serenely in. the sunshine of their own military 
traditions. Their use of cavalry showed either an igno- 
rance of, or contempt for, the experience of the American 
armies; but, in this respect, the Austrians were not less 
perspicacious than their adversaries. The campaign pro- 



*See pp. 43 and 78. 



tin Clery's "Minor Tactics" occurs the following astonishing passage: "The 
use made of entrenchments by the Turks was not the least remarkable feature of 
the war of 1877. Field works, as aids in defense, had been used with advantage 
in previous wars, but no similar instance exists of an impregnable system of earth- 
works being improvised under the very noses of the enemy." Col. Clery's book is 
an evidence of his intelligent study and thorough knowledge of European mili- 
tary history; yet, as late as 1885, this professor of tactics at the Royal Military Col- 
lege at Sandhurst seems not to have heard of Johnston's works at Kenesaw 
Mountain, or the fortifications constructed at Spottsylvania and Petersburg. 



89 

duced some fine examples of combats between opposing 
forces of cavalry; but it also produced many instances in 
which the Austrians hurled their cavalry against intact 
infantry armed with breech-loaders, only to learn from 
their own defeat and an appalling list of killed and wound- 
ed, that they had applied the tactics of a past age to the 
conditions of a new era. Both armies seem to have been 
afraid to let their cavalry get out of sight, and to have 
reserved their mounted troops solely for use on the field 
of battle. If they had studied the great raids of the 
American cavalry leaders, they would have learned a les- 
son which there were excellent opportunities to apply. 

It would, probably, have been impossible for the 
Austrian cavalry to cut the Prussian communications be- 
fore the junction of the invading armies was effected. A 
cavalry column attempting to move around the left of 
Frederick Charles would almost certainly have been 
caught between the First Army and the impassible Iserge- 
birge,- and captured before doing any damage. A column 
moving around the Prussian right, into Saxony, would 
have encountered the cavalry division of Von Miilbe's 
reserve corps, to say nothing of the infantry and artillery; 
and the movement would, doubtless, have come to naught. 
A movement against the communications of the Crown 
Prince could have been made only via the valley of the 
Oder, where it could have been effectually opposed. But 
it is certain that after the battle of Koniggratz the Aus- 
trians had it in their power to balk the advance of Von 
Moltke by operating with cavalry against his communica- 
tions. In this case the raiders would have been operating 
in their own country, and among a friendly population; 
the railways could have been cut without difficulty, and 
the cavalry could have retreated without serious danger 
of being intercepted. The effect upon the invading army 
does not admit of doubt. We have seen that, with unob- 
structed communications, the Prussian army was subjected 
to no slight distress, after the battle of Miinchengratz, for 



90 

want of rations. Even two days after peace had been 
agreed upon, the Austrian garrison of Theresienstadt, ig- 
norant of the termination of the war, by a successful sally 
destroyed the railway bridge near Kralup. The line of 
communication of the Prussians with the secondary base 
of supplies at Turnau was thus broken; and, though hos- 
tilities were at an end, the invaders were subjected to 
much inconvenience. It is easy to imagine what would 
have been the effect upon the Prussians during their ad- 
vance to the Danube, if a Stuart, a Forrest or a Grierson 
had operated against the railways upon which the supply 
of the invading army necessarily depended. 

Nor were the raiding opportunities altogether on the 
side of the Austrians. The Prague-Olmiitz line of railway, 
of the most vital importance to Von Benedek, ran parallel 
to the Silesian frontier, and in close proximity to it. This 
line of railway should have been a tempting object to a 
raiding column of cavalry. If it had been cut at any point 
near Bohmisch-Triibau, the Austrian army would have 
been in sore straits for supplies. Vigorous and determined 
cavalry raids against the railroad between Bohmisch-Trii- 
bau and Olmiitz would surely have been productive of 
good results, even if the road had not been cut; for Von 
Benedek was extremely solicitous about his communica- 
tions in this part of the theater (as is shown by his long 
detention of the lid Corps. in this region), and an alert 
and enterprising raider might have found means of detain- 
ing from the main Austrian army a force much larger 
than his own. 

But neither the Austrian nor the Prussian cavalry was 
so armed as to be able to make raiding movements with 
much hope of success. Cavalry without the power of 
using effective fire-action can never accomplish anything 
of importance on a raid; for a small force of hostile in- 
fantry can easily thwart its objects. The dragoon regi- 
ments were armed with the carbine, it is true, but they 



91 

seem to have been studiously taught to feel a contempt 
for its use. At Tischnowitz (on the advance from Konig- 
gratz to BriJnn) a Prussian advanced-guard, consisting of 
dragoons, kept off a large force of Austrian cavalry by 
means of carbine fire, until the arrival of reinforcements 
enabled the dragoons to charge with the saber. Accord- 
ing to Hozier, the Austrian cavalry pulled up sharply, 
"half surprised, half frightened, to find that a carbine 
could be of any use, except to make noise or smoke, in 
the hands of a mounted man." Yet nothing seems to 
have been learned from this incident, and it was not until 
a brigade of German cavalry, consisting of three regi- 
ments, was stopped at the village of Vibray, in December, 
1870, by a bare dozen of riflemen, and the Uhlans were 
everywhere forced to retire before the undisciplined 
Francs-tireurs, that the necessity of fire-action on the part 
of all cavalry was forced home to the Germans. Even 
yet the strategical value of the American cavalry raids 
seems to be under-estimated by European military critics, 
who seem also to regard anything like extensive fire-action 
on the part of cavalry as scarcely short of military heresy. 
Von der Goltz says: "Much has been spoken in modern 
times of far-reaching excursions of great masses of cavalry 
in the flank and rear of the enemy, which go beyond the 
object of intelligence, and have for their aim the destruc- 
tion of railways, telegraph wires, bridges, magazines and 
depots. The American War of Secession made us famil- 
iar with many such 'raids,' on which the names of a Stuart, 
an Ashby, a Morgan and others, attained great renown. 
But, in attempting to transfer them to our theaters of war, 
we must primarily take into consideration the different 
nature, civilization and extent of the most European 
countries, but more especially those of the west. Then, 
regard must be paid to the different constitution of the 
forces. If a squadron of horse, improvised by a partisan, 
was defeated in such an enterprise, or if, when surrounded 
by the enemy, it broke itself up, that was of little conse- 



92 

quence. It was only necessary that it was first paid for 
by some successes. Quite a different impression would 
be caused by the annihilation of one of our cavalry regi- 
ments, that by history and tradition is closely bound up 
with the whole army, and which, when once destroyed, 
cannot so easily rise again as can a volunteer association 
of adventurous farmers' sons. 

"The thorough organization of the defensive power 
of civilized nations is also a preventive to raids. Even 
when the armies have already marched away, squadrons 
of horse can, in thickly populated districts, with a little 
preparation, be successfully repulsed by levies. The 
French Francs-tireurs in the western departments attacked 
our cavalry, as soon as they saw it isolated." 

With all deference to the great military writer here 
quoted, it is impossible to concede that he has grasped 
the true idea of cavalry raids. The slight esteem in which 
he holds "a volunteer association of adventurous farmers' 
sons" is not surprising, for Europeans have rarely formed 
a just idea of American volunteers, and the effective fire- 
action of the American cavalry seems to be taken by for- 
eign critics as proof positive that those troops were not 
cavalry, but merely mounted infantry — a view not shared 
by those who participated in the saber charges of Merritt, 
Custer and Devin. As to the annihilation of a Prussian, 
cavalry regiment, there should be no objection to the an- 
nihilation of any regiment, however rich it may be in glo- 
rious history and tradition, provided that the emergency 
demands it, and the results obtained be of sufficient value 
to justify the sacrifice. Von Bredow's charge at Mars-la- 
Tour was deemed well worth the sacrifice of two superb 
cavalry regiments; yet the results obtained by that fam- 
ous charge certainly were not greater than those achieved 
by Van Dorn in the capture of Holly Springs. The former 
is supposed to have stopped a dangerous French attack; 
the latter is known to have checked a Federal campaign 



93 

at its outset. Even had Van Dorn's entire force been 
captured or slain (instead of escaping without loss) the 
result would have justified the sacrifice. Nor is the dan- 
ger of annihilation great, if the cavalry be properly armed 
and trained. That cavalry untrained in fire-action can be 
successfully repulsed by levies, in thickly populated dis- 
tricts, is undoubtedly true; but such cavalry as that which, 
under Wilson, dismounted and carried entrenchments by 
a charge on foot, would hardly be stopped by such troops 
as Franc s-tireurs or any other hasty levies that could be 
raised in a country covered with villages. Superior mo- 
bility should enable cavalry to avoid large forces of in- 
fantry, and it should be able to hold its own against any 
equal force of opposing cavalry or infantry. The objec- 
tions of Von der Goltz and Prince Hohenlohe to raids by 
large bodies of cavalry, lose their force if we consider the 
cavalry so armed and trained as to be capable of effective 
fire-action. When cavalry is so armed and organized as 
to make it possible for Prince Hohenlohe to state that a 
cavalry division of six regiments "could put only 1,400 
carbines into the firing line," and that "in a difificult coun- 
try it could have no chance against even a battalion of 
infantry decently well posted," we must acknowledge that 
a respectable raid is out of the question. 

We do not find, in 1866, the cavalry pushed forward 
as a strategic veil covering the operations of the army. 
On the contrary we find the cavalry divisions kept well to 
the rear, and the divisional cavalry alone entrusted with 
reconnoissance duty, which it performed in anything but 
an efficient manner. At Trautenau, Von Bonin's cavalry 
does not seem to have followed the retreat of Mondl, or 
to have discovered the approach of Von Gablentz. If it 
was of any use whatever, the fact is not made apparent in 
history. At Nachod, Steinmetz's cavalry- did better, and 
gave timely warning of the approach of the enemy; but 
generally, throughout the campaign, the Prussian cavalry 
did not play a part of much importance either in screen- 



94 

ing or reconnoitering. It profited greatly by its experi- 
ence, however, and in the Franco-German war we find it 
active, alert, ubiquitous, and never repeating the drowsy 
blunder committed when it allowed Frederick Charles 
unwittingly to bivouac within four miles and a half of 
Von Benedek's entire army, or the inertness shown when 
it permitted the Austrian army to escape from all touch, 
sight or hearing, for three days, after the battle of Konig- 
gratz. 

On the part of the Austrians, the cavalry was even 
more negligent and inefificient. Outpost and reconnois- 
ance duties were carelessly performed; and Von Benedek 
was greatly hampered by a want of timely and correct 
information of the enemy's movements. In only one in- 
stance does the Austrian cavalry seem to have been used 
profitably; namely, in covering the retreat of the defeated 
army at Koniggratz. In the words of Hozier: "Although 
operations had been conducted in its own country, where 
every information concerning the Prussian movements 
could have been readily obtained from the inhabitants, 
the Austrian cavalry had made no raids against the flank 
or rear of the advancing army, had cut off no ammunition 
or provision trains, had broken up no railway communi- 
cations behind the marching columns, had destroyed no 
telegraph lines between the front and the base of supplies, 
had made no sudden or night attacks against the outposts 
so as to make the weary infantry stand to their arms and 
lose their night's rest, and, instead of hovering around the 
front and flanks to irritate and annoy the pickets, had 
been rarely seen or fallen in with, except when it had 
been marched down upon and beaten up by the Prussian 
advanced-guards." Surely it needed all the energy and 
valor shown in the last hours of Koniggratz to atone, in 

even a small degree, for such inefficiency. 

* 
* * 

The full offensive value of artillery was not yet un- 
derstood in any army; and it is not surprising to notice 



95 

in this campaign the utter absence of the tactics which, 
in the war with France, brought the German guns almost 
up to the skirmish line, and kept them actively engaged 
at close range until the end of the battle. It is, however, 
amazing to observe the slowness and general inefficiency 
of the Prussian artillery in every action. At Trautenau, 
though there were 96 guns belonging to Von Benin's 
corps, only 32 were brought into action, while 42 remained 
in the immediate vicinity without firing a shot. The re- 
maining 22 guns do not seem to have reached the field at 
all. At Soor the Austrians brought 64 guns into action; 
but of the 72 guns of the Prussians, only 18 were brought 
into action from first to last. At Nachod, Skalitz and 
Gitschin it is the same story — plenty of Prussian artillery, 
but only a small portion of the guns brought into action, 
and those without appreciable effect. 

Prince Hohenlohe says that in the entire campaign 
"the Prussian artillery, which numbered as many pieces 
as its adversary, had only once been able to obtain the 
numerical superiority. It had, on all occasions, fought 
against forces two, three, or even four times superior in 
number." At Koniggratz the Prussian artillery was han- 
dled with surprising feebleness. The Crown Prince finally 
succeeded in bringing to bear on the Austrian right a 
force of artillery superior in numbers to that opposed to 
him; but, even in this case, his guns accorsplished but 
little. As to the artillery of Frederick Charles, it prac- 
tically accomplished nothing at all; and it was scarcely of 
more use on the Bistritz than it would have been in Berlin. 
From the beginning to the end of the battle, the Austrians 
had everywhere a decided superiority of artillery fire, ex- 
cept only in the one case on their right. 

The Prussian Staff History says, in regard to the en- 
gagement south of the Sadowa wood: "A want of unity 
in the direction of the artillery was painfully evident on 
this part of the field. Two commandants of regiments 



96 

were on the spot, but the eleven batteries then present 
belonged to five different artillery divisons, some of them 
to the divisional artillery and some to the reserve. This 
accounts for the want of unity of action at this spot; some 
batteries advanced perfectly isolated, whilst others retired 
behind the Bistritz at the same time." To this Colonel 
Home adds: "A great deal of this was due to the fact 
that the guns came into action on one side of a small, 
muddy, stream, over which there were very few bridges, 
and across which bridges might have been thrown with 
ease, while the wagons remained on the other." It may 
be further added, that the Prussian artillery seems to have 
been unduly afraid of encountering infantry fire, and to 
have had a bad habit of withdrawing to refit and to renew 
its ammunition. It is said of the Prussian artillery, that 
"they planted themselves here and there among the re- 
serves, and never found places anywhere to engage."* On 
the march the artillery was kept too far to the rear, and, 
owing to its inefficient action, the infantry, long before 
the close of the campaign, generally showed a disposition 
to despise its help, and to hurry into action without it, 
crowding the roads, and refusing to let the guns pass. 
Much had been expected of their artillery by the Prus- 
sians, and its feeble action was a severe disappointment 
to them. It is to the glory of the Prussians that they 
were quick to fathom the causes of the inefficiency of 
their artillery, and that they were able, in four years, to 
replace the impotence of Koniggratz with the annihilat- 
ing "circle of fire" of Sedan. 

The Austrians far surpassed their adversaries in the 
skill and effectiveness with which they used their artillery. 
' The superiority of the French artillery had largely con- 
tributed to the Au.strian disasters in Italy seven years 
before, and the lesson had not been forgotten. From the 
beginning of the Campaign of 1866, the Austrian artillery 
was an important factor in every engagement, and at 

*May's "Tactical Retrospect." 



97 

Koniggratz it was handled superbly. But, in every case, 
it was used defensively, and the Austrian artillerists orig- 
inated no new tactical features, and taught no lessons that 
could not have been learned from Gettysburg, Malvern 
Hill, Solferino, or even Wagram. 

* 
* * 

The concentration of the Prussian armies preparatory 
to hostilities was made partly by marching, and partly by 
railroad transportation. The work accomplished by the 
railroads may, perhaps, be best expressed in the words of 
the Prussian Staff History: "The whole of the marches 
and of the railway movements were so arranged by the 
General Staff, in harmony with the railway department,, 
that in their execution, in which both the military and 
civil powers were concerned, no impediments or delays 
could occur. The result of these arrangements was, that 
in the twenty-one days allowed, 197,000 men, 55,000 horses, 
and 5,300 wagons were transported for distances varying 
between 120 and 300 miles, without any failure, and in such 
a manner that they attained the required spots at the very 
hour requisite." Prussia was thus enabled, in the short 
space of three weeks, to place 325,000 men on the hostile 
frontiers, of which number 267,000 were ready for opera- 
tions against Austria. Yet, great as this achievement was, 
it shows that the Prussian military system had not yet 
reached the perfection shown in 1870, when nineteen days 
sufficed for the mobilization of an army of 440,000 Ger- 
mans, and its concentration on the frontier of France. 

Further than in the matter of mobilization and con- 
centration, the use of railways in the Austro-Prussian war 
presented no new features. In the matter of supplying 
armies in the field, the small area of the theater of war, 
and the inertness of the cavalry, were such that it is al- 
most impossible to make a comparison of the use of rail- 
ways in this campaign with the use of the same means of 
transport in the War of Secession. If we imagine a Prus- 



98 

sian army pushing entirely through the Austrian Empire, 
to the vicinity of Belgrade, and dependent for its supplies 
■on a single line of railway, back to a base on the Prussian 
frontier; and if we imagine, moreover, that the Austrian 
cavalry possessed vigilance, enterprise, good firearms and 
modern ideas, instead of being a mere military anachro- 
nism, we can picture a parallel to Sherman's Atlanta cam- 
paign. 

In regard to the use of the electric telegraph by the 
Prussians, Hamley says: "The telegraphic communica- 
tion between the two Prussian armies invading Bohemia 
in 1866 was not maintained up to the battle of Koniggratz: 
had it been, and had the situation on both sides been fully 
appreciated, their joint attack might have been so timed 
as to obviate the risk of separate defeat which the prema- 
ture onset of Prince Frederick Charles' army entailed." 
Yet Hozier describes in glowing terms the equipment of 
Frederick Charles' telegraph train, and speaks with some- 
what amusing admiration of the feat of placing the Prince's 
headquarters, at the castle of Grafenstein, in direct tele- 
graphic communication with Berlin, though the castle was 
five miles from the nearest permanent telegraph station. 
With each of the Prussian armies was a telegraph train, 
provided with the wire and other material requisite for 
the construction of forty miles of line. Yet, though com- 
munication was opened between the Crown Prince and 
Frederick Charles early on June 30th; though there were 
three days in which to construct a telegraph line; though 
the headquarters at Gitschin, Kamenitz and Koniginhof 
could have been put in direct communication without ex- 
hausting much more than half the capacity of a single tel- 
egraph train, the Prussians neglected even to preserve 
telegraphic communications to the rear of their armies 
(and thus with each other via Berlin), and, as we have 
seen, staked their success upon the safe delivery of a 



99 

message carried by a courier, over an unknown road, on a 
night of pitchy darkness. Here again a valuable lesson 
might have been learned from the Americans.* 



Though the War of Secession was begun without mili- 
tary preparation on either side; though its earlier opera- 
tions sometimes presented features that would have been 
ludicrous but for the earnestness and valor displayed, and 
the mournful loss of life which resulted; our armies and 
generals grew in excellence as the war continued; and 
before the close of the conflict, the art of war had reached 
a higher development in America than it attained in Eu- 
rope in 1866, and, in some respects, higher than it reached 
in 1870. 

Notwithstanding the excellent organization, the supe- 
rior arms and thorough preparation of the Prussian armies; 
notwithstanding the genius of Von Moltke and the intel- 
ligence and energy of his subordinates, the prime cause 
of Austrian failure is found in the neglect of the Austrian 
generals to watch the development of the art of war on 
our side of the Atlantic. Had they profited by our 
experience, their infantry, on one side of the theater of 
operations, would have been able, behind entrenchments, 
to contain many more than their own numbers of the 
Prussians; and Von Benedek, profiting by his interior 
lines, could then have thrown superior numbers against 
the other armies of his adversary. Opposing the Prussian 
columns with heavy skirmish lines constantly reinforced 
from the rear, the men of the firing line availing them- 
selves of the cover afforded by the ground, he would have 
neutralized, by superior tactics, the superior arms of his 
opponent. His cavalry, instead of using the tactics of a 
by-gone age, would have been used, in part, in cutting the 



*For a description of tlie American military telegraph, see Grant's Memoirs, 
Vol. II., p. 205, et seq. See also the comments on the militar>' telegraph, in Sher- 
man's Memoirs. Vol. II., p. .398. 



100 

Prussian communications, bringing their advance to a halt, 
gaining time for him, when time was of priceless value, 
and enabling him to seize the initiative. 

Possibly the war might, nevertheless, have resulted 
in Prussian success; for Von Moltke has always shown a 
power to solve quickly, and in the most perfect manner, 
any problem of war with which he has been confronted, 
while Von Benedek had only the half-development of a 
general possessing tactical skill without strategical ability. 
But the great Prussian strategist would have failed in his 
first plan of campaign, and he could have been successful 
only when, like his opponent, he availed himself of the 
new developments in warfare illustrated by the America'n 
campaigns. The Seven Weeks' War would have been at 
least a matter of months; Austria would not have been 
struck down at a single blow; other nations might have 
been drawn into the prolonged conflict, and the entire 
history of Europe might have been different. 



APPENDIX I. 

THE PRUSSIAN ADVANCE FROM KONIGGRATZ TO THE DANUBE. 

The day after the battle of Koniggratz was occupied 
by the Prussians in resting their fatigued troops, and in 
separating the mingled corps and detachments of the dif- 
ferent armies. Late in the afternoon the first movements 
in advance began. 

The fortresses of Josephstadt and Koniggratz were 
still in the hands of the Austrians. They were well gar- 
risoned, and could only be taken by siege. Both were 
summoned to surrender, and both refused. These fort- 
resses were of the greatest importance, as they command- 
ed the line of railway on which the Prussians depended 
for supplies, and controlled the passage of the Elbe in the 
vicinity of the battle field. , Strong detachments were, 
therefore, left to mask the fortresses, and on the 5th of 
July the Prussian armies marched to Pardubitz and Przel- 
autsch, at which points they crossed the Elbe. A division 
of Landwehr was sent to Prague, which city surrendered, 
without resistance, on the 8th of July. The Prussians 
were thus able to open communications with the rear by 
rail, via Pardubitz, Prague, Turnau and Reichenberg, in 
spite of the fortresses of Theresienstadt, Koniggratz and 
Josephstadt. 

After the battle of Koniggratz all touch with the Aus- 
trians had been lost, and for three days the Prussians were 
completely in the dark as to the direction taken by the 
retreating army. On July 6th it was learned that Von 
Benedek, with the greater portion of his army, had re- 
treated upon OlmiJtz. 

After the battle two lines of retreat were open to Von 
Benedek. It was desirable to retreat upon Vienna, for the 
double purpose of protecting the city, and effecting a 
junction with the victorious troops, withdrawn from Italy 
for the defense of the capital.* But Vienna was 135 miles 
distant; the army had been heavily defeated; and there 
was danger that a retreat of such a distance would degen- 
erate into a demoralized rout. Olmiitz was only half as 
far away; its fortress would afford the necessary protec- 
tion for reorganizing and resting the army; and its posi- 

*A brief sketch of the operations in Italy is given in Apy^endix III. 



102 

tion on the flank of the Prussians would be a serious 
menace to their communications, in case of their advance 
on Vienna. Von Benedek, therefore, retreated upon 01- 
miitz, sending the Xth Corps by rail to Vienna, and the 
greater part of his cavalry by ordinary roads to the same 
point. 

The situation was now favorable to Von Moltke. He 
had the advantage of interior lines, and he did not hesi- 
tate to make use of them. Yet the problem was by no 
means devoid of difficulties. The Austrian army at Olmiitz 
was still formidable in numbers; the extent of its demor- 
alization was not known; the Austrian troops had a high 
reputation for efficiency, and for a capacity to present 
an undaunted front after a defeat; and it was thought 
possible that Von Benedek might assume the offensive. 
To leave such a formidable army unopposed on his flank 
was not to be thought of; yet it was desirable to reach 
Vienna before the arrival at that city of the troops re- 
called from Italy, or, at any rate, before a considerable army 
could be concentrated for the defense of the capital. A 
division of the Prussian forces was, therefore, necessary. 
The Army of the Elbe and the First Army were directed 
upon Vienna: the former to move via Iglau and Znaym; 
the latter, via Briinn. The Crown Prince was directed 
upon Olmiitz to watch Von Benedek. There w^ere three 
courses open to the Austrian commander: i. To attack 
the flank of the First Army, between Olmiitz and Vienna; 
2. To withdraw rapidly to the capital; 3. To attack the 
Crown Prince. In the first case, the First Army would be 
supported by the Army of the Elbe, and the combined 
forces would be able to take care of themselves. In the 
second case, the Crown Prince was to attack the retiring 
army and harass its march. In the third case, the Crown 
Prince, who, though inferior in numbers, was superior in 
morale, might be more than a match for the Austrians. In 
case of defeat, however, he was to retreat into Silesia, 
where he would have the support of the Prussian fort- 
resses; while Von Moltke, freed from Von Benedek, could 
seize the Austrian capital and command peace. 

On July 7th the cavalry of the Second Army recov- 
ered touch with the Austrians, and there was some skirm- 
ishing with their rear guards. 

On July 8th the Austrian government made overtures 
for an armistice of not less than eight weeks, nor more 



103 

than three months; as a condition to which the fortresses 
of Koniggratz and Josephstadt were to be surrendered. 
The proposition was rejected by the Prussians, who con- 
tinued to advance. 

Von Benedek was relieved from the chief command 
of the Austrian army, being superseded by Arcliduke 
Albrecht, who had won the -victory of Custozza over the 
Italians. Von Benedek retained command, however, 
until the arrival of his army on the Danube. The Austri- 
ans were now straining every nerve to assemble an army 
at Vienna. Leaving only one corps and one division in 
Italy, the Archduke's army had been recalled fromVenetia, 
and was proceeding, by rail and by forced marches, to 
the Danube. 

On the I ith of July Von Benedek's army was ordered 
to Vienna. This army, after a continuous retreat of eight 
days duration, had just completed its concentration at 
Olmiitz; but the movement to Vienna was begun without 
delay, the Illd Corps being sent on the day the order was 
received. The withdrawal of the army from Olmiitz to 
Vienna was not an easy operation. The railway was, as 
yet, beyond the reach of the Prussians; but the aid that it 
could lend was not great. It was estimated that the with- 
drawal of the entire army by the single line of railway 
would require a full month. Part of the troops were, ac- 
cordingly, hurried on by rail, and the bulk of the army 
was ordered to march by the valley of the March to 
Pressburg. This was the most direct route, and the one 
which offered the best roads for marching, though by 
taking this line the Austrian arm)' would expose a flank 
to the attack of the Prussians. Above all things, celerity 
was necessary, in order that the march might be com- 
pleted without fatal interruption. Von Benedek's army 
marched in three echelons. The first, composed of the 
lid and IVth Corps, with the greater part of the Saxon 
cavalry, started on the 14th of July. The second, consist- 
ing of the Vlllth and 1st Corps, left the next day; and 
the third, made up of the Vlth Corps and the Saxons, 
followed on the i6th. 

The Austrian cavalry presented a bold front to the 
Prussian armies moving on Vienna, and a sharp action was 
fought at Tischnowitz, on the iith of July, between the 
cavalry of Frederick Charles' advanced-guard and a divis- 
ion of Austrian lancers, resulting in the defeat of the lat- 



104 

ter. On the I2th Frederick Charles took possession of 
Briinn without resistance. The next day, after some 
skirmishing with the Austrian cavalry, the Army of the 
Elbe occupied Znaym. 

After a rest of two days, the Army of the Elbe and 
the First Army continued their march towards the Dan- 
ube; the former being directed towards Krems, the latter 
moving via Nikolsburg. 

The Austrian troops from Italy began to arrive at 
Vienna on the 14th of July. In the meantime, the Crown 
Prince, hearing of Von Benedek's withdrawal fromOlmiitz, 
directed his march on Prerau, and, on the 14th, reached 
Prosnitz, about twelve miles south of Olmiitz. The first 
Austrian echelon, marching by the right bank of the 
March, just escaped serious collision with the Crown 
Prince, the cavalry of the Second Army skirmishing with 
the Saxon cavalry, and becoming engaged with a battalion 
of infantry on the flank of the Austrian lid Corps. 

On the following day Von Bonin, with the 1st Corps 
and Von Hartmann's cavalry division, attacked the second 
echelon of Von Benedek's army, and defeated it in the 
actions of Tobitschau and Rokienitz. As a result of these 
actions, the right bank of the March was no longer avail- 
able for the Austrian retreat. Von Benedek had, how- 
ever, succeeded in slipping away from the Crown Prince, 
though at the expense of losing his best and most direct 
road to Vienna. 

Learning that large bodies of Austrians had been 
seen moving south frorti Olmiitz for some days, Von 
Moltke saw at once that it would be impossible to bar 
Von Benedek's path with the Second Army, and immedi- 
ately ordered the First Army to Lundenburg. The rail- 
way and telegraph at Coding were cut by a detachment 
of Prussian cavalry, on the 15th, and Frederick Charles 
occupied Lundenburg the next day. 

This was a severe blow to Von Benedek, for he thus 
lost his railway communication with Vienna, his march by 
the valley of the March was headed by the Prussians, and 
he was compelled to make a detour by crossing the Car- 
pathian mountains and following the valley of the Waag. 
To compensate, as far as possible, for the loss of the 
shorter road. Von Benedek hastened his troops by forced 
marches. Von Moltke did not deem it prudent to send 



105 

the Second Army after Von Benedek into the valley of 
the Waag, as communication between the Crown Prince 
and Frederick Charles would thus be lost, and it was now 
desirable to concentrate rather than separate. It was ac- 
cordingly determined to push forward with all available 
troops to the Danube. The Crown Prince had already 
seen the impossibility of thwarting Von Benedek's retreat, 
and, as early as the 15th, had left the 1st Corps to mask 
Olmiitz, had directed the Vth Corps and a cavalry division 
to follow on the flank of Von Benedek, and had pushed 
forward with the rest of his army upon Briinn, where he 
arrived on the 17th. On the same day the Army of the 
Elbe and the First Army were in the neighborhood of 
Nikolsburg. 

On the 19th the heads of the Prussian armies were 
wathin less than two days' march of the Austrian capital, 
but part of the Prussian forces were as far back as Briinn. 
Von Moltke did not know, to a certainty, how much of 
Von Benedek's army had been brought back from Olmiitz 
before the obstruction of the railway. A large part of it 
might already be in his front; he knew that large bodies 
of troops had come in from Italy; the fortifications of 
Florisdorf were extensive; and it seemed possible that the 
Austrians might, by a last great effort, have assembled 
an army large enough to enable them to push forward 
from Florisdorf, to deliver battle on the Marchfeld for the 
defense of their capital. With the double object of pre- 
paring to attack and being in readiness to receive an at- 
tack, Von Moltke ordered the Army of the Elbe to 
Wolkersdorf, the First Army to Wagram, and the Second 
Army in reserve at Shonkirchen. The Prussian army was 
thus concentrated behind the Russbach, in position to 
meet an attack of 150,000 Austrians from Florisdorf; to 
reconnoiter and attack the Florisdorf entrenchments; or 
to leave a corps of observation in front of them and push 
to the left and seize Pressburg. The Second Army, with 
the exception of the Vth Corps, was to be in position to 
support the other two by the 21st. The Vth Corps was to 
be hurried up as rapidly as possible, in order that the en- 
tire army might be concentrated for a decisive battle. 

The only troops of Von Benedek's army which had 
reached Vienna by the 20th were the Xth and Illd Corps, 
part of the Saxons, and four cavalry divisions, numbering 
altogether from 55,000 to 6o,000 men. The reinforcements 



io6 

from Italy which had arrived at the capital numbered 
about 50,000 men. 

Although the occupation of Pressburg was absolutely 
necessary to secure the prompt junction of the divided 
Austrian armies, that important point was held by only a 
single brigade. As soon as the Austrian lid Corps had 
reached Tyrnau, its leading brigade was pushed forward 
rapidly, in country carts, to reinforce the brigade at Press- 
burg, and the rest of the corps hastened towards the same 
place by forced marches. If Pressburg fell into the hands 
of the Prussians, the force still with Von Benedek, consti- 
tuting the bulk of his army, would not be able to reach 
Vienna, and form a junction with the Archduke Albrecht, 
except by making a long detour via Komorn, and would 
probably be delayed so long as to be helpless to prevent 
the capture of the capital. 

On the 2 1st of July the Army of the Elbe and the 
First Army were in position behind the Russbach, and the 
Second Army was drawing near, its two advanced corps 
being not more than one day's march distant. The situ- 
ation of the Austrians was critical. Their lid Corps had 
not yet reached Pressburg, and that all-important point 
was still held by only two brigades. The 1st, Vlth and 
Vlllth Corps, and a division of Saxons, had gotten no 
farther than Neustadtl and Trentschin, nearly sixty miles 
from Pressburg. On the same day Von Fransecky, with 
the Prussian IVth Corps and a cavalry division, crossed 
the March, in the vicinity of Marchegg, advancing upon 
Pressburg. Everything portended to the Austrians the 
loss of that valuable strategic point, and the consequent 
cutting off of Von Benedek from Vienna. The Prussian 
army, numbering, at least, 184,000 men, was concentrated 
and opposed to an army of not more than 1 10,000 men, at 
most, at Vienna. The capture of the capital seemed cer- 
tain ; and Von Moltke, with his forces augmented to 200,000 
men, by the reinforcements that were pushing on to join 
him, could then turn upon Von Benedek, and give a coup 
de grace to the last remnant of Austria's military power. 

At this junction, however, diplomacy stepped in, and, 
through the mediation of France, a five days' armistice, 
as a preliminary to peace, was agreed upon; the armistice 
to go into effect at noon on the 22d of July. 

On the 22d Von Fransecky struck the two Austrian 
brigades at Blumenau, just in front of Pressburg. While 



107 

everything was going in favor of the Prussians, and they 
seemed to be not only on the point of defeating the Aus- 
trians, but of capturing their entire force, the hour of 
noon arrived; the armistice went into effect, the action 
was, with difficulty, broken off, and, after the sudden ter- 
mination of the battle, both armies bivouacked on the 
field. 

The preliminary terms of peace were signed at Nik- 
olsburg on the 26th of July, and definitely ratified at 
Prague on the 30th of August. The orders for the with- 
drawal of the Prussian armies were issued on the 25th of 
August, and the Austrian territory was entn-ely evacuated 
by them by the 20th of September. 

By the terms of the treaty of peace, Venetia was 
ceded to Italy; the old Germanic confederation was dis- 
solved; Schleswig-Holstein became the property of Prus- 
sia; Austria consented to the formation of a North German 
Confederation, and a union of the South German States, 
from both of which confederations she was to be exclud- 
ed; and the defeated power agreed to pay 40,000,000 
Prussian thalers to the victor. From this sum, however, 
15,000,000 thalers were deducted as the price of the Aus- 
trian claims to Schleswig-Holstein, and 5,000,000 thalers 
for the free maintenance of the Prussian army in the Aus- 
trian provinces from the preliminary truce to the final es- 
tablishment of peace. Peace with the German allies of 
Austria was made at about the same time. As a result 
of the war, Prussia annexed the territories of Hanover, 
Hesse-Cassel, Nassau and the free city of Frankfort. The 
population of the victorious kingdom was increased by 
4,285,700 people; and its area, by nearly 25,000 square 
miles of land. 

APPENDIX II. 

THE CAMPAIGiN IN WESTERN GERMANY. 

The surrender of the Hanoverian army at Langen- 
salza, on June 29, 1866, left Von Falckenstein free to op- 
erate against the armies of the South German States. 
His army, now designated "The Army of the Maine," 
numbered 45,000 men and 97 guns. 

Opposed to him were the Bavarian Corps, numbering 
40,000 men and 136 guns, and the Vlllth Federal Corps, 
numbering 46,000 men and 134 guns. The former, under 



io8 

the command of Prince Charles of Bavaria, had concen- 
trated at Schweinfurt; the latter, under the command of 
Prince Alexander of Hesse, at Frankfort. 

Having been informed that the Hanoverians were 
marching on Fulda, Prince Charles began a forward move- 
ment, to effect a junction with them at that point; but 
receiving later news to the effect that the occupation of 
Hesse-Cassel had caused the Hanoverians to turn off 
towards Miihlhausen, and that Prussian forces were con- 
centrating at Eisenach, he decided to direct his march 
more to the right, so as to be able to operate either by 
way of Fulda or the Thuringian Forest [ Thiiringe?' Wald\ 
as circumstances might decide. The march of the Bava- 
rians was begun on June 22d; but much was wanting to 
complete their organization and equipment, and their 
progress was so slow that on the 26th their most advanced 
division had only reached Neustadt, on the Saale, scarcely 
twenty miles from Schweinfurt. 

A prompt union of the separated forces of the allies 
was of the utmost importance. Yet the most precious 
time was aimlessly wasted, and it was not until June 26th 
that any definite steps were taken towards effecting a 
junction of the Bavarians and the VHIth Corps. On that 
day Prince Charles and Prince Alexander held a confer- 
ence, at which it was decided to move forward and effect 
the junction of the two corps at Hersfeld, about twenty- 
one miles north of Fulda. They overlooked the important 
fact that they were twice as far away from the designated 
point as the Prussians were. 

Nothing but the most energetic action on the part of 
the allies could overcome the disadvantages of their 
strategical situation. Yet Prince Charles, learning that 
negotiations were being conducted between the Hanove- 
rians and the Prussians, delayed his march, evidently los- 
ing confidence in the sincerity of his allies, and fearing 
that a surrender of the Hanoverians might leave him to 
contend alone with Von Falckenstein. For three days 
the Bavarians remained inactive; then, hearing of the 
battle of Langensalza, Prince Charles advanced towards 
Gotha. On June 30th the Bavarians had advanced to 
Meiningen, Schleusingen and Hildburghausen, where 
they received news of the surrender of the Hanoverian 
army. The VHIth Corps, in the meantime, had continued 
its march towards Hersfeld. 



109 

The march of Prince Charles towards Gotha had been 
utterly fruitless. He had not only failed to assist the 
Hanoverians, but time had been lost, and the direction of 
his march had carried him away from, instead of towards, 
the Vnith Corps. The latter corps was now at Friedburg, 
more than 8o miles from Meiningen, and the problem of 
effecting a junction now presented many difificulties. The 
union of the two corps could have been easily and safely 
effected by falling back to the line of the Maine; and this 
should have been done, though it was feared that a retreat, 
at the beginning of the campaign, and before the enemy 
had been seen, might have an injurious effect on the 
morale of the troops. To effect a junction without falling 
back would necessitate a flank march of more than 8o 
miles, over difficult mountain roads, in the immediate front 
of the enemy. Such a hazardous movement should not 
have been undertaken except as a last resort. 

Nevertheless, Prince Charles decided to form line at 
Meiningen, facing Eisenach, hoping to join the VHIth 
Corps via Hilders-Fulda and Geisa-Hiinfeld, and request- 
ing Prince Alexander to draw towards him with all avail- 
able forces, partly via Hanau-Fulda-Hunfeld, and partly 
by rail from Frankfort to Gemiinden, and thence via 
Hammelburg to Kissingen. The commander of the 
Vnith Corps consented to move on Fulda, but did not 
see fit to send a force via Kissingen to the neighborhood 
of Schweinfurt, evidently for the military reason that he 
did not wish to divide his force while executing a danger- 
ous movement, and for the political reason that the 
movement urged by Prince Charles, while it would cover 
Bavaria, would expose the territories of the contingents 
which composed the VHIth Corps. Prince Charles 
showed a disposition to ignore the interests of his allies; 
Prmce Alexander exhibited decided insubordination; both 
commanders displayed a lack of military ability; and the 
want of hearty cooperation between the two generals al- 
ready portended disaster to the allied cause. 

On July 1st the Bavarians concentrated at Meiningen, 
and began their march to Fulda. Prince Alexander, 
marching east, occupied Lauterbach and Alsfeld on July 
3d. His force had been diminished by detachments left 
on the Lahn, both to cover Frankfort from a possible at- 
tack from the direction of Cassel, and to protect the flank 
and rear of the army marching towards Fulda. 



no 

On July 3d a Bavarian advanced-guard found Derm- 
bach in possession of the Prussians, and was driven back 
with some loss. On the other hand, a Prussian detach- 
ment was driven out of Wiesenthal. Von Falckenstein 
had advanced from Eisenach on July ist, and he was now 
in the immediate front of the Bavarians; Von Beyer's di- 
vision in and around Geisa; Von Goeben's division at 
Dermbach, and Von Manteuffel's division following in 
reserve. 

On July 4th one of Von Goeben's brigades struck a 
Bavarian division at Zella [about 3 miles south of Derm- 
bach], and an indecisive action followed. With his other 
brigade. Von Goeben attacked another Bavarian division 
at Wiesenthal. Encountering considerable resistance, 
and having no immediate supports at hand, Von Goeben 
gave orders for the withdrawal of his troops, after an ac- 
tion of some hours' duration. At the same time the Ba- 
varians retreated, and the field was abandoned by both 
armies. 

During this time the other Prussian divisions contin- 
ued their march on Fulda, Von Beyer reaching Hiinfeld, 
near which place his advanced-guard had a remarkable 
combat with the Bavarian reserve cavalry, which had 
been sent from Schweinfurt towards Vacha, to open com- 
munications with the Vlllth Corps. The Bavarian ad- 
vanced-guard consisted of two regiments of cuirassiers 
and a detachment of horse artillery. On meeting the 
Prussians the Bavarians opened on them with grape. The 
artillery with Von Beyer's advanced-guard quickly came 
into action, and opened fire with astonishing results; for 
the first shot from the Prussian guns sent the Bavarians 
back in a wild panic, the confusion being rapidly con- 
veyed from the advanced-guard to the main body, until 
the entire force (consisting of three brigades) broke 
into a headlong stampede. Several regiments retreated 
as far as Briickenau and Hammelburg, and many troopers 
did not draw rein until they arrived at the Maine, many 
miles from the scene of action. Several days elapsed 
before the cavalry could be rallied at Briickenau. In this 
case the Bavarians could neither plead surprise nor heavy 
loss. They saw their enemy in time to open fire on him 
first; and their total loss was only 28 men. Only a few 
shots, from two guns, were fired by the Prussians before 
the Bavarian cavalry had scampered beyond reach of 
harm. 



Ill 

The simultaneous retreat of both armies from Wies- 
enthal reminds one of the Jlasfo 2it Big Bethel in i86i; and 
had the Bavarians remained on the field at Hiinfeld long 
enough to dot the ground thickly with dead and wound- 
ed, their action there might be worthy of comparison with 
that of our undisciplined levies at Bull Run. 

After the combat at Wiesenthal, Von Falckenstein 
seems to have felt considerable anxiety; for the next day 
he withdrew Von Goeben through Dermbach, recalled 
Von Beyer to Geisa, and brought up Von Manteuffel in 
close support. This concentration was evidently made 
with a view to fighting a defensive battle; but, on the 6th 
of July, the Prussians discovered that they had won a vic- 
tory on the 4th, the Bavarians being in retreat. Von 
Falckenstein at once pushed forward towards Fulda. 

After the actions of Zella and Wiesenthal Prince 
Charles saw that the intended junction of the separated 
corps at Fulda could not be made, unless he could open 
the road by defeating the Prussians. This now seemed 
out of the question; and he, consequently, fell back on 
Neustadt, and requested Prince Alexander to open com- 
munications with him via Briickenau and Kissingen. 
Prince Alexander, however, does not seem to have been 
over-anxious either to comply with requests or to obey 
orders. On July 5th he had advanced to within seven 
miles of Fulda. Hearing of the Bavarian reverses, he fell 
back to Schlijchtern, where he occupied an exceptionally 
favorable position at the entrance of the Kinzig valley. 
The ground offered every facility for defense; he could 
offer a stubborn resistance to the advance of Von Falck- 
enstein; his line of retreat to Frankfort was secure; and 
he might either wait for the Bavarians to join him, or 
effect a junction with them on the line Hammelburg- 
Gemiinden. 

While at Schliichtern, Prince Alexander learned of 
the Austrian defeat at Koniggratz; and, without consid- 
ering his allies, his only thought seems to have been to 
gain the line of the Maine, between Hanau and Mayence, 
where he might protect the territories of Southwest Ger- 
many. How far he was influenced by his own judgment, 
and how far by the Diet at Frankfort, is not known; but 
he abandoned his strong position at Schliichtern, and 
fell back to Frankfort, where he was joined by the de- 
tachments which had been left on the Lahn. Instead of 



112 

concentrating to oppose the Prussians, the allies thus vol- 
untarily widened the gap between their forces, and will- 
fully invited destruction. 

The Prussians entered Fulda on the 7th of July, and 
rested there one day. From Fulda, Von Falckenstein 
directed Von Goeben on Briickenau, and sent Von Beyer 
out on the Frankfort road to Schliichtern, Von Manteuffel 
occupying Fulda. The movement to Schliichtern was for 
the double purpose of making a feint towards Frankfort, 
and gaining a separate road for the advance of the divis- 
ion. From Schliichtern Von Beyer marched direct to the 
suburbs of Briickenau. Von Goeben marched through 
and beyond Briickenau, and Von Manteuffel, following, 
occupied the town. The Army of the Maine was now 
closely concentrated within nine miles of the Bavarians, 
who were extended along the Saale, from Neustadt to 
Hammelburg, occupying a line 225^ miles long. 

On July loth Von Falckenstein directed Von Beyer 
on Hammelburg and Von Goeben on Kissingen. Von 
Manteuffel was ordered to move on Waldaschach, and 
then to follow Von Goeben. The Bavarians were encoun- 
tered at Hammelburg and Kissingen, and defeated with 
some loss. Minor actions, with similar results, were 
fought on the same day at Friedrichshall, Hausen and 
Waldaschach, up the river from Kissingen. The Bavari- 
ans retreated to Schweinfurt and WiJrzburg, and the passes 
of the Saale remained in the hands of the Prussians. 

All military principles now dictated an advance 
against Schweinfurt, for the purpose of giving the Bava- 
rians a crushing defeat, and disposing of them altogether. 
Such a move would, doubtless, have been made by Von 
Falckenstein, had not political considerations been at this 
time paramount. The Prussian victories in Austria ren- 
dered it probable that peace conferences would soon be 
held; and, at the request of Bismarck, Von Falckenstein 
was notified that it was of political importance to be in 
actual possession of the country north of the Maine, as 
negotiations would probably soon take place on the statu 
quo basis. Von Falckenstein, therefore, decided to move 
against the VHIth Corps, for the purpose of clearing the 
right bank of the Maine entirely of the hostile forces. 

Prince Alexander, thoroughly alarmed at the condi- 
tion of affairs, now sought to form a junction with the 



113 

Bavarians at Wiirzburg, via Aschaffenburg and Gemiinden. 
As a preliminary to this movement, a Hessian brigade 
was sent to Aschaffenburg, to secure the passage of the 
Maine at that point, and to reconnoiter the Prussians. 
The contemplated movement was hopeless from the start, 
unless the Bavarians could render assistance by advanc- 
ing to Gemiinden; and, after the actions on the Saale, 
they were not in a condition to do so. As it was, Prince 
Alexander was endeavoring to cross the difficult moun- 
tain region between Aschaffenburg and Gemiinden, in the 
face of a victorious army, superior to his own in numbers 
and morale, to effect a junction with an ally who was un- 
able to lend him a helping hand. It was the height of 
folly; for the junction could have been easily and safely 
made south of the Maine. True, this would have necessi- 
tated the sacrifice of Frankfort; but defeat north of the 
Maine would compel the evacuation of the city, and de- 
feat was now practically invited. 

Turning away from the Bavarians, Von Falckenstein 
moved down the Maine; Von Goeben in advance, followed 
by Von Manteuffel, while Von Beyer moved, by way of 
the Kinzig valley, on Hanau. On July 13th the Hessian 
brigade was defeated by Von Goeben at Laufach, and fell 
back on Aschaffenburg, to which place reinforcements 
were hurried by Prince Alexander. On the following day 
the Vnith Corps was defeated by Von Goeben at Aschaf- 
fenburg. The brunt of the battle was borne by an Aus- 
trian brigade attached to the Federal Corps; but few 
troops of the Hessian contingents being engaged, and the 
Wiirtemberg and Baden troops arriving too late. Had 
Prince Alexander concentrated his entire force at Aschaf- 
fenburg, the result might have been bad for the Prussians, 
for their march was so unskillfuUy conducted that Von 
Goeben was without support; the other detachments of 
Von Falckenstein's army being more than thirty miles in 
rear. The Prussians did not pursue the enemy, but con- 
tented themselves with remaining in possession of the 
field. 

Prince Alexander was now convinced of the impossi- 
bility of effecting a junction at Wiirzburg via Aschaffen- 
burg. He accordingly abandoned the line of the Lower 
Maine and concentrated his force at Dieburg. Frankfort 
was thus left defenseless, and the remants of the German 
Diet fled to Augsburg. Prince Charles now proposed a 



114 

junction of the allies in the vicinity of Wiirzburg, the 
Vlllth Corps to move via Miltenberg and Tauberbischof- 
sheim, and the concentration to be effected on the 20th 
of July. This movement necessitated a march of some 
ninety miles for the Vlllth Corps, and the uncovering of 
Southwest Germany, while the Bavarians had to march 
only a few miles, and continued to cover their own terri- 
tories; but the imminent danger which now threatened 
the Vlllth Corps caused Prince Alexander to forget local 
and personal jealousies, and strive to effect the junction 
which the military situation imperatively demanded. 

On the i6th of July the Prussians entered Frankfort, 
where they remained until the 2ist: Von Goeben's division 
occupying the city. Von Beyer's division being stationed 
at Hanau, and Von M ant euff el's division holding Aschaf- 
fenburg. The entire region north of the Maine was in the 
possession of the Prussians. Frankfort had been espe- 
cially antagonistic to Prussia, and it now felt the full force 
of the severity of the conquerors. Von Falckenstein lev- 
ied a contribution of ^3,000,000 on the city, and soon fol- 
lowed this heavy exaction by a demand for a second 
enormous contribution of ^10,000,000. The King of Prus- 
sia, however, remitted the second contribution after hear- 
, ing the appeal and protest of the citizens. 

On the i6th of July Von Falckenstein was relieved 
from the Command of the Army of the Maine, and ap- 
pointed military governor of Bohemia. He was succeed- 
ed by Von Manteuffel, whose division was placed under 
command of Von Flies. Reinforcements now raised the 
Army of the Maine to a- strength of 50,000 men and 121 
guns. 

The capture of Frankfort and the possession of the 
country north of the Maine had been obtained at the sac- 
rifice of the great strategic advantage enjoyed by the 
Prussians. It was no longer possible to prevent the con- 
centration of the Vlllth Corps and the Bavarians, and on 
the 22d of July this junction was completed; the former 
corps holding the line of the Tauber, and the latter occu- 
pying a position between that river and Wiirzburg. 

Although the allied forces now numbered 80,000 men 
and 286 guns. Von Manteuffel decided to move against 
them from Frankfort. The advantage of the allies was in 
numbers alone; in viorale, and in the strategic situation, 
the advantage was with the Prussians. Von Manteuffel 



115 

now had a line of communication through Frankfort 
and Cassel. Though he could no longer keep the 
allies asunder, he could, by marching to the Tauber, com- 
pel them to "form front to a flank," while his own front 
securely covered his communications. His communica- 
tions could be intercepted only by a movement of the 
allies north of the Maine, which would reciprocally expose 
their own. 

The allies had hardly effected their junction, when a 
want of harmony in the views of their commanders again 
became evident. An offensive movement against the 
Prussians was agreed upon; but Prince Charles wished to 
move by the left bank of the Maine on Frankfort, while 
Prince Alexander preferred a movement by the right bank 
on Aschaffenburg. The former was, doubtless, the better 
move — at all events it was the safer; for the allies would 
have covered their communications better, and a junction 
might, perhaps, have been effected with the large garrison 
of Mayence — but, after two days of discussion and delib- 
eration, the latter movement was agreed upon. In the 
meantime, while the allies were deliberating. Von Man- 
teuffel was acting; and he was.now moving rapidly towards 
the Tauber. 

On July 23d the Prussians touched the enemy. A 
slight and indecisive action was fought by a Prussian ad- 
vanced-guard with the Baden division at Hundheim, and 
the advanced troops of the Vlllth Corps were pressed 
back along their whole line. While the Prussians were 
thus closing upon the Federal Corps, the Bavarians began 
the contemplated movement by the right bank of the 
Maine; one division being sent by rail to Gemiinden, 
another to Lohr (on the right bank, farther down), and 
part of a third to Wertheim. Thus the junction of the 
allies, which had been effected with such difficulty, was 
voluntarily broken at the very moment of contact with 
the enemy. The line of the allied forces, on the evening 
of July 23d, was 36 miles in extent; while Von Manteuffel's 
army was closely concentrated in their immediate front. 
Prince Alexander, finding himself beyond the immediate 
assistance of the Bavarians, withdrew all his detachments 
behind the Tauber, where his corps was spread over a 
space seven miles in breadth and nine in depth, in a coun- 
try full of deep ravines, which rendered prompt move- 
ments, especially of cavalry and artillery, quite out of the 
question. 



ii6 

On the 24th Von Goeben defeated the Wurtembergers 
at Tauberbischofsheim, and the Baden division at Wer- 
bach. The retreat of the Baden troops uncovered Prince 
Alexander's right flank, and there was now imminent dan- 
ger of the Prussians again pushing in and separating the 
Vlllth Corps from the Bavarians. Prince Alexander, 
therefore, fell back to Gerchsheim, and the Bavarians with- 
drew to Helmstadt. Prince Charles ordered the Vlllth 
Corps back to the line of the Tauber, though the Bavari- 
ans could render no immediate assistance. Prince Alex- 
ander, doubtless appreciating the folly of attempting, with- 
out reinforcements, to dislodge the victorious Prussians 
from a position which he had been unable to hold against 
them, seems to have paid no attention to the order, for 
he proceeded at once to concentrate his scattered divis- 
ions at Gerchsheim. 

On July 25th Von Goeben formed the right of the 
Prussian line. Von Beyer the center and Von Flies the 
left. Von Goeben was to attack the Vlllth Corps in front, 
while Von Beyer turned its right and cut it off from 
Wiirzburg. Von Flies was to keep his division concen- 
trated on the left; for nothing was known of the wherea- 
bouts of the Bavarians, and it was surmised that they 
might be somewhere in that direction. 

Von Beyer, moving against the Vlllth Corps, unex- 
pectedly encountered a Bavarian division at Helmstadt, 
and defeated it, after an engagement which lasted some 
hours. While the Prussians were resting on the field, after 
the action, a second Bavarian division suddenly appeared 
on the crest of a hill in the rear of Von Beyer's left wing. 
So completely was Von Beyer without information as to 
the position of the Bavarians, that he was in doubt whether 
these troops were friend or foe. The Bavarians were in a 
similar quandary. In fact, they had accidentally stumbled 
upon the Prussians, and the surprise was mutual. As 
soon as he discovered that he was in the presence of a 
hostile force. Von Beyer executed a change of front to 
the left, and succeeded in gaining another victory. 

While Von Beyer was engaged with the Bavarians, 
Von Goeben was battling with the Vlllth Corps at Gerch- 
sheim. Prince Alexander was again defeated, and driven 
in rout on Wiirzburg. 

The night after these actions Prince Charles held a 
council of war, and finally decided to attack Von Flies, 



117 

who, having advanced, was now on the Prussian left. 
Learning, however, that his own left had been uncovered 
by the defeat of the Vlllth Corps, the Bavarian com- 
mander resolved to stand on the defensive on the plateau 
of Waldbiittelbriinn (in rear of Rossbriinn*), and ordered 
Prince Alexander to take up a position immediately in 
front of Wiirzburg, to cover the retreat of the army across 
the Maine, should such a movement be necessary. 

About 3 o'clock on the morning of July 26th, a sim- 
ultaneous attempt of the Bavarians and Von Flies to oc- 
cupy some commanding ground which lay between the 
outposts, brought on an action at Rossbriinn. While Von 
Flies was engaged with the Bavarians, Von Beyer struck 
them heavily on the flank, and by 10 o'clock the Bavari- 
ans were in full retreat. The Prussians did not attempt 
a pursuit, and by i o'clock, p. m.. Prince Charles had ral- 
lied and concentrated his corps on the plateau of Wald- 
biittelbriinn. In the meantime the Vlllth Corps had 
crossed the Maine. 

The position of the Bavarians was now full of peril. 
Their allies had been defeated, and were glad to place a 
river between themselves and the Prussians. The Bava- 
rians were, consequently, alone on the left bank of the 
Maine; their losses had been considerable; their inorale\\dJS> 
shattered; their retreat across the defiles of the Maine was 
insecure; and a defeat in their present position meant ab- 
solute ruin. The Prussian Official History says: "A re- 
newed attack on the part of the Prussian main forces would 
necessarily have forced it [the Bavarian Corps] to a strug- 
gle for life or death. The political situation of affairs 
showed no reason for bringing on so desperate a combat. 
The only object henceforth was to occupy as much terri- 
tory of the allies as possible, in order to facilitate peace 
negotiations with them, and maneuvering against the ene- 
my's left flank would oblige him to retreat without any 
hard struggle." This apology for a failure to complete the 
defeat of a shattered and unsupported hostile force seems 
somewhat disingenuous. A complete defeat and surrender 
of the Bavarians would have been quickly followed by the 
capture or dispersion of the Vlllth Corps, and the entire 
South-German territory would have been at the mercy of 
the Prussians. Certainly such a condition of affairs would 

*Rossbrunn is not marked on the map. It is about 7 miles due west of Wiirz- 
burg. 



ii8 

have "facilitated peace negotiations" by rendering further 
resistance hopeless. Moreover, the same history states 
that the retreat of the Vlllth Corps behind the Maine 
was not known at the Prussian headquarters; and it seems 
probable that inefficient performance of outpost and re- 
connoissance duties on the part of the Prussians, rather 
than any considerations of politics or magnanimity, 
saved the Bavarians from destruction. Late in the day, 
Prince Charles withdrew across the Maine. 

On July 27th the Prussians moved on Wiirzburg. 
Their artillery exchanged shots with the citadel of Marien- 
berg (on the left bank of the Maine, opposite Wiirzburg), 
and succeeded in setting fire to the arsenal, but withdrew 
without effecting anything of moment. 

The contending armies now faced each other, each 
in an almost impregnable position. The situation was, 
however, altogether in favor of the Prussians. Their 
communications were secure, while the communications 
of the allies with Hesse, Baden and Wiirtemburg were 
intercepted, and those with Bavaria were endangered, by 
the position of the Army of the Maine. Moreover, the 
Prussian lid Reserve Corps had moved from Saxony via 
Leipsic, Plauen and Hof, and was now approaching Bai- 
reuth. In the language of the Prussian Official History: 
"The position of the Bavarian army at Wiirzburg had now 
become untenable. It could only extricate itself from its 
present position either by assuming the offensive against 
the Prussian army — which was scarcely possible at this 
point — or by a retrograde, movement up the Maine, so as 
to face the army to the north and re-establish its base on 
the Bavarian territory in its rear." 

But the bitterness of extreme defeat was not pushed 
home to the allies; for on July 28th news of the peace 
preliminaries between Prussia and Austria, and of an 
armistice with Bavaria, was received. Though the truce 
with Bavaria was not to go into effect until August 2d,, 
hostilities were suspended, the only movement of im- 
portance being the occupation of Nuremberg by the Prus- 
sian lid Reserve Corps. 

Peace was concluded on August 13th with Wiirtem- 
berg, on the 17th with Baden, and on the 22d with Bavaria. 



119 

It is hardly possible to contemplate the operations 
of the armies in Western Germany, in 1866, with any feel- 
ing of admiration. In the strategical operations of Von 
Falckenstein and Von Manteuffel are found the only re- 
deeming features of the campaign. Von Falckenstein 
especially, in pushing in between the two armies of the 
allies, and defeating them in succession, displayed gener- 
alship of no mean order; but the want of harmony between 
the allied leaders removed every obstacle from the path 
of Prussian success. The Prussians seem to have been 
often completely in the dark as to the designs, and even 
in regard to the positions, of the allies. We find the 
Army of the Maine waiting, in a defensive position, nearly 
two days, in ignorance of its own victory at Wiesenthal. 
We find the Prussians winning a victory at Aschaffenburg, 
when their own unskillful march invited a defeat, and 
their success was due solely to the greater blunders of 
their opponents. Before, and even during, the battle of 
Helmstadt the Prussians seem to have been in complete 
ignorance of the position and movements of Prince 
Charles, and Von Beyer's escape from disaster when sur- 
prised by the Bavarians, was due solely to the fact that 
the surprise was accidental and mutual. Advanced-guard, 
outpost and reconnoissance duties seem to have been 
performed with the grossest inefificiency. In almost every 
action the Prussians seem to have been unaware of the 
extent of their victory, or to have shown an incapacity to 
organize a pursuit. Gneisenau and his famous order to 
"pursue to the last breath of horse and man" seem to 
have been forgotten in the Army of the Maine; and we 
find Prince Charles, after the battle of Rossbriinn, quietly 
slipping back, without molestation, to an almost impreg- 
nable position, when a simple frontal attack by the Prus- 
sians would have completed the discomfiture and insured 
the destruction of the Bavarian army. 

As to the allies, every adverse criticism that can be 
made on their opponents, applies to them in a still higher 
degree. Their leaders rarely rose to the level of respec- 
table mediocrity. The junction of the allied corps, which 
was imperative from the first, was made only when they 
were practically herded together by the movements of 
the Prussians. As soon as they had been forced into the 
long-desired junction, they voluntarily undertook an ill- 
advised movement which separated them again, at the 



120 

very moment of their contact with the enemy. Incapacity 
and jealousy were characteristics of both the allied com- 
manders; and to these defects Prince Alexander added 
the greater fault of insubordination. . It would be hard to 
find among the improvised "political generals" who ap- 
peared on the stage of war in the earlier part of the 
American conflict, a single one who possessed in a greater 
degree than Prince Charles or Prince Alexander a genius 
for blundering — an eminent capacity for invariably doing 
the wrong thing. It may be said of the two generals of 
the allied armies, that their operations afford a fine dem- 
onstration of the principles of war by the method of 
reductio ad absurduni, 

APPENDIX III. 

THE OPERATIONS IN ITALY. 

Only a brief mention of the operations in Italy is 
here necessary. On the night of the 23d of June, 1866, 
the Italian army crossed the Mincio, and encountered the 
Austrians at Custozza on the next day. The Italian army, 
numbering about 120,000 men, was under the nominal 
command of King Victor Emmanuel, the real commander 
being General La Marmora. The Austrians, numbering 
about 72,000, were commanded by Archduke Albrecht. 
The battle resulted in the defeat of the Italians, who 
withdrew across the Mincio. The Austrian commander 
remained on the defensive. 

Garibaldi, with about 6,000 volunteers, invaded the 
Tyrol, but was defeated in two small actions. Though 
he finally succeeded in gaining a foothold on Austrian 
soil, his operations were of no importance. 

On the 20th of July the Austrian fleet, under Teget- 
hoff, defeated the Italian fleet in the great naval battle of 
Lissa, in which the Italians lost three iron clads. 

Immediately after the battle of Koniggratz, Venetia 
was offered by Austria to the French Emperor, and the 
Vth and IXth Corps were recalled to the Danube. The 
Italians, under the command of Cialdini, again advanced, 
and the Austrians (now numbering scarcely 30,000) fell 
back to the neighborhood of Venice. On the 25th of July 
all military operations were stopped by the conclusion of 
an armistice. 

The Italians had everywhere suffered defeat. Yet 
their alliance was of the utmost advantage to Prussia; for 
they neutralized three army corps, which would have 
been of priceless value to the Austrians in Bohemia. 



121 



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE. 



In the preparation of this work the following books 
have been consulted: ' 

"The Campaign of 1866 in Germany," by the Prussian 
Staff. 

Hozier's "Seven Weeks' War." 

Derrecagaix's ''La Guerre ModerneT 

Adams' "Great Campaigns in Europe." 

Lewis' "History of Germany." 

Jomini's "Art of War." 

Hamley's "Operations of War." 

Von der Goltz's "The Nation in Arms." 

Chesney's "Essays in Military Biography." 

Brackenbury's "Field Works." 

Home's ''Precis of Modern Tactics." 

Clery's "Minor Tactics." 

Maude's "Tactics and Organization." 

Prince Hohenlohe's "Letters on Cavalry." 

Prince Hohenlohe's "Letters on Artillery." 

Trench's "Cavalry in Modern War." 

Scribner's "Army and Navy in the Civil War." 

"Battles and Leaders of the Civil War." 

Swinton's "Army of the Potomac." 

Memoirs of Gen. U. S. Grant. 

Memoirs of Gen. W. T. Sherman. 

Capt. F. V. Greene's Essay on "The Important Im- 
provements in the Art of War, etc." 

Capt. J. R. Lumly's Essay on "Mounted Riflemen." 

The quotations from Baron Stoffel and Capt. May 
are taken from Home's "Precis of Modern Tactics." 



